



المركز الفلسطيني للتنمية والحريات الإعلامية «مدم»
Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms (MADA)

Press Freedom Index in Palestine 2025

(The Seventh Annual Index)

May 2026





PRESS FREEDOM INDEX IN PALESTINE 2025

(The Seventh Annual Index)

May 2026

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Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms “MADA”

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PRESS FREEDOM INDEX IN PALESTINE 2025

Executive Summary

The Press Freedom Index in Palestine constitutes a periodic assessment of the state of press freedom through a numerical expression of progress and regression in press freedom reality in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. To accomplish this, the Index employs seventy-two indicators to calculate the index score for the period under study (2025), with indicator data collected in 2026. The Palestinian Center for Media Freedoms (MADA) has been developing press freedom measurement indicators for Palestine since 2018 through 2025, adopting them to gauge the level of advance or decline in press freedom across the country. These indicators measure press freedom in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The 2025 West Bank Press Freedom Index was constructed on the basis of the 2024 Palestine Press Freedom Index framework comprising seventy-two indicators distributed across eight domains: (1) Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom; (2) Legal and Societal Restrictions on Press Freedom; (3) Operational Independence of Media Outlets; (4) Media and Content Diversity; (5) Self-Censorship and Government Measures; (6) Funding Policies; (7) Transparency and Access to Information; and (8) Self-Regulation of Journalists and Their Protection.


The Index relies on several information sources to arrive at its scores, including Palestinian legislation, reports issued by MADA documenting press freedom violations in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and an opinion poll of two hundred-two (202) Palestinian journalists working in both regions.

These indicators were adopted to measure progress and regression in press freedom in Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip), conducting a comprehensive analysis of freedom levels across both geographic zones and comparing them with results from prior years. However, during 2023 and 2024, the Index was measured exclusively in the West Bank due to the genocidal war being waged against our Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, rendering the study impossible under the prevailing conditions, due to thousands of martyrs and wounded, including dozens of journalists killed during the war, making press freedom conditions the worst not only in Gaza compared to previous years but at the global level. This precluded a comprehensive analysis of press freedoms in Gaza during those years, as had previously been carried out across both regions simultaneously. To reassess developments in press freedom, MADA has reinstated coverage of both the West Bank and Gaza Strip as before the genocide; the seventh edition of the Index has thus resumed operations across both regions.

» Key Index Results for 2025

The Palestine Press Freedom Index for the period covered by this report (1 January 2025 – 31 December 2025) scored four hundred-one (401), a score falling at the lower bound of the “Sensitive” classification, indicating that press freedom conditions remain concerning and hampered by interventions restricting journalistic freedoms. The West Bank sub-index scored three hundred seventy-three (373), placing press freedom in the “Difficult” classification, while the Gaza Strip sub-index scored four hundred fifty-one (451), situating it within the “Sensitive” classification according to the progress ratings of the Palestine Press Freedom Index.


Overall Score of the Palestine Press Freedom Index



The detailed results of the seventy-two indicators for 2025 reveal considerable variation in scores across all indicators. While two indicators attained the maximum score of 1,000 and three indicators received a score of zero — the lowest possible score — sixty-four indicators (89% of all indicators) scored within the 'Low,' 'Difficult,' or 'Sensitive' classifications (i.e., 600 or below). In contrast, eight indicators (11%) scored within the 'Good' or 'High' classifications.

Results by press freedom domain reveal limited variation across press freedom classifications. Five of the eight domains constituting the Index were classified as 'Difficult': (1) Media and Content Diversity, (2) Government and Self-Censorship, (3) Funding Policies, (4) Transparency and Access to Information, and (5) Self-Regulation of Journalists. Three domains received a 'sensitive' classification: (1) Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom, (2) Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom, and (3) Operational Independence of Media Outlets.


Comparison of Domain Scores Between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip



The West Bank press freedom domains were distributed between two classifications 'Difficult' and 'Sensitive'. Two domains received a 'Sensitive' rating: (1) Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom and (2) Operational Independence of Media Outlets, while the remaining six domains were classified as 'Difficult'. Conversely, in the Gaza Strip, six domains received a 'Sensitive' classification: (1) Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom, (2) Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom, (3) Operational Independence of Media Outlets, (4) Media and Content Diversity, (5) Funding Policies, and (6) Self-Regulation of Journalists. Two domains were classified as 'Difficult': (1) Government and Self-Censorship and (2) Transparency and Access to Information.

Comparative analysis across the seven readings of the Index indicates that the 2025 Press Freedom Index score increased by twenty-seven (27) points compared with the 2022 Index score. Nevertheless, the Index has shown a sustained downward trajectory since 2020, with the 2025 score declining by ninety-three (93) points relative to the 2020 score (401 compared with 494). The 2025 result also represents a decrease of eighty-three (83) points compared with the baseline assessment conducted in 2018. Taken together, these trends reflect a persistent and significant deterioration in the state of press freedom in Palestine.

Comparison of Press Freedom Index Scores Across the Seven Assessments



Comparison of Press Freedom Index Domain Scores in Palestine Across Different Years

The domain scores comprising the Press Freedom Index in Palestine recorded a sustained decline in 2025 compared with their 2022 levels across seven key domains: (1) legal guarantees for press freedom; (2) legal restrictions on press freedom; (3) operational independence of media outlets; (4) funding policies; (5) the operational independence of media outlets; (6) governmental and self-censorship; and (7) transparency and access to information. By contrast, the score for the journalists' self-regulation domain improved.

The findings across the domains of the Press Freedom Index indicate that four domains recorded higher scores in 2025 compared to their scores in 2022, namely: (1) Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom, which increased by seventy-nine (79) points (480 versus 401); (2) Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom, which increased by sixty-four (64) points (430 versus 366); (3) Operational Independence of Media Outlets, which increased by thirty-one (31) points (450 versus 419); and (4) Funding Policies, which increased by ninety-four (94) points (390 versus 296).

Conversely, four domains recorded lower scores in 2025 compared to their scores in 2022, namely: (1) Operational Independence of Media Outlets, which decreased by twenty-seven (27) points (390 vs. 417); (2) Government Censorship and Self-Censorship, which decreased by nine (9) points (330 vs. 339); (3) Transparency and Access to Information, which decreased by twenty-five (25) points (340 vs. 365); and (4) Journalists' Self-Regulation, which decreased by seven (7) points (400 vs. 407).

Press Freedom Domain Score Comparison — Palestine (by Year)

Domain	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025
Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom	406	354	413	401	480
Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom	463	479	485	366	430
Operational Independence of Media Outlets	565	470	552	419	450
Media Outlets and Content Diversity	481	455	447	417	390
Government and Self-Censorship	515	501	546	339	330
Funding Policies	457	433	516	296	390
Transparency and Access to Information	465	490	454	365	340
Self-Regulation of Journalists	588	581	529	407	400

At the level of the West Bank, three domains recorded higher scores in 2025 compared to their scores in 2024, albeit at varying degrees, namely: Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom, Operational Independence of Media Outlets, and Funding Policies. Conversely, five domains recorded lower scores at varying degrees, namely: Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom, Media Outlets and Content Diversity, Government Censorship and Self-Censorship, Transparency and Access to Information, and Journalists' Self-Regulation

Press Freedom Domain Score Comparison — West Bank (by Year)

Domain	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2025
Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom	415	344	430	412	313	317	480
Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom	471	477	577	411	384	454	350
Operational Independence of Media Outlets	569	447	572	410	348	344	430
Media Outlets and Content Diversity	478	435	436	424	420	454	360
Government and Self-Censorship	543	520	583	343	357	330	310
Funding Policies	459	432	515	296	321	300	370
Transparency and Access to Information	458	493	467	370	365	355	350
Self-Regulation of Journalists	618	588	533	401	370	361	330

In the Gaza Strip, all eight domains recorded higher scores in 2025 compared to their scores in 2022. However, six domains continued to register scores below those achieved in previous readings, namely: Operational Independence of Media Outlets, Media Outlets and Content Diversity, Government Censorship and Self-Censorship, Funding Policies, Transparency and Access to Information, and Journalists' Self-Regulation. Meanwhile, two of the eight domains attained their highest scores since the Index was first launched in 2018.

Press Freedom Domain Score Comparison — Gaza Strip (by Year)

Domain	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025
Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom	438	376	383	384	500
Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom	446	487	476	537	540
Operational Independence of Media Outlets	559	502	513	447	500
Media Outlets and Content Diversity	490	479	470	406	440
Government and Self-Censorship	465	476	476	328	380
Funding Policies	440	437	512	298	420
Transparency and Access to Information	475	483	429	317	320
Self-Regulation of Journalists	543	566	523	417	510

» Recommendations

The findings of the Palestine Press Freedom Index call for a collective effort by the government, the Palestinian Journalists Syndicate, civil society organizations, and international organizations active in this field to address the identified shortcomings, with a view to strengthening the environment for journalistic work and restoring the capacities of journalists, particularly those who have suffered severe losses as a result of the genocidal war in Gaza. Recommendations are organized by responsible party, given the complex and interrelated circumstances, constraints, and factors affecting the journalistic and media landscape in Palestine.

1. Recommendations Addressed to the Palestinian Government

1. **Halt Assaults on Journalists:** The government and its security services must cease the practice of arresting, assaulting, or destroying the equipment of journalists, and must adopt deterrent measures against all those who perpetrate such violations.
2. **Enact a Right to Access Information Law:** There is an urgent need to pass legislation guaranteeing the right to access information, with the necessary mechanisms to ensure its effective implementation.
3. **Amend the Cybercrime Law to Remove Restrictions on Press Freedom:** Legislative provisions permitting the blocking of websites without a judicial order must be repealed, and legislation guaranteeing press freedom in conformity with the Palestinian Basic Law must be adopted.
4. **Align Domestic Legislation with International Standards:** Expedite the harmonization of domestic legislation with international standards on freedom of expression, as stipulated in the international conventions to which the State of Palestine is a signatory.
5. **Engage Journalists and Civil Society Organizations:** Journalists and civil society organizations must be included in all official discussions concerning amendments to press freedom laws or the enactment of new, related legislation.
6. **Expedite Judicial Proceedings:** Judicial proceedings in cases involving press freedom must be accelerated, with the appointment of specialized judges to adjudicate cases involving the prosecution of journalists for their professional conduct, and respect for press freedom must be guaranteed.

7. **Establish an Independent Media Council:** An independent supreme media council, autonomous from government influence, must be established to uphold press freedom and regulate the media sector.
8. **Review Government Financial Policies Toward the Media:** Financial policies imposed on media outlets, including fees and taxes, must be reviewed, and emergency financial assistance must be provided to media institutions at risk of closure due to financial crises or those that sustained destruction as a result of the genocidal war in Gaza.
9. **Establish a Specialized Government Center:** A dedicated government center must be created to receive and follow up on complaints relating to attacks on journalists, with a commitment to conduct thorough investigations and referring perpetrators to the judiciary.
10. **Protect the Rights of Journalists upon Media Outlet Closure:** The rights of journalists working in media outlets that may be subject to closure must be protected, and the Companies Law must be reviewed to ensure that the rights of workers are guaranteed in the event of such closures.
11. **Public Prosecution Investigations into Complaints:** The Public Prosecution must complete rigorous investigations into all submitted complaints and refer files to the competent judicial authorities upon completion of the investigation to ensure accountability for those responsible for violations.
12. **Hold General Elections:** There is an urgent need to proceed with general presidential and legislative elections, as the separation of powers and the organization of elections contribute to creating an enabling environment for respect for freedom of expression.

2. Recommendations Addressed to the Journalists Syndicate

1. **Hold Regular Syndicate Elections:** Free, fair, and regular periodic elections must be conducted within the Palestinian Journalists Syndicate, as the official representative body of journalists.
2. **Activate the Syndicate's Role in Protecting Journalists' Rights:** The Syndicate must fulfill its mandate of defending journalists' rights and representing them before the relevant authorities, particularly in cases of arbitrary treatment or arrest by security or legal bodies.
3. **Provide Training and Professional Development Programs:** Efforts must be made to enhance the capacities and professional skills of Palestinian journalists in the areas of journalism and modern media technologies, thereby contributing to the development of their professional performance and updating their knowledge.
4. **Activate Complaint and Grievance Mechanisms:** An effective mechanism must be established within the Syndicate enabling journalists to submit complaints and grievances in cases of threats or harassment, with a commitment to rigorous follow-up and accountability for all those who attack journalists.
5. **Strengthen Cooperation with International Organizations:** Cooperation with international human rights and press freedom organizations must be enhanced to shed light on violations affecting Palestinian journalists and to support international efforts to pressure the occupation into improving the state of the press in Palestine.

6. **Protect Journalists in Conflict Zones:** Mechanisms must be put in place to protect journalists working in conflict and tension areas, including the provision of personal protective equipment and health insurance for field correspondents.
7. **Reinforce Journalistic Unity:** Coordination and cooperation among various Palestinian journalistic and media institutions must be promoted with a view to consolidating efforts in addressing common challenges, whether legal or professional.
8. **Monitor Media Outlets' Compliance with Professional Standards:** As part of its role in developing the Palestinian media landscape, the Syndicate should enhance its monitoring of the performance of local media outlets, ensuring adherence to professional journalism standards and ethics, and holding any media outlet that violates these standards accountable.

3. Recommendations Addressed to Palestinian Civil Society Organizations

1. **Raise Public Awareness of Journalists' Rights:** Launch public awareness campaigns on journalists' rights and the imperative of protecting press freedom as an integral component of civil and political rights, emphasizing its linkage to the freedom of society as a whole, and clarifying the role of journalism in strengthening democracy and community participation, through lectures and educational seminars in schools and universities.
2. **Establish an International Solidarity Network:** Establish an international solidarity network comprising journalists, human rights organizations, and global media institutions to support Palestinian journalists in confronting restrictions and assaults, and to provide media and logistical support in the event of threats or arrests.
3. **Strengthen the Role of Community Oversight and Accountability Regarding Press Freedom Violations:** This can be achieved through independent documentation of violations and their referral to the competent local authorities.
4. **Advocate for Comprehensive Legal Reform:** Including the enactment of a right to access information law and amendments to laws restricting freedom of expression and journalistic work.
5. **Expand Psychosocial Support Programs for Journalists:** These programs should address the psychological impact of conditions of war and the continuous psychological pressures to which journalists are subjected.
6. **Build Effective Partnerships with Syndicates and Media Institutions:** Implement collective protection initiatives and promote a culture of reporting and advocacy.
7. **Empower Women Journalists:** Develop dedicated programs to enhance their participation and combat gender-based discrimination or violence in the journalistic work environment.
8. **Monitor the Performance of Official and Media Authorities from a Rights-Based Perspective:** And engage actively with press freedom reports and indices to promote transparency and change.
9. **Contribute to Training Journalists in Professional and Digital Safety:** To address growing surveillance and cybersecurity risks.

4. Recommendations Addressed to the International Community

1. Support Palestinian civil society efforts to promote press freedom and provide sustainable funding for training programs, professional protection, and legal awareness.
2. Assist the Journalists Syndicate and media freedom institutions in developing monitoring tools and national freedom of expression indicators.
3. Encourage the Palestinian government to align its legislation with international media freedom standards through legal advisory services and policy reform partnerships.
4. Support the adoption of a right to access information law, as one of the fundamental benchmarks in governance and openness reports and link it to international support programs.
5. Provide technical support for the development of independent national press freedom indicators, as a tool for internal accountability and to inform regional and international reports.
6. Fund initiatives aimed at reducing self-censorship and societal pressures on journalists through public education and advocacy campaigns.
7. Promote exchange of expertise between Palestinian and international media institutions to support media Operational Independence and diversity.

Introduction

The Press Freedom Index in Palestine constitutes a periodic assessment of the state of press freedom through a numerical expression of progress and regression in press freedom conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. To accomplish this, the Index employs seventy-two indicators to calculate the index score for the period under study (2025), with indicator data collected in 2026.

The Palestinian Center for Media Freedoms (MADA) has been developing press freedom measurement indicators for Palestine (the West Bank including Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip) for the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022, adopting them to gauge the level of advance or decline in press freedom across the country. These indicators measure press freedom in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They were adopted to assess progress and regression in press freedom in Palestine (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), conducting a comprehensive analysis of freedom levels across both geographic zones and comparing results with prior years. However, during 2023 and 2024 specifically, the Index was measured exclusively in the West Bank due to the genocidal war being waged against our Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, with thousands of martyrs and wounded, including hundreds of journalists killed during the war, rendering study in Gaza impossible and making press freedom conditions the worst not only in Gaza but at the global level. This precluded a comprehensive analysis of press freedoms in Gaza during those years.

MADA's press freedom measurement methodology is based on temporal comparison within the same geographic area from one year to the next, taking into account relevant international indices, particularly those used by Press House and Reporters Without Borders, and UNESCO's Media Development Indicators, along with expert determinations of what is appropriate for measuring press freedom in Palestine, following the revision and reformulation of these indicators and the addition of a new set of indicators of particular importance and weight in measuring press freedom in Palestine.

The study focused on monitoring indicators related to Palestinian performance and measures taken for the respect of, or the hindrance of, press freedom. It excluded performance and measures attributable to the Israeli occupation, such as those related to legislation and numerous practices for which information cannot be collected and instead tracked Israeli violations of press freedom within MADA's annual report for 2025.

What distinguishes the methodology of the Palestine Press Freedom Index is that it is built on temporal comparison across different periods, each spanning one year, rather than cross-country comparisons, and it focuses exclusively on Palestinian affairs, which facilitates the use of its findings to adopt policies and measures contributing to the promotion of press freedom.

The Palestine Press Freedom Index pursues multiple objectives, chief among which are three primary goals:

1. Informing the public and stakeholders about the extent of freedom of expression.
2. Enabling the quantitative measurement of institutional variables, procedures, and measures, so that these variables can be examined across different time periods, thereby allowing real-time monitoring of regression and/or progress in each domain.
3. Assisting decision-makers, in government and civil society institutions, in identifying the gaps requiring intervention to strengthen freedom of expression and to counter attacks on media sector workers in general.

Methodology

1. Adoption of Index Indicators

The Index emerged from extensive discussions involving human rights institutions, academics, journalists, and statistical experts over a prolonged period. These discussions focused on the nature of the indicators adopted to measure press freedom across the themes and classifications, ensuring that indicators are measurable and amenable to annual comparison, that their results can be converted into numerical scores and weights, that the weight of each indicator is appropriate, that indicators are distributed across headings, issues, and groups, that the weight of each group relative to the overall score is defined, and that the information sources for each indicator are determined according to a specific weighting methodology. The Index contains seventy-two (72) indicators, and in accordance with the scoring and weighting methodology, it was agreed that scores for each indicator range between (0), the lowest possible score, and (1,000)¹.

2. Data Collection Mechanism

Data collection employs various methods appropriate to each indicator, with information obtained from primary sources as well as sources active in the field of press freedom in Palestine, to preserve the accuracy and credibility of each indicator. Key sources include:

1. Civil society institutions active in press freedom in Palestine and international institutions, particularly for information related to qualitative indicators.
2. Questionnaires for the collection of data related to quantitative indicators: a dedicated questionnaire for media outlet employees and a separate questionnaire for media institution directors/owners.

3. Indicator Weighting Mechanism

The Index has a single primary numerical value expressing press freedom in Palestine for the period under study, but it also encompasses seventy-two (72) individual indicators, each with a score expressing the status of that specific indicator. Sub-indices were also adopted to contribute to a broader understanding of the Press Freedom Index across its eight domains: (1) Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom; (2) Legal and Societal Restrictions on Press Freedom; (3) Operational Independence of Media Outlets; (4) Media Outlets and

¹ By referring to the annexes, specifically the Indicators and Scoring Table, which details the number of indicators per domain and their corresponding scores.

Content Diversity; (5) Self-Censorship and Government Measures; (6) Funding Policies; (7) Transparency and Access to Information; (8) Self-Regulation of Journalists and Their Protection.

The domain on Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom comprises eight (8) indicators; Legal and Societal Restrictions on Press Freedom contains fourteen (14) indicators; Operational Independence of Media Outlets contains seven (7); Media and Content Diversity contains seven (7); Self-Censorship and Government Measures contains eight (8); Funding Policies contains nine (9); Transparency and Access to Information contains eight (8); and Self-Regulation of Journalists and Their Protection contains eleven (11) indicators.

The Index indicators adopt an equal weighting per indicator of $(100/72 = 1.3888)$, with each domain's contribution to the overall score calculated according to the number of indicators assigned to it.

Distribution of Indicators by Domain, Classification, and Contribution Percentage

Domain	No. of Indicators		Total	Domain Weight
	Legislation	Practices		
Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom	5	3	8	11.11%
Legal and Societal Restrictions on Press Freedom	2	12	14	19.45%
Operational Independence of Media Outlets	2	5	7	9.72%
Media Outlets and Content Diversity	1	6	7	9.72%
Self-Censorship and Government Measures	0	8	8	11.11%
Funding Policies	3	6	9	12.5%
Transparency and Access to Information	2	6	8	11.11%
Self-Regulation of Journalists and Their Protection	1	10	11	15.28%
Total	17	55	72	100%

4. Indicator Weighting

Following a review of assessment methods and consultation with a number of technical and statistical experts, a scoring mechanism close to, but slightly different from, that used by Reporters Without Borders was adopted, in order to ensure that the values employed are more aligned with the Palestinian cultural context. A review of indicator scores reveals that they range from (0) to (1,000), indicating that the indicator selection process has succeeded in incorporating a wide variety of types and categories, allowing for the measurement of different aspects of press freedom in Palestine. Based on a review of these variations and the range they encompass, we have classified the scores according to their capacity to provide a meaningful picture of the extent to which the Index contributes to measuring the effectiveness of press freedom. This review led to the adoption of the classification presented in the table below, in which five grades have been identified, each assigned a distinct color code.


Table (4): Score Classification by Level of Progress in the Palestine Press Freedom Index

Color	Lower Grade	Upper Grade	Classification
	801	1000	High
	601	800	Good
	401	600	sensitive
	201	400	Difficult
	00	200	Low

Study Implementation Steps

The first step involved holding meetings to discuss the study’s objectives and implementation timeline, defining deliverables for each phase, reviewing and refining the methodology proposed by MADA, and identifying the study’s target population. The implementation plan for the survey and its timeline was also discussed. These meetings addressed study expectations as well as needs and challenges related to implementation, including key stakeholders to be engaged.

The main activities of the study were organized under four general phases.




Index Results for 2025

» 1. Press Freedom Index in Palestine

The 2025 Palestine Press Freedom Index results reveal the following main features:

- A. The Palestine Press Freedom Index for the reporting period (1 January 2025 – 31 December 2025) scored 401, a score falling at the lower bound of the ‘sensitive’ classification, indicating that press freedom conditions remain concerning and beset by interventions curtailing journalistic freedoms. The West Bank sub-index scored 373, placing press freedom in the ‘Difficult’ classification, while the Gaza Strip sub-index scored 451, situating it within the Sensitive classification.**



B. Indicators Rated ‘Low’ (0–200): Ten indicators (14%) received a ‘Low’ rating, relating to the following principal issues:

1. 1.2 Alignment of national legislation with international instruments guaranteeing press freedom.
2. 1.4 Criminalization of incitement by government officials against media outlets.
3. 2.9 Compensation by public authorities for material damage sustained due to attacks on journalistic equipment.
4. 2.10 Punitive measures taken against persons who attacked me or a colleague at work.
5. 2.11 Systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists or media outlet owners on account of writing and/or broadcasting.
6. 4.7 Extent of coverage by various media outlets of issues related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds.
7. 5.8 Use of coded language and alternative terms on social media platforms to avoid censorship and/or removal of content by these platforms.
8. 6.5 Allocation of government advertising budgets to media outlets in a fair manner.
9. 7.1 Existence of a Right to Access Information Law.
10. 7.2 Existence of laws and legislation enabling journalists’ access to information.

C. Indicators Rated 'Difficult' (201–400): Twenty-eight indicators (39% of all indicators) received a 'Difficult' rating, relating to the following subjects:

1. 1.7 Whether the Cybercrime Law has enhanced press freedom.
2. 2.6 Imposition of restrictions on or prohibition of coverage of public events by journalists.
3. 2.12 Defamation, incitement, or libel against journalists online on account of publishing sensitive reports.
4. 2.13 Restrictive measures taken by official authorities, such as closure and/or blocking, against media outlets in 2025.
5. 3.1 Licensing laws that allow government control over media outlets.
6. 3.2 Licensing procedures that impede the operation and establishment of independent media outlets.
7. 3.4 Whether official media outlets enjoy editorial Operational Independence and cover news of all segments of the population.
8. 4.1 Monopolization of access to information by a number of media outlets and influential figures.
9. 4.3 Existence of monopoly in the provision of internet and/or telecommunications services.
10. 4.4 Availability of internet access to all, at low cost and with adequate quality.
11. 4.6 Diversity of sources, information, and content related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds.
12. 5.2 Refusal by media outlets to publish journalistic material for fear of prosecution by public authorities.
13. 5.3 Publication of news on websites and subsequent retraction.
14. 5.4 Exposure of journalists to family and/or social pressure on account of publishing information.
15. 5.5 Subjection of writers and/or editors to official or societal threats on account of publication.
16. 5.6 Existence of blacklists of individuals and/or institutions prohibited from appearing on various or certain media outlets.
17. 6.2 Imposition of value-added tax on the purchase of paper and/or newsprint, broadcasting equipment, and other media equipment.
18. 6.3 Existence of restrictions on foreign funding and/or support for media outlets.
19. 6.4 Fair government financial support to media outlets based on market share or advertising revenue.
20. 6.8 Whether journalists' and other media professionals' wage levels are sufficiently high to deter bribery.
21. 7.3 Clarity of restrictions imposed on access to information.
22. 7.4 Existence of official spokespersons who provide information to journalists smoothly and promptly.

23. 8.2 Dismissal or restrictions imposed on media employees due to advertiser objections to their journalistic work.
24. 8.4 Operational Independence of representative bodies of media workers from government and political party influence.
25. 8.5 Whether the journalists' representative body demonstrates professionalism and Operational Independence in its work.
26. 8.7 Freedom of official media workers to join 'representative bodies' of journalists.
27. 8.8 Degree of representation of the media workers' representative body.
28. 8.10 Degree of involvement of the media workers' representative body in formulating policies and general directives.

D. Indicators Rated 'sensitive' (401–600): Twenty-six indicators (36% of all indicators) received a Sensitive rating, relating to the following subjects:

1. 1.5 Imposition of legal restrictions on the coverage of ethnic, religious, and/or national security issues.
2. 1.6 Existence of procedures and directives permitting journalists freedom of movement during the declaration of states of emergency and lockdowns.
3. 1.8 Behavioral or legal codes criminalizing the receipt of bribes by media personnel intended to influence their work.
4. 2.2 Number of recorded cases of arrests of journalists and/or media personnel.
5. 2.5 Number of recorded physical assaults against journalists and/or media personnel.
6. 2.7 Confiscation and/or destruction of journalistic equipment and/or materials on the grounds of journalistic activity.
7. 2.8 Conduct of serious investigations by official authorities into complaints filed by media personnel.
8. 2.14 Imposition of restrictions on access to and/or transmission of information as a result of a state of emergency.
9. 3.3 Dominance of state-owned media outlets over the news and information ecosystem within the country.
10. 3.5 Clarity of media ownership procedures and the availability of opportunities to establish media outlets without political discrimination.
11. 3.6 Diversity of media ownership and the absence of its concentration among specific political and/or economic affiliations.
12. 3.7 Deliberate concealment of official positions held in media outlets and of affiliations with such outlets.
13. 4.2 Provision by the state of legislation permitting the concentration of monopolies and cross-ownership of media outlets.
14. 5.1 Imposition of editorial censorship within media outlets over published content.
15. 5.7 Government censorship procedures governing publication and/or print media acting as an impediment to press freedom.
16. 6.1 Imposition of high fees for obtaining broadcast frequencies and/or registering newspapers and/or online outlets.

17. 6.7 Bribery of journalists by active parties to influence news content in their media work.
18. 7.5 Permitting journalists to accompany security forces during field operations.
19. 7.6 Pressure exerted on journalists to disclose their sources of information.
20. 7.7 Violation of journalists' privacy by public authorities.
21. 7.8 Existence of active sharing of public information across various media outlets by government officials and competent authorities.
22. 8.1 Existence of legislation permitting journalists to form representative bodies (trade unions) within media institutions.
23. 8.3 Regular and periodic elections within representative bodies of media personnel.
24. 8.6 Encouragement of women's access to decision-making positions within media institutions and journalists' representative bodies.
25. 8.9 Membership and affiliation procedures for the journalists' trade union body are acceptable and professional in nature.
26. 8.11 Degree of effectiveness of the media personnel trade union body in intervening and advocating for the rights of its members.

E. Indicators Rated "Good" (601-800): Four indicators (5.5% of all indicators) received a "Good" rating, relating to the following subjects:

1. 2.3 Number of cases of summoning and interrogation of journalists and/or media workers.
2. 4.5 Use by the government of media ownership licensing and frequencies as a pressure tool against independent media outlets.
3. 6.6 Use of advertising as a pressure tool to influence editorial decisions.
4. 6.9 Exertion of pressure on journalists through salary reductions and/or termination of emergency staff contracts.

F. Indicators Rated 'High' (801-1000): Four indicators (4.2% of all indicators) received a 'High' rating:

1. 1.1 Constitutional guarantees of press freedom provided by the Basic Law.
2. 1.3 Judicial guarantees in Palestinian courts protecting press freedom.
3. 2.1 Imposition of high civil fines on journalists following conviction for the offense of defamation, slander, and libel.
4. 2.4 Number of cases of torture of journalists and/or media workers.

» 2. Press Freedom Index in the West Bank

The West Bank Press Freedom Index received a 'Difficult' classification (score: 373), falling 28 points below the overall Palestine Press Freedom Index score for 2025, indicating that press freedom in the West Bank suffers from interventions restricting journalistic freedoms.

A. Indicators that rated "low" (0-200): Eighteen indicators (25%) received a 'Low' rating. These indicators were as follows:

1. 1.2 Harmonization of National Legislation with International Instruments Guaranteeing Freedom of the Press.

2. 1.4 Criminalization of the Incitement of Government Officials Against Media Outlets.
3. 1.7 The Existence of the Cybercrime Law Has Reinforced Freedom of the Press.
4. 2.2 Number of Cases of Arbitrary Detention Against Journalists and/or Media Workers.
5. 2.6 Imposition of Restrictions on or Prevention of Journalists' Coverage of Public Events and the Exercise of Their Journalistic Work.
6. 2.9 I Have Been Compensated by the Public Authorities for the Material Damage Sustained as a Result of the Assault on My Equipment.
7. 2.10 Punitive Measures Taken Against Persons Who Assaulted Me or a Colleague in the Workplace.
8. 4.4 Universal Accessibility of the Internet at Low Cost and Adequate Quality.
9. 4.6 Diversity of Sources, Information, and Content Related to Corruption and/or Misuse of Public Funds.
10. 4.7 Degree of Coverage by Various Media Outlets of Issues Related to Corruption and/or Misuse of Public Funds.
11. 5.8 Use of Alternative Symbols and Words on Social Media Platforms to Avoid the Blocking and/or Removal of Posts by These Platforms.
12. 6.4 Government Financial Support for Media Outlets on a Fair and Equitable Basis, According to Market Share or Advertising Market Criteria.
13. 6.5 Allocation of Government Advertising Budgets to Media Outlets in a Fair and Equitable Manner.
14. 6.8 Wage Levels for Journalists and Other Media Professionals Are Sufficiently High to Prevent Susceptibility to Bribery.
15. 7.1 Existence of a Right of Access to Information Law.
16. 7.2 Existence of Laws and Legislation Enabling Journalists' Access to Information.
17. 8.4 Operational Independence of Representative Bodies of Media Workers from the Influence of Government and Political Parties.
18. 8.5 The Journalists' Union Body Is Characterized by Professionalism and Operational Independence in Its Operations.

B. Indicators that rated "Low" Classification (201–400): Twenty-six indicators (36% of the total number of indicators) received a "Difficult" classification. These indicators pertained to the following subject areas:

1. 2.3 Number of Cases of Summons and Investigation Against Journalists and/or Media Workers.
2. Systematic Prosecution or Imprisonment of Journalists and/or Media Outlet Owners as a Result of Their Written Work and/or Broadcasting.
3. 2.12 Defamation, Incitement, or Vilification Against Journalists Online on the Grounds of Their Publication of Sensitive Reports.
4. 2.13 Were Restrictive Measures Taken by the Official Authority — Such as Closure and/or Blocking — Against Media Outlets During the Year 2025?
5. 3.1 Licensing Laws That Permit Government Control Over Media Outlets.
6. 3.2 Licensing Procedures That Impede the Operation and Establishment of Independent Media Outlets.

7. 3.4 Enjoyment by Official Media Outlets of Editorial Operational Independence and Coverage of News Across All Segments of the Population.
8. 3.5 Transparency of Media Ownership Procedures and Availability of Opportunities to Establish Media Outlets Without Political Discrimination.
9. 4.3 Existence of a Monopoly in the Provision of Internet and/or Telecommunications Services.
10. 5.1 Imposition of Editorial Censorship in Media Outlets Over Matters Published Through Them.
11. 5.2 Abstention by Media Outlets from Publishing Journalistic Material for Fear of Prosecution by Public Authorities.
12. 5.3 Publication of News Items on Online Platforms Followed by Their Retraction.
13. 5.4 Exposure of Journalists to Family and/or Social Pressure on the Grounds of Publishing Information.
14. 5.5 Subjection of Writers and/or Editors to Official or Societal Threats on the Grounds of Publication.
15. 5.6 Existence of Blacklists of Persons and/or Institutions Barred from Appearing on Various or Specific Media Outlets.
16. 6.2 Imposition of Value-Added Tax on the Purchase of Paper and/or Newsprint, Broadcasting Equipment, and Other Media Equipment.
17. 6.3 Existence of Restrictions on Foreign Funding and/or Foreign Support for Media Outlets.
18. 7.3 Clarity of Restrictions Imposed on Access to Information.
19. 7.4 Existence of Official Spokespersons Who Provide Information to Journalists Smoothly and Promptly.
20. 7.5 Permitting Journalists to Accompany Security Services on Field Operations Conducted by Them.
21. 8.2 Harassment and/or Dismissal of Media Outlet Employees on the Grounds of Advertisers' Objections to Their Journalistic Work.
22. 8.7 Freedom of Workers in Official Media Outlets to Join Representative Bodies for Journalists.
23. 8.8 Degree of Representation by the Union Body of Media Workers.
24. 8.9 Membership and Affiliation Procedures of the Union Body for Media Workers Are Acceptable and Professional.
25. 8.10 Degree of Involvement of the Union Body for Media Workers in the Formulation of Policies and General Orientations.
26. 8.11 Degree of Effectiveness of the Union Body for Media Workers in Intervening and Advocating for the Rights of Its Members.

C. Indicators that rated “sensitive” (401–600): Fourteen indicators (19% of the total number of indicators) received a “Sensitive” classification. These indicators pertained to the following subject areas:

1. 1.5 Imposition of Legal Restrictions on the Coverage of Ethnic, Religious, and/or National Security Issues.
2. 1.6 Existence of Procedures and Directives Allowing Journalists Freedom of Movement During the Imposition of States of Emergency and Lockdowns.
3. 2.7 Confiscation and/or Destruction of My Equipment and/or Journalistic Materials on the Grounds of My Journalistic Work.
4. 2.8 Opening of Serious Investigations by Official Authorities into Complaints Filed by Media Workers.
5. 2.14 Imposition of Restrictions on the Obtaining and/or Transmission of Information as a Result of a State of Emergency.
6. 3.6 Diversity of Media Outlets in Terms of Ownership and the Absence of Their Concentration Among Specific Political and/or Economic Interests.
7. 4.1 Monopolization of Access to Information by a Number of Media Outlets and Persons of Influence.
8. 5.7 Government Regulatory Procedures for Publication and/or Print Media Constitute an Impediment to Media Freedom.
9. 6.1 Imposition of High Fees for the Obtaining of Broadcast Frequencies and/or the Registration of Newspapers and/or Online Platforms.
10. 7.6 Pressure on Journalists to Disclose Their Sources of Information.
11. 7.7 Violation of the Privacy of Journalists by Public Authorities.
12. 8.1 Existence of Laws Permitting Journalists to Form Representative Bodies (Trade Unions) Within Media Outlets.
13. 8.3 Regular Periodic Elections Within Representative Bodies of Media Workers.
14. 8.6 Promotion of Women’s Access to Decision-Making Positions in Media Institutions and in Representative Bodies for Journalists.

D. Indicators that rated “Good” (601–800): Twelve indicators (17% of the total number of indicators) received a “Good” classification. These indicators pertained to the following subject areas:

1. 1.8 Codes of Conduct or Legal Rules Criminalizing the Receipt of Bribes by Media Workers for the Purpose of Influencing Their Work.
2. 2.1 Imposition of High Civil Fines on Journalists Following Their Conviction on Charges of Defamation, Libel, and Slander.
3. 2.4 Number of Cases of Torture Against Journalists and/or Media Workers.
4. 2.5 Number of Cases of Physical Assault Against Journalists and/or Media Workers.
5. 3.3 Dominance of State-Owned Media Outlets Over the News and Information System in the Country.
6. 3.7 Intentional Concealment of Official Positions’ Ownership of Media Outlets and of Their Affiliation with Such Outlets.

7. 4.2 Provision by the State of Laws Permitting the Concentration of Monopolies and Cross-Ownership of Media Outlets.
 8. 4.5 Use by the Government of Media Outlet Licensing and Broadcast Frequencies as a Means of Pressure Against Independent Media Outlets.
 9. 6.6 Use of Advertising as a Means of Pressure to Influence Editorial Decisions.
 10. 6.7 Bribery of Journalists by Vested Actors to Influence News Content in Their Media Work.
 11. 6.9 Exertion of Pressure on Journalists Through Salary Reductions and/or Termination of Contracts of Casual and Emergency Employees.
 12. 7.8 Existence of Public Information Sharing Across Various Media Outlets by Government Officials and Competent Authorities.
- E. Indicators that rated “High” (801–1000): Two indicators (3% of the total number of indicators) received a “High” classification. These indicators pertained to the following subject areas:**
1. 1.1 Guarantees Enshrined in the Basic Law for the Freedom of the Press.
 2. 1.3 Judicial Guarantees in Palestinian Courts Protecting Freedom of the Press.

» 3. Press Freedom Index in the Gaza Strip

The Press Freedom Index for the Gaza Strip received a “sensitive” classification (scoring 451), a score indicating that the state of press freedom in the Gaza Strip remains a matter of serious concern. The Gaza Strip press freedom score represents an increase of 50 points compared to the overall Press Freedom Index score for Palestine.

A. Indicators Receiving a “Low” Classification (0–200): Nine indicators (12.5% of the total) received a “Low” classification, pertaining to the following key areas:

1. 1.2 Harmonization of National Legislation with International Press Freedom Instruments.
2. 1.4 Criminalization of Incitement by Government Officials Against Media Outlets.
3. 2.9 Compensation by Public Authorities for Material Damage Sustained Due to Assault on Journalistic Equipment.
4. 2.11 Systematic Prosecution or Imprisonment of Journalists and/or Media Outlet Owners on the Basis of Their Written Work and/or Broadcasting.
5. 7.1 Existence of a Right of Access to Information Law.
6. 7.2 Existence of Laws and Legislation Enabling Journalist Access to Information.
7. 7.6 Pressure on Journalists to Disclose Confidential Sources.
8. 7.7 Violation of Journalists’ Privacy by Public Authorities.
9. 7.8 Proactive Sharing of Public Information Across Media Outlets by Government Officials and Competent Authorities.

B. Indicators Receiving a “Low” Classification (201–400): Twenty-one indicators (29% of the total) received a “Difficult” classification, pertaining to the following subject areas:

1. 1.8 Codes of Conduct or Legal Rules Criminalizing the Receipt of Bribes by Media Workers for the Purpose of Influencing Their Work.

2. 2.5 Number of Cases of Physical Assault Against Journalists and/or Media Workers.
 3. 2.10 Punitive Measures Taken Against Persons Who Assaulted a Journalist or a Fellow Media Worker.
 4. 2.12 Defamation, Incitement, or Vilification Against Journalists Online on the Grounds of Publishing Sensitive Reports.
 5. 3.2 Licensing Procedures That Impede the Operation and Establishment of Independent Media Outlets.
 6. 4.3 Existence of a Monopoly in the Provision of Internet and/or Telecommunications Services.
 7. 4.4 Universal Accessibility of the Internet at Low Cost and Adequate Quality.
 8. 4.5 Use of Media Outlet Licensing and Broadcast Frequencies by the Government as a Means of Pressure Against Independent Media Outlets.
 9. 4.7 Degree of Coverage by Media Outlets of Issues Related to Corruption and/or Misuse of Public Funds.
 10. 5.2 Self-Censorship by Media Outlets Through Withholding Journalistic Material for Fear of Prosecution by Public Authorities.
 11. 5.3 Publication of News Items on Online Platforms Followed by Their Retraction.
 12. 5.4 Exposure of Journalists to Family and/or Social Pressure on the Grounds of Publishing Information.
 13. 5.5 Subjection of Writers and/or Editors to Official or Societal Threats on the Grounds of Publication.
 14. 5.6 Existence of Blacklists of Persons and/or Institutions Barred from Appearing on Various or Specific Media Outlets.
 15. 5.8 Use of Alternative Symbols and Coded Language on Social Media Platforms to Avoid Content Blocking and/or Removal by These Platforms.
 16. 6.1 Imposition of High Fees for Obtaining Broadcast Frequencies and/or Registering Newspapers and/or Online Platforms.
 17. 6.2 Imposition of Value-Added Tax on the Purchase of Newsprint, Broadcasting Equipment, and Other Media Equipment.
 18. 6.3 Existence of Restrictions on Foreign Funding and/or Support for Media Outlets.
 19. 6.5 Allocation of Government Advertising Budgets to Media Outlets in a Fair and Equitable Manner.
 20. 6.6 Use of Advertising as a Means of Pressure to Influence Editorial Decisions.
 21. 6.8 Harassment and/or Dismissal of Media Employees on the Grounds of Advertiser Objections to Their Journalistic Work.
- C. Indicators Receiving a “sensitive” Classification (401–600): Thirty-three indicators (46% of the total) received a “Sensitive” classification, pertaining to the following subject areas:**
1. 1.5 Imposition of Legal Restrictions on the Coverage of Ethnic, Religious, and/or National Security Issues.
 2. 1.6 Existence of Procedures and Directives Allowing Journalists Freedom of Movement During States of Emergency and Lockdowns.

3. 1.7 The Cybercrime Law Has Reinforced Freedom of the Press.
4. 2.6 Imposition of Restrictions on or Prevention of Journalists' Coverage of Public Events and the Exercise of Their Journalistic Work.
5. 2.7 Confiscation and/or Destruction of Journalistic Equipment and/or Materials on the Grounds of Journalistic Work.
6. 2.8 Opening of Serious Investigations by Official Authorities into Complaints Filed by Media Workers.
7. 2.13 Restrictive Measures Taken by Official Authorities, Such as Closure and/or Blocking, Against Media Outlets During 2025.
8. 2.14 Imposition of Restrictions on Access to and/or Transmission of Information as a Result of a State of Emergency.
9. 3.1 Licensing Laws Permitting Government Control Over Media Outlets.
10. 3.3 Dominance of State-Owned Media Outlets Over the News and Information Landscape.
11. 3.4 Enjoyment by Official Media Outlets of Editorial Operational Independence and Coverage of News Across All Segments of the Population.
12. 3.6 Diversity of Media Outlet Ownership and Its Non-Concentration Among Specific Political and/or Economic Interests.
13. 3.7 Intentional Concealment of Official Positions' Ownership of and Affiliation with Media Outlets.
14. 4.1 Monopolization of Access to Information by Select Media Outlets and Persons of Influence.
15. 4.6 Diversity of Sources, Information, and Content Related to Corruption and/or Misuse of Public Funds.
16. 5.1 Imposition of Editorial Censorship in Media Outlets Over Published Content.
17. 5.7 Government Regulatory Procedures for Publication and/or Print Media as an Impediment to Media Freedom.
18. 6.7 Bribery of Journalists by Vested Actors to Influence News Content.
19. 6.8 Wage Levels for Journalists and Other Media Professionals Sufficient to Prevent Susceptibility to Bribery.
20. 6.9 Exertion of Pressure on Journalists Through Salary Reductions and/or Termination of Contracts of Casual Employees.
21. 7.3 Clarity of Restrictions Imposed on Access to Information.
22. 7.4 Existence of Official Spokespersons Who Provide Information to Journalists Smoothly and Promptly.
23. 7.5 Permitting Journalists to Accompany Security Services on Field Operations.
24. 8.1 Existence of Laws Permitting Journalists to Form Representative Bodies (Trade Unions) Within Media Outlets.
25. 8.3 Regular Periodic Elections Within Representative Bodies of Media Workers.
26. 8.4 Operational Independence of Representative Bodies of Media Workers from Government and Political Party Influence.

27. 8.5 The Journalists' Union Body Is Characterized by Professionalism and Operational Independence.
28. 8.6 Promotion of Women's Access to Decision-Making Positions in Media Institutions and Representative Bodies for Journalists.
29. 8.7 Freedom of Workers in Official Media Outlets to Join Journalists' Representative Bodies.
30. 8.8 Degree of Representation by the Union Body of Media Workers.
31. 8.9 Membership and Affiliation Procedures of the Union Body for Media Workers Are Acceptable and Professional.
32. 8.10 Degree of Involvement of the Union Body for Media Workers in Policy Formulation and the Setting of General Orientations.
33. 8.11 Degree of Effectiveness of the Union Body for Media Workers in Advocating for and Defending Members' Rights.

D. Indicators Scoring in the "Good" Classification (601–800): Three indicators (4.5% of the total) received a "Good" classification, pertaining to the following subject areas:

1. 3.5 Transparency of Media Ownership Procedures and Equal Opportunity to Establish Media Outlets Free from Political Discrimination.
2. 4.2 Provision by the State of Laws Permitting the Concentration of Monopolies and Cross-Ownership of Media Outlets.
3. 6.4 Government Financial Support for Media Outlets on a Fair and Equitable Basis, According to Market Share or Advertising Market Criteria.

E. Indicators Scoring in the "High" Classification (801–1000): Six indicators (8% of the total) received a "High" classification, pertaining to the following subject areas:

1. 1.1 Guarantees Enshrined in the Basic Law for the Freedom of the Press.
2. 1.3 Judicial Guarantees in Palestinian Courts Protecting Freedom of the Press.
3. 2.1 Imposition of High Civil Fines on Journalists Following Conviction on Charges of Defamation, Libel, and Slander.
4. 2.2 Number of Cases of Arbitrary Detention Against Journalists and/or Media Workers.
5. 2.3 Number of Cases of Summons and Investigation Against Journalists and/or Media Workers.
6. 2.4 Number of Cases of Torture Against Journalists and/or Media Workers.

Detailed Results by Indicators

The detailed results of the seventy-two (72) indicators comprising the index reveal significant variation in the scores assigned to each indicator. While two indicators received a score of 1000, the highest possible score attainable under the index, three indicators received a score of zero, representing the lowest possible score. In addition, sixty-four (64) indicators (89% of all indicators) fell within the categories of Low, Difficult, or Sensitive (i.e., scoring 600 or below). By contrast, only eight (8) indicators (11% of the total indicators) achieved scores within the Good or High categories.

The following table presents the list of index indicators, sub-indices, and the classifications assigned to each of them.

Table (5): Scores of Index Indicators by the Domain and Type

No.	Indicator	Domain	Type	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Palestine
1	1.1 Legal guarantees for freedom of the press enshrined in the Basic Law.	Legal Guarantees	Legislation	1000	1000	1000
2	1.2 Alignment of national legislation with international standards safeguarding press freedom.	Legal Guarantees	Practices	0	0	0
3	1.3 Judicial safeguards within Palestinian courts protecting freedom of the press.	Legal Guarantees	Legislation	1000	1000	1000
4	1.4 Criminalization of incitement by government officials against media outlets.	Legal Guarantees	Practices	0	0	0
5	1.5 Imposition of legal restrictions on coverage of ethnic, religious, and/or national security issues.	Legal Guarantees	Practices	500	500	500
6	1.6 Existence of procedures and directives allowing journalists freedom of movement during states of emergency and lockdowns.	Legal Guarantees	Legislation	410	590	480
7	1.7 The Cybercrime Law has strengthened freedom of the press.	Legal Guarantees	Legislation	170	580	340
8	1.8 Legal or ethical codes criminalize bribery of media workers intended to influence their professional activities.	Legal Guarantees	Legislation	756	330	540
9	2.1 Imposition of excessive civil fines on journalists convicted of libel, slander, or defamation offenses.	Legal Restrictions	Practices	800	1000	900
10	2.2 Number of arrests of journalists and/or media workers.	Legal Restrictions	Practices	0	1000	500

11	2.3 Number of summonses and interrogations involving journalists and/or media workers.	Legal Restrictions	Practices	300	1000	650
12	2.4 Number of torture cases involving journalists and/or media workers.	Legal Restrictions	Practices	700	1000	850
13	2.5 Number of physical assaults against journalists and/or media workers.	Legal Restrictions	Practices	800	300	550
14	2.6 Restrictions on or prevention of journalists from covering public events and carrying out their journalistic work.	Legal Restrictions	Practices	180	445	250
15	2.7 Confiscation and/or destruction of my equipment and/or journalistic materials due to my journalistic work.	Legal Restrictions	Practices	420	500	450
16	2.8 Serious investigations conducted by official authorities into complaints submitted by media workers.	Legal Restrictions	Practices	410	500	440
17	2.9 Compensation provided by public authorities for material damage resulting from attacks on my equipment.	Legal Restrictions	Practices	0	120	50
18	2.10 Punitive measures taken against individuals who assaulted me or one of my colleagues.	Legal Restrictions	Practices	0	300	120
19	2.11 Systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists and/or media owners as a result of published or broadcast content.	Legal Restrictions	Practices	336	0	168
20	2.12 Online defamation, incitement, or smear campaigns targeting journalists because of their publication of sensitive reports.	Legal Restrictions	Practices	270	330	290
21	2.13 Restrictive measures imposed by public authorities against media outlets during 2025, including closure and/or blocking.	Legal Restrictions	Practices	270	420	330
22	2.14 Restrictions on access to and/or dissemination of information due to a state of emergency.	Legal Restrictions	Practices	430	590	480
23	3.1 Licensing laws that enable government control over the media.	Media Operational Independence	Legislation	227	500	363

24	3.2 Licensing procedures that hinder the establishment and operation of independent media outlets.	Media Operational Independence	Practices	330	350	340
25	3.3 Dominance of state-owned media over the country's news and information landscape.	Media Operational Independence	Practices	660	480	570
26	3.4 Editorial Operational Independence of state media and inclusiveness in covering all segments of society.	Media Operational Independence	Practices	300	490	370
27	3.5 Transparency of media ownership procedures and equal opportunities to establish media outlets without political discrimination.	Media Operational Independence	Legislation	350	650	450
28	3.6 Diversity of media ownership and the absence of concentration among specific political and/or economic interests.	Media Operational Independence	Practices	440	600	470
29	3.7 Deliberate concealment of public officials' ownership of media outlets and their affiliations with such outlets.	Media Operational Independence	Practices	700	460	600
30	4.1 Monopoly over access to information by a limited number of media outlets and influential actors.	Content Diversity	Practices	440	420	330
31	4.2 State provision of laws enabling monopolization and cross-ownership concentration in the media sector.	Content Diversity	Legislation	610	670	460
32	4.3 Existence of monopolies in the provision of internet and/or telecommunications services.	Content Diversity	Practices	370	300	350
33	4.4 Universal access to the internet at affordable cost and adequate quality.	Content Diversity	Practices	160	320	280
34	4.5 Government use of media licensing and frequency allocation as a means of pressure against independent media.	Content Diversity	Practices	750	400	630
35	4.6 Diversity of sources, information, and content related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds.	Content Diversity	Practices	110	590	310
36	4.7 Extent of media coverage of issues related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds.	Content Diversity	Practices	90	260	180

37	5.1 Imposition of editorial censorship on published media content.	Self-Censorship & Government Measures	Practices	330	550	420
38	5.2 Media outlets refrain from publishing journalistic material for fear of prosecution by public authorities.	Self-Censorship & Government Measures	Practices	240	380	290
39	5.3 Publication of news on online platforms followed by its subsequent withdrawal.	Self-Censorship & Government Measures	Practices	330	290	300
40	5.4 Journalists subjected to family and/or societal pressure because of publishing information.	Self-Censorship & Government Measures	Practices	320	340	300
41	5.5 Writers and/or editors subjected to official or societal threats because of published content.	Self-Censorship & Government Measures	Practices	360	390	390
42	5.6 Existence of blacklists of persons and/or institutions prohibited from appearing in some or all media outlets.	Self-Censorship & Government Measures	Practices	400	330	370
43	5.7 Government censorship procedures governing publication and/or printed materials hinder media freedom.	Self-Censorship & Government Measures	Practices	450	450	450
44	5.8 Use of coded language or alternative expressions on social media platforms to avoid blocking and/or deletion of content.	Self-Censorship & Government Measures	Practices	50	270	140
45	6.1 Imposition of high fees for obtaining broadcasting frequencies and/or registering newspapers and websites.	Funding Policies	Legislation	480	350	440
46	6.2 Imposition of value-added tax on the purchase of paper, newsprint, broadcasting equipment, and other media equipment.	Funding Policies	Legislation	250	300	270
47	6.3 Restrictions on foreign funding and/or support for media outlets.	Funding Policies	Legislation	380	400	390

48	6.4 Fair allocation of state financial support to media outlets based on market share or advertising market criteria.	Funding Policies	Practices	30	650	240
49	6.5 Fair distribution of government advertising budgets across media outlets.	Funding Policies	Practices	0	400	130
50	6.6 Use of advertising as a means of pressure to influence editors' decisions.	Funding Policies	Practices	750	300	610
51	6.7 Bribery of journalists by influential actors to influence news content in their media work.	Funding Policies	Practices	610	430	530
52	6.8 Salary levels of journalists and other media professionals are sufficient to reduce vulnerability to bribery.	Funding Policies	Practices	40	470	210
53	6.9 Pressure exerted on journalists through salary reductions and/or termination of contracts during states of emergency and lockdowns.	Funding Policies	Practices	790	490	670
54	7.1 Existence of a right to information law.	Transparency & Information Access	Legislation	0	0	0
55	7.2 Existence of laws and regulations enabling journalists' access to information.	Transparency & Information Access	Practices	200	0	100
56	7.3 Clarity of restrictions imposed on access to information.	Transparency & Information Access	Legislation	230	480	330
57	7.4 Availability of official spokespersons who provide information to journalists efficiently and promptly.	Transparency & Information Access	Practices	280	470	360
58	7.5 Permission for journalists to accompany security forces during field operations.	Transparency & Information Access	Practices	360	520	410
59	7.6 Pressure on journalists to reveal their sources of information.	Transparency & Information Access	Practices	520	31	430
60	7.7 Violations of journalists' privacy by public authorities.	Transparency & Information Access	Practices	520	42	480

61	7.8 Public dissemination of information through various media outlets by government officials and competent authorities.	Transparency & Information Access	Practices	710	36	580
62	8.1 Existence of laws allowing journalists to establish representative bodies (trade unions/professional associations) within the media sector.	Journalists' Self-Regulation	Legislation	600	580	590
63	8.2 Restrictions and/or dismissal of media employees following pressure from advertisers regarding their journalistic work.	Journalists' Self-Regulation	Practices	340	370	350
64	8.3 Regular periodic elections within representative bodies of media workers.	Journalists' Self-Regulation	Practices	440	490	460
65	8.4 Operational Independence of representative bodies of media workers from government and political party influence.	Journalists' Self-Regulation	Practices	130	500	270
66	8.5 The representative journalists' union operates professionally and independently.	Journalists' Self-Regulation	Practices	190	500	210
67	8.6 Promotion of women's access to decision-making positions in media institutions and representative journalists' bodies.	Journalists' Self-Regulation	Practices	420	540	510
68	8.7 Freedom of employees in state media to join representative journalists' bodies.	Journalists' Self-Regulation	Practices	240	540	360
69	8.8 Degree of representation of the trade union/body representing media workers.	Journalists' Self-Regulation	Practices	290	510	380
70	8.9 Membership and affiliation procedures within the representative body of media workers are fair and professional.	Journalists' Self-Regulation	Legislation	330	570	430
71	8.10 Degree of involvement of the representative body of media workers in shaping public policies and general directions.	Journalists' Self-Regulation	Practices	260	520	350
72	8.11 Effectiveness of the representative body of media workers in intervening and defending the rights of its members.	Journalists' Self-Regulation	Practices	350	540	430


The detailed findings across the seventy-two indicators of the index, at the level of both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, reveal the following: two indicators received a score of 1,000 in the West Bank, compared to six indicators in the Gaza Strip. Seven indicators received a score of zero in the West Bank, compared to five indicators in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that three indicators received a score of zero in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip alike, namely: (1) Alignment of national legislation with international standards safeguarding press freedom; (2) the criminalization of incitement by government officials against media outlets; and (3) the existence of a right of access to information law.

Furthermore, fifty-eight (58) indicators in the West Bank received scores falling within the Difficult, low, or sensitive classifications, that is, a score of 600 or below, compared to sixty-three (63) indicators in the Gaza Strip falling within the same classifications. It is worth noting that fifty-four (54) indicators were assigned the same classification in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. With regard to the Good or Satisfactory classification, fourteen indicators (14) in the West Bank received scores qualifying them for this classification, compared to nine indicators (9) in the Gaza Strip. It is worth noting that five indicators qualified for this classification in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip alike.

Results of the Sub-Index Across Press Freedom Index Domains

The findings by press freedom domain in Palestine, as illustrated in the figure below, indicate limited variation across press freedom classifications. Five of the eight domains comprising the scale received a Difficult classification, namely: (1) Media Outlets and Content Diversity; (2) Governmental and Self-Censorship; (3) Funding Policies; (4) Transparency and Access to Information; and (5) Journalists' Self-Regulation. Three domains received a sensitive classification, namely: (1) Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom; (2) Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom; and (3) Editorial Operational Independence of Media Outlets.

Figure No. () presents the number and reference codes of the indicators falling within each domain.




Domain Classification Scores: A Comparative Overview of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

As indicated in the figure above, the press freedom index domains in the West Bank were broken down across two classifications, Difficult and Sensitive, whereby two domains received a Sensitive classification, namely: (1) Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom; and (2) Editorial Operational Independence of Media Outlets. The remaining six domains received a Difficult classification. By contrast, six domains in the press freedom index for the Gaza Strip received a sensitive classification, namely: (1) Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom; (2) Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom; (3) Editorial Operational Independence of Media Outlets; (4) Media Outlets and Content Diversity; (5) Funding Policies; and (6) Journalists' Self-Regulation. Two domains received a Difficult; namely: (1) Governmental and self-censorship, and (2) Transparency and Access to Information.

1. Sub-Index for the Domain of Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom

This domain comprises eight indicators. Two indicators received a score of 1,000, namely: (1) guarantees enshrined in the Basic Law for press freedom; and (2) judicial guarantees in Palestinian courts protecting press freedom. Conversely, two other indicators received a score of zero, namely: (1) the alignment of national legislation with international instruments guaranteeing press freedom; and (2) the criminalization of incitement by government officials against media outlets. One indicator received a score of 500, pertaining to the imposition of legal restrictions on coverage of ethnic, religious, and/or national security issues. Two indicators received a sensitive classification, namely: the existence of procedures and directives permitting journalists freedom of movement during states of emergency and lockdowns; and the existence of ethical or legal codes criminalizing the acceptance of bribes by media professionals in the course of their work. The eighth indicator received a Difficult classification with a score of 340, relating to whether the cybercrime law has strengthened press freedom.

Scores of the Sub-Index for the Domain of Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom



Regarding the comparative scores between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as shown in the figure above, five indicators received identical scores: two received a score of 1,000, two received a score of zero, and the fifth received a score of 500, pertaining to the imposition of legal restrictions on coverage of ethnic, religious, and/or national security issues. Two indicators scored higher in the Gaza Strip compared to their counterparts in the West Bank, namely: (1) the existence of procedures and directives permitting journalists freedom of movement during states of emergency and lockdowns (590 vs. 410); and (2) whether the cybercrime law has strengthened press freedom (580 vs. 170). One indicator scored higher in the West Bank compared to the Gaza Strip, namely: the existence of ethical or legal codes criminalizing the acceptance of bribes by media professionals to influence their work (756 vs. 330).

2. Sub-Index for the Domain of Legal and Societal Restrictions on Press Freedom


This domain comprises fourteen indicators. Two indicators received a Satisfactory classification, namely: (1) the imposition of high civil fines on journalists following conviction for defamation, libel, and/or slander; and (2) the indicator pertaining to the number of cases of torture against journalists and/or media professionals, which received a Good classification.

Conversely, three indicators received a low classification, namely: (1) the number of cases of torture against journalists and/or media professionals; (2) punitive measures taken against individuals who assaulted me or one of my colleagues; and (3) the systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists and/or media owners as a result of their published writing and/or broadcasts.

Three indicators received a Difficult classification, namely: (1) the systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists and/or media owners as a result of their published writing and/or broadcasts; (2) online defamation, incitement, or smear campaigns targeting journalists on the basis of their coverage of sensitive issues; and (3) the imposition of restrictive measures by official authorities, such as shutdowns and/or blocking, against media outlets during 2025.

Five indicators received a sensitive classification, namely: (1) the number of arrests of journalists and/or media professionals; (2) the number of physical assaults against journalists and/or media professionals; (3) the confiscation and/or damage of my journalistic equipment and/or materials in connection with my journalistic work; (4) the conduct of serious investigations by official authorities into complaints filed by media professionals; and (5) the imposition of restrictions on access to and/or transmission of information as a result of a state of emergency.

Scores of the Sub-Index for the Domain of Legal and Societal Restrictions on Press Freedom




As shown in the figure above, four indicators in the sub-scale for the domain of legal and societal restrictions on press freedom scored higher in the Gaza Strip compared to their counterparts in the West Bank, while one indicator scored higher in the West Bank, namely: the imposition of restrictions on access to and/or transmission of information as a result of a state of emergency.

3. Sub-Index for the Domain of Editorial Operational Independence of Media Outlets

This domain comprises seven indicators. Three indicators received a Difficult classification (i.e., scores ranging between 201 and 400), namely: licensing laws that permit government control over media outlets; licensing procedures that impede the operation and establishment of independent media outlets; and the enjoyment by state media of editorial Operational Independence and coverage of news across all segments of the population. Conversely, four indicators received a sensitive classification (i.e., scores ranging between 401 and 600), namely: (1) the dominance of state-owned media over the country's news and information ecosystem; (2) the transparency of media ownership procedures and the availability of opportunities to establish media outlets without political discrimination; (3) the diversity of media ownership and its non-concentration among specific political

and/or economic interests; and (4) the deliberate concealment of official office-holders' ownership stakes in media outlets and their affiliations therewith.

Scores of the Sub-Index for the Domain of Editorial Operational Independence of Media Outlets




As shown in the figure above, five indicators in the sub-index for the domain of editorial Operational Independence of media outlets scored higher in the Gaza Strip compared to their counterparts in the West Bank, while two indicators scored higher in the West Bank, namely: the dominance of state-owned media over the country's news and information ecosystem; and the deliberate concealment of official office-holders' ownership stakes in media outlets and their affiliations therewith.

4. Sub-Index for the Domain of Media Outlets and Content Diversity

This domain comprises seven indicators. One indicator received a low classification (i.e., a score ranging between 0 and 200), namely: the extent to which various media outlets cover issues related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds. Four indicators received a Difficult classification (i.e., scores ranging between 201 and 400), namely: the monopolization of access to information among a number of media outlets and influential actors; the existence of a monopoly in the provision of internet and/or telecommunications services; the universal availability of internet access at low cost and adequate quality; and the diversity of sources, information, and content related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds.

Conversely, two indicators received a sensitive classification (i.e., scores ranging between 401 and 600), namely: (1) the existence of laws permitting the concentration of monopolies and cross-ownership of media outlets; and (2) the use by the government of media ownership licensing and frequency allocation as a means of pressure against independent media outlets.

Scores of the Sub-Index for the Domain of Media Outlets and Content Diversity




As shown in the figure above, four indicators in the sub-index for the domain of media outlets and content diversity scored higher in the West Bank compared to their counterparts in the Gaza Strip, while three indicators scored higher in the Gaza Strip, namely: (1) the existence of laws permitting the concentration of monopolies and cross-ownership of media outlets; (2) the diversity of sources, information, and content related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds; and (3) the extent to which various media outlets cover issues related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds.

5. Sub-Index for the Domain of Self-Censorship and Governmental Procedures

This domain comprises eight indicators. One indicator received a Low rating: the use of coded language and alternative terminology on social media platforms to avoid content blocking and/or removal by these platforms. Five indicators received a Difficult rating: media outlets refraining from publishing journalistic content out of fear of prosecution by public authorities; the publication and subsequent retraction of news on online platforms; journalists facing family and/or social pressure as a result of published information; writers and/or editors being subjected to formal or community-level threats related to their published content; and the existence of blacklists of individuals and/or institutions barred from appearing across some or all media outlets.

In contrast, two indicators received a Sensitive rating (i.e., scoring between 401 and 600): (1) the imposition of editorial censorship within media outlets over published content; and (2) governmental regulatory procedures governing publication and/or print media constituting an impediment to press freedom.

Scores of the Sub-Index for the Domain of Self-Censorship and Governmental Procedures




The figure above illustrates that the scores of five indicators within the sub-index for the domain of media Operational Independence in the Gaza Strip were higher than those of three indicators in the West Bank. Two indicators recorded higher scores in the West Bank: the publication and subsequent retraction of news on online platforms, and the existence of blacklists of individuals and/or institutions barred from appearing across some or all media outlets. Meanwhile, the indicator concerning governmental regulatory procedures governing publication and/or print media constituting an impediment to press freedom received an identical score of (450) in both regions.

6. Sub-Index for the Domain of Funding Policies

This domain comprises nine indicators. Two indicators received a “Good” rating (i.e., scoring between 601 and 800): the use of advertising as a pressure tool to influence editorial decisions, and the exertion of pressure on journalists through salary reductions and/or the termination of contracts of casual employees during emergencies and shutdowns. Conversely, one indicator received a Low rating: the allocation of governmental advertising budgets to media outlets in an equitable manner.

Four indicators received a Difficult rating: the imposition of value-added tax on the purchase of paper and/or newsprint, broadcast equipment, and other media equipment; the existence of restrictions on foreign funding and/or support for media outlets; the provision of government financial subsidies to media outlets on a fair basis relative to market share or advertising market standing; and wage levels for journalists and other media professionals being sufficiently high to preclude susceptibility to bribery. Two indicators received a Sensitive rating: (1) the imposition of high fees for obtaining broadcast frequencies and/or registering newspapers and/or online platforms; and (2) the bribing of journalists by external actors to influence news content in their media work.

Scores of the Sub-Index for the Domain of Funding Policies




The figure above illustrates that the scores of five indicators within the sub-index for the Funding Policies domain in the Gaza Strip were higher than the scores of four indicators in the West Bank, while the scores of four West Bank indicators surpassed those of their four counterparts in the Gaza Strip.

7. Sub-Index for the Domain of Transparency and Access to Information

This domain comprises eight indicators. Two indicators received a Low rating: (1) the existence of a right of access to information law; and (2) the existence of laws and legislation enabling journalists' access to information. Two further indicators received a Difficult rating: (1) the clarity of restrictions imposed on access to information; and (2) the availability of official media spokespersons who provide information to journalists in a smooth and timely manner.

Four indicators received a Sensitive rating: permitting journalists to accompany security forces on field operations; pressure exerted on journalists to disclose their sources; the violation of journalists' privacy by public authorities; and the proactive sharing of public information across various media outlets by government officials and relevant authorities.

Scores of the Sub-Index for Transparency and Access to Information Domain




The figure above indicates that the scores of four indicators within the sub-index for the Transparency and Access to Information domain in the West Bank were higher than those of four indicators in the Gaza Strip, while the scores of three Gaza Strip indicators surpassed those of their three West Bank counterparts, namely: the clarity of restrictions imposed on access to information; the availability of official media spokespersons who provide information to journalists in a smooth and timely manner; and the permitting of journalists to accompany security forces on field operations. Meanwhile, the indicator concerning the existence of a right of access to information law received an identical score of (0) in both regions.

8. Sub-Index for the Domain of Journalist Self-Regulation and Protection

This domain comprises eleven indicators. Six indicators received a “Difficult” rating, as follows: (1) Harassment and/or dismissal of media workers on grounds of advertiser objections to their journalistic work. (2) Operational Independence of media workers’ representative bodies from government influence and political party interference. (3) The degree to which the journalists’ representative union operates with professionalism and editorial Operational Independence. (4) Freedom of formal media workers to join journalists’ representative bodies. (5) The degree of representativeness of the journalists’ union among media workers. (6) The degree to which the journalists’ union is engaged in policy formulation and public agenda-setting.

Five indicators received a “sensitive” rating, as follows: (1) Existence of legislation permitting journalists to establish representative bodies (trade unions) within media institutions. (2) Regularity of periodic elections within media workers’ representative bodies. (3) Promotion of women’s access to decision-making positions in media institutions and journalists’ representative bodies. (4) Acceptability and professionalism of membership and accreditation procedures within the media workers’ union. (5) The degree of effectiveness of the media workers’ union in intervening and advocating for the rights of its members.

Scores for the Sub-Index of the Journalist Self-Regulation and Protection Domain




The figure above indicates that the scores of ten indicators within the sub-index for the domain of journalist self-regulation and protection in the Gaza Strip were higher compared to the scores of the corresponding ten indicators in the West Bank. Conversely, one indicator recorded a higher score in the West Bank relative to its counterpart in the Gaza Strip, namely: the existence of legislation permitting journalists to establish representative bodies (trade unions) within media institutions.

Results of the Seven Readings of the Press Freedom Index

» Index Scores Across the Seven Readings

The press freedom index score rose by twenty-seven (27) points in 2025 compared to the score recorded in 2022. Nevertheless, the index has undergone a continuous decline since 2020, with the 2025 score falling ninety-three (93) points below the score recorded in 2020 (401 versus 494), and eighty-three (83) points below the score recorded in the first reading in 2018. This indicates a sustained and notable deterioration of press freedoms in Palestine.

Comparative Index Scores Across the Seven Readings



The rise in the 2025 score relative to 2022 is attributable to score increases, at varying degrees, across thirty-three (33) indicators, as follows:

1.3	Judicial guarantees in Palestinian courts protecting press freedom.
1.7	The extent to which the Cybercrime Law has strengthened press freedom.
1.8	Whether codes of conduct or legal provisions criminalize the acceptance of bribes by media workers to influence their journalistic output.
2.2	Number of recorded arrests of journalists and/or media workers.
2.3	Number of recorded summonses and interrogations of journalists and/or media workers.
2.4	Number of recorded cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers.
2.5	Number of recorded physical assaults against journalists and/or media workers.
2.8	Whether official authorities have conducted serious investigations into complaints filed by media workers.
2.8	Whether compensation has been provided by public authorities for material damage resulting from attacks on equipment.
2.10	Whether punitive measures have been taken against individuals who assaulted the respondent or their colleagues.

2.14	Imposition of restrictions on access to and transmission of information under states of emergency.
3.3	Dominance of state-owned media over the news and information ecosystem.
3.4	Degree of editorial Operational Independence enjoyed by public media and their coverage of all segments of society.
3.7	Concealment of official ownership stakes in media outlets and deliberate non-disclosure of such affiliations.
4.1	Monopolization of information access by select media outlets and influential actors.
4.2	Existence of legislation enabling media ownership concentration and cross-ownership.
4.5	Government use of media licensing and broadcast frequency allocation as leverage against independent media.
5.1	Imposition of editorial censorship within media outlets over published content.
5.7	Whether government regulatory procedures for publishing and/or print media obstruct press freedom.
6.1	Imposition of high fees for broadcast frequency allocation and/or newspaper and website registration.
6.2	Imposition of value-added tax on the purchase of newsprint, broadcasting equipment, and other media equipment.
6.3	Existence of restrictions on foreign funding and/or financial support for media outlets.
6.4	Whether government financial support for media is distributed equitably on the basis of market share or advertising revenue.
6.6	Use of advertising as a pressure mechanism to influence editorial decisions.
6.8	Whether journalists' and media professionals' salary levels are sufficiently high to mitigate susceptibility to bribery.
6.9	Whether journalists face economic pressure through salary reductions and/or termination of fixed-term contracts and forced closures.
7.5	Whether journalists are permitted to embed with security forces during field operations.
7.7	Violation of journalists' privacy by public authorities.
7.8	Degree to which government officials and relevant authorities proactively share public information across media platforms.
8.1	Existence of legislation permitting journalists to establish representative bodies (trade unions) within media institutions.
8.3	Regularity of periodic elections within media workers' representative bodies.
8.4	Operational Independence of media workers' representative bodies from government influence and political party interference.

8.10	Degree to which the media workers' union is engaged in policy formulation and public agenda-setting.
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Conversely, the scores of thirty-two (32) indicators declined in 2025 compared to 2022, at varying degrees, as follows:

1.6	Existence of procedures and directives permitting journalists freedom of movement during states of emergency and lockdowns.
2.1	Imposition of high civil penalties on journalists following conviction on charges of defamation, libel, and slander.
2.6	Imposition of restrictions on or prohibition of journalists' coverage of public events and the conduct of their journalistic work.
2.7	Confiscation and/or destruction of the respondent's equipment and/or journalistic materials on grounds of their journalistic work.
2.12	Online defamation, incitement, or smear campaigns targeting journalists on grounds of publishing sensitive reports.
2.13	Whether restrictive measures, such as shutdowns and/or website blocking, were taken by official authorities against media outlets during 2025.
3.1	Licensing laws enabling government control over media outlets.
3.2	Licensing procedures impeding the operation and establishment of independent media outlets.
3.5	Transparency of media ownership procedures and equal opportunity to establish media outlets without political discrimination.
3.6	Diversity of media ownership and absence of its concentration among specific political and/or economic interests.
4.3	Existence of monopolization in the provision of internet and/or telecommunications services.
4.4	Accessibility of internet use for all, at low cost and adequate quality.
4.6	Diversity of sources, information, and content related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds.
4.7	Degree to which various media outlets cover issues related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds.
5.2	Self-censorship by media outlets, refraining from publishing journalistic material out of fear of prosecution by public authorities.
5.3	Publication of news content on online platforms followed by its retraction.
5.4	Journalists facing family and/or social pressure on grounds of publishing information.
5.5	Writers and/or editors being subjected to official or societal threats on grounds of publication.
5.6	Existence of blacklists of individuals and/or institutions barred from appearing on various or specific media outlets.

5.8	Use of coded language and substitute terms on social media platforms to avoid content being banned and/or removed by those platforms.
6.5	Whether government advertising budgets are allocated to media outlets in a fair and equitable manner.
6.7	Bribery of journalists by interested parties to influence news content in their media work.
7.2	Existence of laws and legislation provide journalists with access to information.
7.3	Clarity of restrictions imposed on access to information.
7.4	Availability of official spokespersons who provide journalists with information in a smooth and timely manner.
7.6	Pressure on journalists to disclose their sources of information.
8.2	Harassment and/or dismissal of media workers on grounds of advertiser objections to their journalistic work.
8.5	The degree to which the journalists' representative union operates with professionalism and editorial Operational Independence.
8.7	Freedom of formal media workers to join journalists' representative bodies.
8.8	The degree of representativeness of the journalists' union among media workers.
8.9	Acceptability and professionalism of membership and accreditation procedures within the media workers' union.
8.11	The degree of effectiveness of the media workers' union in intervening and advocating for the rights of its members.


Seven indicators received the same score in the most recent reading (2025) as in the 2022 reading, as follows:

1.1	Guarantees enshrined in the Basic Law for press freedom.
1.2	Alignment of national legislation with international instruments guaranteeing press freedom.
1.4	Criminalization of government officials' incitement against media outlets.
1.5	Imposition of legal restrictions on coverage of ethnic, religious, and/or national security matters.
2.11	Systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists and/or media owners as a result of their writing and/or broadcasting.
7.1	Existence of a right of access to information law.
8.6	Promotion of women's access to decision-making positions in media institutions and journalists' representative bodies.

» Results by Domain Classification Across the Seven Readings

The domain scores of the press freedom index recorded continuous declines across seven domains in 2025 compared to the scores recorded in 2022, namely: (1) the domain of legal guarantees for press freedom, (2) the domain of legal restrictions on press freedom, (3) the domain of media outlet Operational Independence, (4) the domain of funding policies, (5) the domain of media outlet Operational Independence, (6) the domain of governmental and self-censorship, and (7) the domain of transparency and access to information. Conversely, the score for the domain of journalist self-regulation recorded an increase. See the figure below.

Comparative Domain Scores of the Press Freedom Index in Palestine for the Years 2018–2025



The domain results of the press freedom index in Palestine indicate that four domains recorded score increases in 2025 compared to the scores recorded in 2022, as follows: (1) the domain of legal guarantees for press freedom, which rose by 79 points (480 versus 401); (2) the domain of legal restrictions on press freedom, which rose by 64 points (430 versus 366); (3) the domain of media outlet Operational Independence, which rose by 31 points (450 versus 419); and (4) the domain of funding policies, which rose by 94 points (390 versus 296).

Conversely, four domains recorded score declines in 2025 compared to the scores recorded in 2022, as follows: (1) the domain of media outlet Operational Independence, which fell by 27 points (390 versus 417); (2) the domain of governmental and self-censorship, which fell by nine points (330 versus 339); (3) the domain of transparency and access to information, which fell by 25 points (340 versus 365); and (4) the domain of journalist self-regulation, which fell by seven points (400 versus 407).

Comparative Domain Scores of the Press Freedom Index in Palestine by Year

Domain	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025
Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom	406	354	413	401	480
Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom	463	479	485	366	430
Operational Independence of Media Outlets	565	470	552	419	450
Media Outlets and Content Diversity	481	455	447	417	390
Governmental and Self-Censorship	515	501	546	339	330
Funding Policies	457	433	516	296	390
Transparency and Access to Information	465	490	454	365	340
Journalists' Self-Regulation	588	581	529	407	400

At the West Bank level, three domains recorded score increases in 2025 compared to the scores recorded in 2024, at varying degrees, namely: legal guarantees for press freedom, media outlets Operational Independence, and funding policies. Conversely, five domains recorded score declines at varying degrees, namely: legal restrictions on press freedom, media outlets and content diversity, governmental and self-censorship, transparency and access to information, and journalists' self-regulation.

Comparative Scores of the Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom Domain in the West Bank by Year

Domain	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2025
Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom	415	344	430	412	313	317	480
Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom	471	477	577	411	384	454	350
Operational Independence of Media Outlets	569	447	572	410	348	344	430
Media Outlets and Content Diversity	478	435	436	424	420	454	360
Governmental and Self-Censorship	543	520	583	343	357	330	310
Funding Policies	459	432	515	296	321	300	370
Transparency and Access to Information	458	493	467	370	365	355	350
Journalists' Self-Regulation	618	588	533	401	370	361	330

In the Gaza Strip, all eight domain scores recorded increases in 2025 compared to the scores recorded in 2022. However, six domains continued to register scores below those achieved in previous readings, namely: media outlet Operational Independence, media outlets and content diversity, governmental and self-censorship, funding policies, transparency and access to information, and journalist self-regulation. Meanwhile, two of the eight domains recorded their highest scores since the index was first launched in 2018.

Comparative Scores of the Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom Domain in the Gaza Strip by Year


Domain	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025
Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom	438	376	383	384	500
Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom	446	487	476	537	540
Operational Independence of Media Outlets	559	502	513	447	500
Media Outlets and Content Diversity	490	479	470	406	440
Governmental and Self-Censorship	465	476	476	328	380
Funding Policies	440	437	512	298	420
Transparency and Access to Information	475	483	429	317	320
Journalists' Self-Regulation	543	566	523	417	510

Results of Individual Indicators Across the Seven Readings


1. Sub-Index for the Domain of Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom

1.1: The indicator (existence of guarantees enshrined in the Basic Law for press freedom) maintained the same score throughout the years 2018–2025. This indicator was measured on the basis of the legal component questionnaire, where the percentage of indicator achievement reached 100%. The open-response results unanimously confirmed the existence of guarantees enshrined in the Basic Law for press freedom: “The Basic Law guaranteed both freedom of opinion and expression and the freedom to establish media stations, prohibiting their closure except by judicial order, and also guaranteed personal liberty and equality before the law”.


The Basic Law provides constitutional protection frameworks, whereby it “guarantees the establishment of newspapers and other media outlets and makes it a right for all, as well as the freedom of audiovisual and print media, freedom of printing, publishing, distribution, and broadcasting, the freedom of those working therein, the prohibition of censorship on media outlets, and the impermissibility of issuing warnings against them, suspending, confiscating, dissolving, or imposing restrictions on them, except in accordance with the law and by virtue of a judicial ruling, pursuant to Article 27 thereof”.




1.2: The percentage of indicator achievement reached 0%, resulting from a consensus in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip that national legislation has not been brought into alignment with international instruments guaranteeing press freedom following the State of Palestine’s accession to those instruments. These institutions unanimously affirmed that no harmonization of national legislation has taken place since the State of Palestine signed the international instruments guaranteeing press freedom. Accordingly, this indicator has scored 0% in the percentage of indicator achievement throughout the years 2018–2025.




1.3: The score of the indicator (availability of judicial guarantees in Palestinian courts protecting press freedom) rose in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during 2025 to 100%, compared to 52% in 2022, while it stood at approximately 62.5% in 2022. It is noted that this indicator in Palestine for the years 2018 and 2022 recorded a 10-point increase between 2018 (40%) and 2022 (52%), with this increase attributed to a rise in the indicator achievement rate in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.




1.4: The achievement percentage for the indicator (existence of legal provisions criminalizing government officials' incitement against media outlets) in Palestine reached 0%, resulting from a consensus in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the absence of any legal provisions criminalizing government officials' incitement against media outlets.



1.5: The achievement percentage for the indicator (existence of legal provisions imposing restrictions on coverage of ethnic, religious, national security, or sensitive issues such as those pertaining to children and gender) remained stable at 50% in Palestine throughout the years 2018–2025, and likewise in the West Bank for the years 2023–2024. This indicator was measured on the basis of the legal component questionnaire, where the percentage of indicator achievement reached 50% for both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The response results unanimously indicated the option of “existence of such restrictions, but in a limited form”.




1.6: The results indicated an increase in the achievement rate of the indicator (existence of procedures and directives permitting journalists freedom of movement during states of emergency and lockdowns) in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 2025. However, the indicator score remained the lowest recorded compared to previous years. At the Palestine level, the indicator declined in 2022 compared to 2020, falling from 64.8% in 2020 to 50% in 2022, and further to 48% in 2025, while in the Gaza Strip it rose from 37.6% in 2020 to 59% in 2025. This indicates that the implementation of relevant procedures has improved in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.




1.7: The results indicate that the indicator (assessment of whether the Cybercrime Law has strengthened press freedom) continued to record an increasing score at the Palestine level in 2025, with the percentage of indicator achievement rising to 34% compared to 30% in 2022, while it stood at approximately 21.6% in 2020. In the West Bank, a four-point decline was recorded in 2025 compared to 2024, while the indicator rose significantly in the Gaza Strip from 33% in 2022 to 58% in 2025. This indicates that the existence of the law cannot be considered to have yielded positive outcomes or to have strengthened

press freedom in any meaningful way, but only to a limited degree.




1.8: The results indicate that the indicator (existence of codes of conduct or legal provisions criminalizing the acceptance of bribes by media workers to influence their journalistic output) maintained the same score across the two most recent readings. In the West Bank, the indicator recorded 75.6% in both 2024 and 2025, compared to 78.9% in 2023 and approximately 50.4% in 2020. In the Gaza Strip, the percentage declined in the two most recent readings compared to 2020, standing at approximately 50.4% in 2020 versus 33% in both 2022 and 2025.




2. Sub-Index for the Domain of Legal and Societal Restrictions on Press Freedom

The following are the results for each indicator:

2.1: The achievement rate of the indicator (absence of imposition of high civil penalties on journalists following conviction on charges of defamation, libel, and slander) declined to 90% in 2025 due to a score decrease in the West Bank, while the Gaza Strip maintained a score of 100%.



2.2: The indicator achievement rate stood at 0% at the Palestine level throughout 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022, (on account of recorded arrests of journalists and/or media workers)² despite a decline in the West Bank indicator achievement rate from 61% in 2020 to 0% in 2022. The rate subsequently rose in 2023 to 20%, with (8) arrest cases documented, before falling to 10% in 2024, with 9 cases documented. In accordance with the methodology, whereby 10% is deducted per person up to a maximum of 10 individuals, and given that (9) cases were recorded, resulting in a 90% deduction, the indicator achievement rate stands at 10%. Meanwhile, in the Gaza Strip during the years 2018–2022, the indicator achievement rate rose from 0% in 2020 to 100% in 2022, which impacted the indicator achievement rate at the Palestine level. Arrests of journalists and/or media workers continued to be recorded in the West Bank in 2025, whereas no arrest cases were documented in the Gaza Strip during 2025.




2.3: The indicator achievement rate rose to 65% at the Palestine level, representing an increase of 65 points compared to 2022. The indicator score in the Gaza Strip rose significantly compared to 2022 (100% versus 0%), while in the West Bank it declined in 2025 compared to 2024, owing to (continued cases of summons and interrogation of journalists and/or media workers)⁴. The score increases recorded in the West Bank over the two most recent years are attributable to a reduction in the number of summons and interrogation cases involving journalists and/or media workers to a single case, yielding

² Indicator has been used based on data documented by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA.


³ Indicator has been used based on data documented by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA.

⁴ Indicator has been used based on data documented by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA.

an indicator achievement rate of 90% in the West Bank for 2024, compared to seven summons and interrogation cases in 2025. In 2022, the total number of summons and interrogation cases across the West Bank and Gaza Strip reached (12), distributed as follows: (9) cases in the West Bank and (3) cases in the Gaza Strip. In accordance with the indicator achievement rate calculation methodology, whereby 10% is deducted per summons or interrogation case, the indicator recorded 0% at the Palestine level throughout the four years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022.




2.4: The indicator achievement rate for (absence of recorded cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers)⁵ maintained the same score at the Palestine level. No cases were recorded in the Gaza Strip, yielding an indicator achievement rate of 100%, while the West Bank score declined by 30 points in 2025 compared to 2024, due to the documentation of (3) cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers. This is in accordance with the indicator achievement rate calculation methodology, whereby 10% is deducted per recorded torture case.




2.5: The indicator (number of physical assaults against journalists and/or media workers)⁶ recorded an increase at the Palestine level. Nevertheless, physical assaults against journalists and/or media workers persisted, with (2) cases documented in the West Bank in 2025, yielding an indicator achievement rate of 80%, compared to (9) cases in the West Bank in 2023, which yielded an indicator achievement rate of 10%, representing a decline

5 Indicator has been used based on data documented by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA.
 6 Indicator has been used based on data documented by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA.


from 2022, when (5) cases were recorded at an achievement rate of 50%, and from 2020, when a single case was recorded at an achievement rate of 90.0%. In the Gaza Strip, (7) cases were recorded, compared to (2) cases in 2022 and (3) cases in 2020. At the Palestine level, the indicator stood at 55% in 2025, compared to approximately 78% in 2018.




2.6: The results indicate that the indicator (imposition of restrictions on or prohibition of journalists’ coverage of public events and conduct of their journalistic work) declined at the West Bank level in 2025 compared to 2024 (18% versus 38.4%), having reached approximately 55.0% in 2020. The indicator achievement rate in the Gaza Strip stood at 44.5%, compared to 40% in 2022 and 52% in 2020. At the Palestine level, the indicator stood at 25% compared to 37% in 2022 and 54% in 2020, with a persistent disparity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.




2.7: A continued decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (absence of confiscation and/or destruction of the journalist’s equipment and/or journalistic materials on grounds of their journalistic work) at the Palestine level, falling from 83% in 2020 to 72% in 2022 and to 45% in 2025. In the West Bank, the rate stood at 74.7% in 2022, declined to 60.2% in 2023, recovered to 64.8% in 2024, before declining again to 42% in 2025. A corresponding decline was also observed in the Gaza Strip, from 83% in 2020 to 66% in 2022 and to 50% in 2025.




2.8: The results indicate an increase in the achievement rate of the indicator (conduct of serious investigations by official authorities into complaints filed by media workers). At the Palestine level, the indicator rose from 23.0% in 2020 to 28.0% in 2022 and subsequently to 44% in 2025. In the West Bank, the rate stood at 26.2% in 2022, declined to 21.4% in 2023, before rising to 29.6% in 2024 and to 41% in 2025. A sharp increase was also observed in the Gaza Strip, from 14% in 2020 to 33% in 2022 and to 50% in 2025. This was reflected in a 16-point increase in the indicator score at the Palestine level.




2.9: A continuous decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (compensation by public authorities for material damage resulting from attacks on the journalist's equipment) at the West Bank level, standing at 4.5% in 2022, declining to 0% in 2023, recovering to 6% in 2024, before declining once again to 0%. In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate fell from 11% in 2018 to 0% in 2022, before recovering to 12% in 2025. At the Palestine level, a decline from 12% in 2019 to 3% in 2022 was observed, followed by a recovery to 12% in 2025.




2.10: A marginal improvement was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (punitive measures taken against individuals who assaulted journalists or their colleagues). In the West Bank, the rate rose from 10% in 2018 to 16% in 2023, before declining to 12.7% in 2024 and further to 0% in 2025. In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate fell from 25% in 2020 to 22% in 2022, before rising to 30% in 2025. At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate rose to 12% in 2025 from 11% in 2022, attributable to the increase in the Gaza Strip from 22% in 2022 to 30% in 2025.




2.11: A significant decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (absence of systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists and/or media owners as a result of their writing and/or broadcasting), with the achievement rate in the Gaza Strip reaching 0% in 2025, and 33.6% in the West Bank. At the Palestine level, the rate stood at 16.8% compared to 55% in 2022. This indicator was measured on the basis of the legal component questionnaire, with responses ranging between the options of “yes, to a significant degree” and “yes, but to a limited degree”.




2.12: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (absence of widespread and arbitrary online defamation, incitement, or smear campaigns targeting journalists on grounds of publishing sensitive reports). In the West Bank, the rate stood at 39% in 2022, declined to 38.1% in 2023, fell further to 33.2% in 2024, and then to 27% in 2025. A corresponding decline was observed in the Gaza Strip, from 61% in 2020 to 40% in 2022 and to 37% in 2025. At the Palestine level, the indicator declined from 59% in 2020 to 39% in 2022, and further by 10 points in 2025.



2.13: A significant decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (absence of restrictive measures taken by official authorities against media outlets, such as shutdowns and/or website blocking) at the West Bank level, standing at 64% in 2022, rising to 66% in 2023, before declining sharply to 32% in 2024 and to 27% in 2025. A corresponding decline was also observed in the Gaza Strip, from 75.0% in 2018 to 42% in 2025. At the Palestine level, the indicator declined from 75% in 2018 to 60% in 2022 and to 33% in 2025.




2.14: The achievement rate of the indicator (imposition of restrictions on access to and/or transmission of information as a result of states of emergency) increased in the West Bank, rising from 40% in 2022 to 43% in 2025, and in the Gaza Strip from 37% in 2022 to 59% in 2025. At the Palestine level, the rate rose by 9 points, from 39% in 2022 to 48% in 2025, with this increase attributable to score gains in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.




3. Sub-Index for the Domain of Media Outlet Operational Independence

The following are the results for each indicator:


3.1: A continued decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (assessment that media licensing laws are not biased toward government control over media outlets). In the West Bank, the rate stood at 44.4% in 2022, declined to 31.6% in 2023, and fell further to 22.7% in both 2024 and 2025. In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate rose from 48.3% in 2020 to 50% in both 2022 and 2025, which impacted the indicator achievement rate at the Palestine level during 2022, before declining to 36.3% in 2025, compared to 53.8% in 2020.




3.2: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (assessment that licensing procedures do not impede the operation and establishment of independent media outlets). In the West Bank, the rate stood at 40% in 2022, declined to 30.9% in 2023, fell further to 28.5% in 2024, before recovering to 33% in 2025. In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate declined from 50.3% in 2020 to 33% in 2025. At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate declined in 2025 to 34%, compared to 58% in 2020.




3.3: A notable improvement was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (assessment of the absence of state-owned media dominance over the national news and information ecosystem). At the Palestine level, a significant improvement was observed from 39.2% in 2020 to 57% in 2025. In the West Bank, the rate stood at 40.4% in 2022, declined to 37.0% in 2024, before rising to 66% in 2025. In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate improved from 36.4% in 2020 to 48% in 2025.




3.4: An increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (public media outlets enjoying editorial Operational Independence and providing news coverage of all segments of society). In the West Bank, the rate stood at 24.3% in 2022 and rose to 30% in 2025. A sharp increase was also observed in the Gaza Strip, from 26.8% in 2022 to 49% in 2025. This contributed to an increase in the indicator achievement rate at the Palestine level from 25.1% in 2022 to 37% in 2025.




3.5: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (transparency of media ownership procedures and equal opportunity to establish media outlets without political discrimination). At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate declined from 53.2% in 2022 to 45% in 2025. In the West Bank, the rate stood at 47.1% in 2022, declined sharply to 23.8% in 2023, fell further to 16.4% in 2024, before recovering to 35% in 2025. In the Gaza Strip, a decline was observed in the indicator achievement rate from 70.8% in 2022 to 65% in 2025.



3.6: A marginal decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (existence of diversity in media ownership). In the West Bank, the rate stood at 43.4% in 2022, increased slightly to 45.8% in 2023, rose further to 50% in 2024, before declining to 44% in 2025. In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate rose from 51.7% in 2020 to 58.0% in 2022 and further to 60% in 2025. At the Palestine level, an extremely marginal decline was observed, from 48.3% in 2020 to 48.2% in 2022 and to 47% in 2025.




3.7: An increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (absence of deliberate concealment of official ownership stakes in media outlets and non-disclosure of affiliations therewith). At the Palestine level, the rate rose from 43.7% in 2022 to 60% in 2025, representing the highest achievement rate recorded for this indicator across all readings. In the West Bank, the rate stood at 46.8% in 2022, declined to 45.8% in 2023, recovered to 48.6% in 2024, before rising notably to 70% in 2025. A corresponding increase was also observed in the Gaza Strip, from 37.5% in 2022 to 46% in 2025.




4. Sub-Index for the Domain of Media Outlets and Content Diversity

The following are the results for each indicator:


4.1: An increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (existence of monopolization of information access by select media outlets and influential actors). In the West Bank, the rate stood at 34.2% in 2022, rose to 35.6% in 2024, before rising further to 44% in 2025. A corresponding increase in the indicator achievement rate was also observed in the Gaza Strip, from 26.6% in 2022 to 42% in 2025. The same pattern applies at the Palestine level, where the rate rose from 31.7% in 2022 to 43% in 2025.




4.2: An improvement was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (existence of state legislation permitting the concentration of media monopolies and cross-ownership of media outlets), with the indicator achievement rate at the Palestine level advancing from 57.1% in 2022 to 64% in 2025. This improvement is attributable to an increase in the indicator achievement rate in the Gaza Strip to 67%, compared to 61% in the West Bank. A continuous upward trend in the achievement rate of this indicator has been observed since the index was first launched. In the West Bank, the rate stood at 55.5% in 2022, rose to 65.7% in 2023, and reached 61% in 2025. In the Gaza Strip, the rate rose from 25% in 2018 to 67% in 2025.




4.3: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (existence of monopolization in the provision of internet and/or telecommunications services). In the West Bank, the rate stood at 56.3% in 2022, increased marginally to 58.7% in 2023, before declining to 58.2% in 2024 and continuing to fall to 37% in 2025. The same pattern applies in the Gaza Strip, with the rate declining from 50% in 2022 to 30% in 2025. At the Palestine level, a notable decline of 20 percentage points was recorded in the overall indicator value in 2025 compared to 2022, falling from 54.2% in 2022 to 34% in 2025.




4.4: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (universal accessibility of internet use at low cost). In the West Bank, the rate stood at 35% in 2022, declined to 31.2% in 2023, recovered to 42.4% in 2024, before falling in 2025 to 16%, the lowest score recorded for this indicator since its introduction. At the Palestine level, a decline of 7 percentage points was observed, from 34.9% in 2022 to 28% in 2025. In the Gaza Strip, the rate declined from 34.7% in 2022 to 32% in 2025.




4.5: An increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (government use of media licensing and broadcast frequency allocation as leverage against independent media outlets). In 2025, the indicator recorded the second highest score since the index was first launched. In the West Bank, it recorded the highest score since the index was first launched. In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate rose in 2025 to 40%, compared to 37.5% in 2022.



4.6: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (diversity of sources, information, and content related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds). In the West Bank, the rate stood at 31.4% in 2022, declined to 29.6% in 2023, recovered to 32.2% in 2024, before falling to 11%, the lowest level recorded across the four readings. In the Gaza Strip, the rate rose significantly to 59%, compared to 34.7% in 2022. At the Palestine level, the indicator score declined for the second consecutive reading, reaching 31%.




4.7: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (existence of coverage by various media outlets of issues related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds). At the Palestine level, the indicator rate declined to 18% in 2025 compared to 34.3% in 2022. In the West Bank, the rate stood at 33.5% in 2024 and declined to 9% in 2025. In the Gaza Strip, the rate also declined to 26% in 2025, compared to 34.3% in 2022.




5. Sub-Index for the Domain of Self-Censorship and Governmental Measures

This indicator was measured on the basis of questionnaire items relating to tools of oversight over journalistic work, as follows:


5.1: A notable decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (imposition of editorial censorship within media outlets over published content). In the West Bank, the rate stood at 38.9% in 2022, declined to 32.0% in 2023, fell further to 29.4% in 2024, before recovering to 33% in 2025. The same pattern applies at the Palestine level; although the achievement rate rose to 42% in 2025, a notable decline remains evident compared to the rate recorded in 2020 (58.4%). A marked decline was also observed in the Gaza Strip, from 60% in 2020 to 37.9% in 2022.




5.2: A marginal decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (media outlets refraining from publishing journalistic material out of fear of prosecution by public authorities) at the Palestine level, from 30% in 2022 to 29% in 2025. In the West Bank, the rate stood at 31.4% in 2022, declined to 31.1% in 2023, fell further to 27.4% in 2024, and to 24% in 2025. An increase was observed in the Gaza Strip, from 27% in 2022 to 38% in 2025.




5.3: A continued decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (retraction of news articles and content following publication on online platforms) at the Palestine level, as well as in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, since the 2020 reading, which recorded the highest score for this indicator since the index was first launched.




5.4: A continued decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (journalists facing family and/or social pressure on grounds of published information), with the indicator achievement rate at the Palestine level declining for the second consecutive reading. In the West Bank, the rate stood at 40.5% in 2022, rose to 41.8% in 2023, declined to 41.3% in 2024, and further to 31% in 2025. A marginal increase was observed in the Gaza Strip, from 33.1% in 2022 to 34% in 2025.




5.5: A continued decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (writers and/or editors being subjected to official or societal threats on grounds of publication) at the Palestine level, with the rate falling from 64% in 2019 to 39% in 2025. In the West Bank, the rate stood at 40.7% in 2022, rose to 44.3% in 2023, declined to 40.3% in 2024, and further to 36% in 2025. A corresponding decline was also observed in the Gaza Strip, from 46.8% in both 2020 and 2022 to 39% in 2025.



5.6: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (existence of blacklists of individuals and/or institutions barred from appearing on various or specific media outlets). In the West Bank, the rate stood at 36.3% in 2022, rose to 37.6% in 2023, declined to 36.4% in 2024, before recovering to 40% in 2025. The same pattern applies at the Palestine level, where the rate declined from 56.0% in 2020 to 39.5% in 2022 and further to 37% in 2025. A corresponding decline was also observed in the Gaza Strip, from 46.3% in 2020 to 33% in 2025.




5.7: A notable increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (government regulatory procedures for publishing and/or print media obstructing press freedom) at the Palestine level, from 18.1% in 2022 to 45% in 2025. This is attributable to a significant increase in the indicator achievement rate in the Gaza Strip in 2025 compared to 2022 (45% versus 8.3%). The indicator score in the West Bank also rose from 32.4% in 2024 to 45% in 2025.



5.8: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (use of coded language and substitute terms on social media platforms to avoid content being banned and/or removed by those platforms):


- At the Palestine level, the indicator declined from 20.8% in 2020 to 16.1% in 2022 and further to 14% in 2025, indicating a widespread and persistent use of coded language and substitute terms on social media platforms to circumvent content bans and/or removal by those platforms.
- In the West Bank, the rate stood at 17.2% in 2022, declined to 14.9% in 2023, fell further to 13.9% in 2024, and to 5% in 2025.
- In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate rose from 13.8% in 2022 to 27% in 2025.



6. Sub-Index for the Domain of Funding Policies


6.1: An increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (imposition of high fees for broadcast frequency allocation and/or newspaper registration):

- The indicator achievement rate at the Palestine level rose from 29.8% in 2022 to 44% in 2025.
- In the West Bank, the rate stood at 28.8% in 2024 and rose to 48% in 2025.
- In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate rose from 25% in 2022 to 35% in 2025.




6.2: A marginal increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (imposition of value-added tax on the purchase of newsprint and/or broadcasting equipment and other media equipment):

- A marginal increase was recorded at the Palestine level, from 25.6% in 2022 to 27% in 2025, though this remains below the achievement rate recorded in 2020 (35.1%).
- In the West Bank, the rate stood at 27.2% in 2022, rose notably to 40.5% in 2023, declined to 39.4% in 2024, and further to 25% in 2025.
- In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate rose from 20.9% in 2022 to 30% in 2025.




6.3: An increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (existence of restrictions on foreign funding and/or financial support for media outlets) in 2025 compared to 2022, at an increase of eighteen points at the Palestine level, and 27.5 points in the Gaza Strip. In the West Bank, the rate rose by 8 points from 29.6% in 2024 to 38% in 2025.




6.4: An increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (equitable government financial support for media outlets on the basis of market share or advertising revenue):

- In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate rose from 17.1% in 2020 to 33.4% in 2022, and further to 65% in 2025.
- In the West Bank, a continuous decline was recorded, with the rate standing at 15.7% in 2022, declining to 9.5% in 2023, falling further to 7.2% in 2024, and to 3% in 2025.
- At the Palestine level, the indicator recovered after a notable decline from 28.8% in 2020 to 20.2% in 2022, rising again to 24% in 2025.




6.5: A continued decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (equitable allocation of government advertising budgets across media outlets) at the Palestine level, with the rate continuing to fall from 27% in 2020 to 14.9% in 2022 and further to 13% in 2025.

- In the West Bank, the rate stood at 12.9% in 2022, declined to 11.9% in 2023, fell further to 6.3% in 2024, and reached 0% in 2025.
- In the Gaza Strip, the indicator recovered in 2025 following declines recorded in the 2019, 2020, and 2022 readings.




6.6: An increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (absence of the use of advertising as a pressure mechanism to influence editorial decisions):

- The indicator achievement rate at the Palestine level rose from 46.9% in 2022 to 61% in 2025.
- In the West Bank, a continuous upward trend was observed, with the rate standing at 47.2% in 2022, rising to 50.1% in 2023, advancing to 57.2% in 2024, and reaching 75% in 2025.
- In the Gaza Strip, a notable decline was recorded, from 77.5% in 2020 to 47.2% in 2022 and further to 30% in 2025.




6.7: A marginal decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (absence of bribery of journalists by interested parties to influence news content in their media work):

- A marginal decline was recorded at the Palestine level, from 56.1% in 2022 to 53% in 2025.
- In the West Bank, the rate stood at 55.6% in 2022, remained relatively stable at 56% in 2023, before rising to 59.2% in 2024, with a marginal further increase in 2025.
- In the Gaza Strip, a significant decline was recorded, from 85.6% in 2020 to 57.2% in 2022 and further to 43% in 2025.




6.8: A marginal increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (salary levels of journalists and other media professionals being sufficiently high to mitigate susceptibility to bribery):

- In the Gaza Strip, a significant increase was recorded, from 15.2% in 2022 to 47% in 2025.
- In the West Bank, the rate stood at 16.8% in 2022, declined to 11.9% in 2023, fell further to 9.3% in 2024, and to 4% in 2025.
- At the Palestine level, a sharp decline was recorded from 57.7% in 2020 to 16.2% in 2022, though the rate recovered by five points in the most recent reading.




6.9: A significant increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (whether the respondent and/or their colleagues at the institution have been subjected to salary reductions and/or contract terminations):

- The indicator recorded an achievement rate of 67% at the Palestine level, indicating an improvement in salary conditions and/or employment continuity.
- In the West Bank, the indicator recovered, with the achievement rate reaching 79% in 2025 compared to 33.3% in 2024.
- In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate rose to 49% in 2025 compared to 37.5% in 2022.
- A wide disparity is evident between the indicator achievement rates in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 2025 (79% versus 37.5%).




7. Sub-Index for the Domain of Transparency and Access to Information

7.1: The indicator (existence of a law guaranteeing the right of access to information) has continued to score 0 points in Palestine across the five readings from 2018 to 2025, with scores of 0 points in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for the same years. Response results unanimously confirmed the absence of any law guaranteeing the right of access to information.




7.2: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (existence of laws and legislation providing journalists with access to information):

- At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate declined from 26.6% in 2022 to 10% in 2025.
- In the West Bank, the rate stood at 30.6% in 2022, declined to 26.3% in 2023, recovered to 29.0% in 2024, before declining again to 20% in 2025.
- In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate continued to register a persistently low rate of 0% in both 2022 and 2025.




7.3: A continued decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (clarity of restrictions imposed on access to information):


- At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate declined to 33% in 2025 compared to 42% in 2022.
- In the West Bank, the rate stood at 41.5% in 2022, declined to 39.7% in 2023, fell further to 35.3% in 2024, and continued to decline to 23% in 2025.
- In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate rose to 48% in 2025 compared to 42.9% in 2022.



7.4: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (contribution of official spokespersons to providing information necessary for journalistic work) in 2025 compared to the achievement rates recorded in previous readings.




7.5: An increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (permission granted to journalists to embed with security forces during field operations) in 2025 compared to the achievement rate recorded in the previous reading, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.




7.6: A marginal decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (absence of direct or indirect pressure on journalists to disclose sources of information obtained and published):

- At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate continued to decline over the years, recording its highest score in 2018 and its lowest score in 2025, reflecting an increase in journalists' exposure to direct and indirect pressure to disclose their sources of information.
- In the West Bank, the rate stood at 47.2% in 2022, declined to 44.7% in 2023, fell further to 41.4% in 2024, before recovering to 52% in 2025.
- In the Gaza Strip, the rate stood at 42.9% in 2022 and declined to 31% in 2025.




7.7: An increase, at varying degrees, was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (perception of violation of journalists' privacy by public authorities) in 2025 compared to the achievement rate recorded in the previous reading, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.



7.8: Regarding the indicator (proactive sharing of public information across various media platforms by government officials and relevant authorities):


- In the West Bank, the rate stood at 36.2% in 2022, declined marginally to 36.0% in 2023, fell further to 33.1% in 2024, before rising significantly to 71% in 2025 — reflecting a shift in the policy of the Palestinian Government and a number of public institutions regarding information-sharing across media platforms during the recent period.
- In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate declined from 42.0% in 2022 to 36% in 2025.
- At the Palestine level, the rate stood at 38% in 2022 and rose to 58% in 2025.



8. Sub-Index for the Domain of Journalists' Self-Regulation and Protection

8.1: An increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (existence of laws allowing journalists to establish representative bodies/trade unions):


- In the West Bank, the indicator achievement rate stood at 41.1% in 2022, declined slightly to 40.8% in 2023, fell further to 40.4% in 2024, before increasing significantly to 60% in 2025.
- In the Gaza Strip, the rate stood at 51.8% in 2022 and increased to 58% in 2025.
- At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate rose from 44.6% in 2022 to 59% in 2025, reflecting relative stability in this area without substantial structural improvement.




8.2: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (dismissal of media employees due to pressure from advertisers in response to their journalistic work):

- At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate declined for the third consecutive reading, dropping significantly from 65.9% in 2020 to 42.9% in 2022, and further to 35% in 2025.

- In the West Bank, the rate stood at 41.5% in 2022, increased to 46.4% in 2023, declined again to 34.8% in 2024, and fell slightly further to 34% in 2025.
- In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate declined markedly from 65.9% in 2020 to 45.5% in 2022, reaching 37% in 2025.




8.3: An increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (holding regular periodic elections within the journalists' representative body/trade union) in 2025 compared to the achievement rate recorded in the previous reading, in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, relative to the 2022 reading.




8.4: A slight increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (Operational Independence of representative bodies of media workers from government and political party influence):

- At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate increased to 27% in 2025 compared to 23% in 2022.
- In the Gaza Strip, the rate stood at 18.0% in 2022 and increased to 50% in 2025.
- In the West Bank, the indicator achievement rate stood at 25.5% in 2022, declined slightly to 24.9% in 2023, fell further to 21.3% in 2024, and declined again to 13% in 2025, indicating a deterioration in this aspect in recent years.




8.5: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (professionalism and Operational Independence of the journalists' representative union):

- At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate declined from 33.4% in 2022 to 21% in 2025.
- In the Gaza Strip, the rate stood at 33.8% in 2022 and increased to 50% in 2025.
- In the West Bank, the indicator achievement rate declined from 33.1% in 2022 to 19% in 2025, reflecting instability in this indicator.




8.6: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (encouraging women's access to decision-making positions within media institutions and journalists' representative bodies). This indicator recorded its lowest score across all seven readings in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.




8.7: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (freedom of employees in state-owned media institutions to join journalists' representative bodies):

- At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate declined from 48.2% in 2022 to 36% in 2025, reflecting deterioration in this indicator during the recent period.
- In the West Bank, the rate stood at 47.7% in 2022, declined to 41.5% in 2023, fell further to 39.2% in 2024, and reached 24% in 2025.
- In contrast, the indicator achievement rate in the Gaza Strip increased from 49.2% in 2022 to 54% in 2025.




8.8: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (representativeness of the union body for media workers):

- At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate declined from 44.3% in 2022 to 42.6%, and further to 38% in 2025.
- In the West Bank, the rate declined from 36% in 2024 to 29% in 2025, reflecting continued deterioration in this aspect.
- In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate stood at 47.8% in 2022 and increased slightly to 51% in 2025.




8.9: A decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (membership and affiliation procedures within the media workers’ union body being considered acceptable and professional):

- At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate declined from 49.9% in 2022 to 43% in 2025.
- In the West Bank, the rate stood at 51.9% in 2022, declined to 41.1% in 2023, fell further to 40.1% in 2024, and continued declining to 33% in 2025, indicating regression in this indicator during recent years.
- In the Gaza Strip, the indicator achievement rate increased from 46.0% in 2022 to 57% in 2025.




8.10: A slight increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (involvement of the media workers’ union body in shaping public policies and general orientations):

- At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate increased from 32.9% in 2022 to 35% in 2025.
- In the Gaza Strip, the rate rose from 36.1% in 2022 to 52% in 2025.
- In contrast, the indicator achievement rate in the West Bank declined from 29.2% in 2024 to 26% in 2025.



8.11: A slight decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator (effectiveness of the media workers' union body in intervening and defending the rights of its members):

- At the Palestine level, the indicator achievement rate declined from 45.2% in 2022 to 43% in 2025.
- In the West Bank, the rate declined from 41.8% in 2024 to 35% in 2025.
- In contrast, the indicator achievement rate in the Gaza Strip increased from 45.5% in 2022 to 54% in 2025.



Annexes

Annex No. (1): Indicator Achievement Rate by Domain and Region During the Years 2018–2025

Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom	West Bank						Gaza Strip						Palestine				
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025
1.1 Legal guarantees for freedom of the press.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
1.2 Alignment of national legislation with international standards safeguarding press freedom.	0%	0%	0.0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0%	0%
1.3 Judicial safeguards within Palestinian courts protecting freedom of the press.	41%	39%	44.0%	63%	48.7%	52.3%	100.0%	38%	67%	44.0%	38%	100%	40%	48%	44.0%	52%	100%
1.4 Criminalization of incitement by government officials against media outlets.	0%	0%	0.0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0%	0%
1.5 Imposition of legal restrictions on coverage of ethnic, religious, and/or national security issues.	50%	50%	50%	50%	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%
1.6 Existence of procedures and directives allowing journalists freedom of movement during states of emergency and lockdowns.		80.0%	80.0%	50%	30.3%	29.8%	41.0%			37.6%	52%	59%			64.8%	50%	48%
1.7 The Cybercrime Law has strengthened freedom of the press.			20.0%	28%	21.4%	21.2%	17.0%			24.8%	33%	58%			21.6%	30%	34%
1.8 Legal or ethical codes criminalize bribery of media workers intended to influence their professional activities.			50.4%	39%	78.9%	75.6%	75.6%			50.4%	33%	33%			50.4%	54%	54%

Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom	West Bank						Gaza Strip					Palestine						
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025	
2.1 Imposition of excessive civil fines on journalists convicted of libel, slander, or defamation offenses.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	80.0%	80.0%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	90.0%
2.2 Number of arrests of journalists and/or media workers.	0%	0%	61%	0%	20%	10.0%	0.0%	40%	0%	0%	100%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	50.0%
2.3 Number of summonses and interrogations involving journalists and/or media workers.	0%	0%	0%	10%	30%	90.0%	30.0%	0%	0%	0%	70%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	65.0%
2.4 Number of torture cases involving journalists and/or media workers.			90%	70%	60%	100.0%	70.0%				80%	100%	100%			85%	85%	85.0%
2.5 Number of physical assaults against journalists and/or media workers.	80%	72%	90%	50%	10%	80.0%	80.0%	75%	73%	70%	80%	30%	78%	73%	61%	30%	30%	55.0%
2.6 Restrictions on or prevention of journalists from covering public events and carrying out their journalistic work.			55%	35%	33%	38.4%	18.0%			52%	40%	44.5%				54%	37%	25.0%
2.7 Confiscation and/or destruction of my equipment and/or journalistic materials due to my journalistic work.	78%	73%	83%	75%	60%	64.8%	42.0%	73%	70%	83%	66%	50%	76%	72%	83%	72%	72%	45.0%
2.8 Serious investigations conducted by official authorities into complaints submitted by media workers.	58%	61%	27%	26%	21%	29.6%	41.0%	68%	58%	14%	33%	50%				23%	28%	44.0%

2.9 Compensation provided by public authorities for material damage resulting from attacks on my equipment.	13%	7%	39%	4%	0%	6.0%	0.0%	11%	17%	11%	0%	12%	12%	10%	30%	3%	5.0%
2.10 Punitive measures taken against individuals who assaulted me or one of my colleagues.	10%	30%	38%	6%	16%	12.7%	0.0%	17%	33%	25%	22%	30%	13%	31%	34%	11%	12.0%
2.11 Systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists and/or media owners as a result of published or broadcast content.	100%	100%	51%	59%	53%	33.6%	33.6%	90%	100%	51%	34%	0%	90%	100%	51%	55%	16.8%
2.12 Online defamation, incitement, or smear campaigns targeting journalists because of their publication of sensitive reports.	42%	37%	58%	39%	38%	33.2%	27.0%	42%	37%	61%	40%	33%	42%	37%	59%	39%	29.0%
2.13 Restrictive measures imposed by public authorities against media outlets during 2025, including closure and/or blocking.	75%	0%	73%	64%	66%	32.0%	27.0%	75%	0%	69%	34%	42%	75%	0%	72%	60%	33.0%
2.14 Restrictions on access to and/or dissemination of information due to a state of emergency.			48%	40%	32%	27.8%	43.0%			52%	37%	59%			49%	39%	48.0%

Operational Independence of Media Outlets	West Bank						Gaza Strip				Palestine						
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025
3.1 Licensing laws that enable government control over the media.	54%	42%	58.0%	44.4%	31.6%	22.7%	22.7%	54.0%	51.6%	48.3%	50.0%	50.0%	54.3%	46.1%	53.8%	45.2%	36.3%
3.2 Licensing procedures that hinder the establishment and operation of independent media outlets.	58%	45%	62.2%	40.0%	30.9%	28.5%	33.0%	56.0%	53.1%	50.3%	33.3%	35.0%	57.1%	48.7%	58.0%	38.3%	34.0%
3.3 Dominance of state-owned media over the country's news and information landscape.	72%	44%	40.6%	40.4%	38.7%	37.0%	66.0%	64.0%	50.3%	37.8%	36.4%	48.0%	69.3%	46.3%	39.2%	39.1%	57.0%
3.4 Editorial Operational Independence of state media and inclusiveness in covering all segments of society.	34%	35%	70.6%	24.3%	26.6%	37.7%	30.0%	27.9%	29.8%	66.4%	26.8%	49.0%	31.8%	33.3%	69.2%	25.1%	37.0%
3.5 Transparency of media ownership procedures and equal opportunities to establish media outlets without political discrimination.	42%	45%	71.3%	47.1%	23.8%	16.4%	35.0%	56.0%	54.7%	58.7%	70.8%	65.0%	47.1%	49.3%	68.5%	53.2%	45.0%
3.6 Diversity of media ownership and the absence of concentration among specific political and/or economic interests.	67%	49%	46.2%	43.4%	45.8%	50.0%	44.0%	78.0%	66.1%	51.7%	58.0%	60.0%	70.7%	55.9%	48.3%	48.2%	47.0%

3.7 Deliberate concealment of public officials' ownership of media outlets and their affiliations with such outlets.	52%	54%	51.0%	46.8%	45.8%	48.6%	70.0%	36.0%	44.8%	44.8%	44.8%	37.5%	46.0%	46.4%	50.3%	49.0%	43.7%	60.0%
Media Outlets and Content Diversity	West Bank								Gaza Strip				Palestine					
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025	
4.1 Monopoly over access to information by a limited number of media outlets and influential actors.	54.4%	46.6%	35.7%	34.2%	30.1%	35.6%	44%	50.0%	46.4%	29.4%	26.6%	42%	52.8%	46.4%	33.6%	31.7%	43%	
4.2 State provision of laws enabling monopolization and cross-ownership concentration in the media sector.	25.0%	28.5%	54.5%	55.5%	65.7%	60.6%	61%	25.0%	33.3%	53.8%	66.6%	67%	25.0%	31.5%	54.5%	57.1%	64%	
4.3 Existence of monopolies in the provision of internet and/or telecommunications services.	31.1%	19.7%	39.9%	56.3%	58.7%	58.2%	37%	44.0%	26.0%	47.6%	50.0%	30%	35.7%	22.2%	42.7%	54.2%	34%	
4.4 Universal access to the internet at affordable cost and adequate quality.	37.7%	21.6%	25.9%	35.0%	31.2%	42.4%	16%	48.0%	43.0%	35.7%	34.7%	32%	41.4%	30.0%	29.4%	34.9%	28%	
4.5 Government use of media licensing and frequency allocation as a means of pressure against independent media.	44.4%	56.8%	64.3%	50.0%	50.0%	55.1%	75%	50.9%	46.8%	67.8%	37.5%	40%	46.1%	52.6%	65.0%	46.8%	63%	
4.6 Diversity of sources, information, and content related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds.			49.7%	31.4%	29.6%	32.2%	11%			60.8%	34.7%	59%			53.8%	32.5%	31%	

4.7 Extent of media coverage of issues related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds.																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																										
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5.7 Government censorship procedures governing publication and/or printed materials hinder media freedom.	74%	47%	60.0%	21.4%	38.1%	32.4%	45%	64%	53%	36.0%	8.3%	45%	71%	49%	54.4%	18.1%	45%
5.8 Use of coded language or alternative expressions on social media platforms to avoid blocking and/or deletion of content.			24.0%	17.2%	14.9%	13.9%	5%			14.4%	13.8%	27%			20.8%	16.1%	14%

Funding Policies	West Bank							Gaza Strip					Palestine				
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025
6.1 Imposition of high fees for obtaining broadcasting frequencies and/or registering newspapers and websites.	38%	47%	43.2%	31.5%	32.5%	28.8%	48%	54%	44%	40.5%	25.0%	35%	44%	45%	42.3%	29.8%	44%
6.2 Imposition of value-added tax on the purchase of paper, newsprint, broadcasting equipment, and other media equipment.	48%	56%	29.7%	27.2%	40.5%	39.4%	25%	42%	37%	50.5%	20.9%	30%	46%	48%	35.1%	25.6%	27%
6.3 Restrictions on foreign funding and/or support for media outlets.	56%	34%	64.0%	24.3%	42.9%	29.6%	38%	42%	56%	59.5%	12.5%	40%	51%	43%	63.1%	21.3%	39%
6.4 Fair allocation of state financial support to media outlets based on market share or advertising market criteria.	16%	20%	29.7%	15.7%	9.5%	7.2%	3%	14%	14%	17.1%	33.4%	65%	15%	18%	28.8%	20.2%	24%
6.5 Fair distribution of government advertising budgets across media outlets.	60%	44%	27.9%	12.9%	11.9%	6.3%	0%	58%	36%	22.5%	20.9%	40%	59%	41%	27.0%	14.9%	13%

	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2025	Gaza Strip					Palestine				
								2018	2019	2020	2022	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025
6.6 Use of advertising as a means of pressure to influence editors' decisions.	57%	49%	67.6%	47.2%	50.1%	57.2%	75%	64%	66%	77.5%	45.9%	30%	59%	56%	69.4%	46.9%	61%
6.7 Bribery of journalists by influential actors to influence news content in their media work.	90%	87%	86.5%	55.6%	56.0%	59.2%	61%	89%	86%	85.6%	57.2%	43%	89%	86%	86.5%	56.1%	53%
6.8 Salary levels of journalists and other media professionals are sufficient to reduce vulnerability to bribery.	29%	23%	57.7%	16.8%	11.9%	9.3%	4%	36%	28%	58.6%	15.2%	47%	32%	25%	57.7%	16.2%	21%
6.9 Pressure exerted on journalists through salary reductions and/or termination of contracts during states of emergency and lockdowns.			56.8%	35.4%	34.0%	33.3%	79%			50.5%	37.5%	49%			55.0%	36.1%	67%
Transparency and Access to Information		West Bank						Gaza Strip					Palestine				
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025
7.1 Existence of a right to information law.	0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
7.2 Existence of laws and regulations enabling journalists' access to information.	0%	21%	21.6%	30.6%	26.3%	29.0%	20%	25%	17%	16.8%	0.0%	0%	10%	20%	20.0%	26.2%	10.0%
7.3 Clarity of restrictions imposed on access to information.	47%	64%	52.8%	41.5%	39.7%	35.3%	23%	47%	53%	44.8%	42.9%	48%	47%	60%	50.4%	42.0%	33.0%
7.4 Availability of official spokespersons who provide information to journalists efficiently and promptly.	53%	52%	62.4%	46.6%	44.0%	46.6%	28%	64%	61%	69.6%	53.1%	47%	58%	55%	64.8%	48.8%	36.0%

7.5 Permission for journalists to accompany security forces during field operations.	44%	43%	54.4%	29.4%	23.3%	23.7%	36%	37%	33%	44.0%	34.4%	52%	41%	40%	51.2%	31.1%	41.0%
7.6 Pressure on journalists to reveal their sources of information.	85%	71%	73.6%	47.2%	44.7%	41.4%	52%	75%	82%	76.0%	42.9%	31%	81%	75%	74.4%	45.8%	43.0%
7.7 Violations of journalists' privacy by public authorities.			51.2%	42.0%	41.2%	38.1%	52%			50.4%	38.4%	42%			51.2%	40.8%	48.0%
7.8 Public dissemination of information through various media outlets by government officials and competent authorities.			56.8%	36.2%	36.0%	33.1%	71%			41.6%	42.0%	36%			52.0%	38.2%	58.0%

Journalists Self-Regulation and Their Protection	West Bank						Gaza Strip						Palestine					
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025	2018	2019	2020	2022	2025	
8.1 Existence of laws allowing journalists to establish representative bodies (trade unions/professional associations) within the media sector.	100%	100%	61.5%	41.1%	40.8%	40.4%	60.0%	100%	100%	57.1%	51.8%	58%	100%	100%	60.4%	44.6%	59.0%	
8.2 Restrictions and/or dismissal of media employees following pressure from advertisers regarding their journalistic work.	75%	61%	64.8%	41.5%	46.4%	34.8%	34.0%	75%	71%	65.9%	45.5%	37%	75%	65%	65.9%	42.9%	35.0%	
8.3 Regular periodic elections within representative bodies of media workers.	50%	36%	41.8%	36.8%	39.4%	44.9%	44.0%	0%	17%	30.8%	34.5%	49%	30%	30%	37.4%	36.0%	46.0%	

8.4 Operational Independence of representative bodies of media workers from government and political party influence.	49%	55%	26.4%	25.5%	24.9%	21.3%	13.0%	48%	46%	29.7%	18.0%	50%	49%	52%	27.5%	23.0%	27.0%
8.5 The representative journalists' union operates professionally and independently.	43%	38%	29.7%	33.1%	22.2%	26.7%	19.0%	40%	36%	28.6%	33.8%	50%	42%	37%	29.7%	33.4%	21.0%
8.6 Promotion of women's access to decision-making positions in media institutions and representative journalists' bodies.	81%	75%	54.9%	49.3%	43.7%	47.1%	42.0%	62%	67%	52.7%	55.5%	54%	74%	72%	53.8%	51.4%	51.0%
8.7 Freedom of employees in state media to join representative journalists' bodies.			48.4%	47.7%	41.5%	39.2%	24.0%			41.8%	49.2%	54%			46.2%	48.2%	36.0%
8.8 Degree of representation of the trade union/body representing media workers.			57.1%	42.6%	41.1%	36.0%	29.0%			60.4%	47.8%	51%			58.2%	44.3%	38.0%
8.9 Membership and affiliation procedures within the representative body of media workers are fair and professional.			53.8%	51.9%	41.1%	40.1%	33.0%			59.3%	46.0%	57%			56.0%	49.9%	43.0%
8.10 Degree of involvement of the representative body of media workers in shaping public policies and general directions.			68.1%	31.3%	30.9%	29.2%	26.0%			69.2%	36.1%	52%			69.2%	32.9%	35.0%
8.11 Effectiveness of the representative body of media workers in intervening and defending the rights of its members.			79.1%	45.1%	39.6%	41.8%	35.0%			78.0%	45.5%	54%			79.1%	45.2%	43.0%

» Annex No. (2): Indicators and Scoring Criteria

1	Legal Guarantees for Freedom of the Press			
No.	Question	Scoring Criteria	Information Verification	Category
1.1	Legal guarantees for freedom of the press enshrined in the Basic Law.	(Exists = 1000) (No guarantees = 0)	Review of legal texts	Legislation
1.2	Alignment of national legislation with international standards safeguarding press freedom.	(Yes, to a large extent = 1000) (Yes, partially = 500) (No alignment = 0)	Review of legal texts	Practices
1.3	Judicial safeguards within Palestinian courts protecting freedom of the press.	(Strong safeguards exist = 1000) (Moderate safeguards exist = 750) (Weak safeguards exist = 500) (No safeguards exist = 0)	Review of legal texts	Legislation
1.4	Criminalization of incitement by government officials against media outlets.	(Yes = 1000) (No = 0)	Review of legal texts	Practices
1.5	Imposition of legal restrictions on coverage of ethnic, religious, and/or national security issues.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No restrictions exist = 1000)	Review of legal texts	Practices
1.6	Existence of procedures and directives allowing journalists freedom of movement during states of emergency and lockdowns.	(Yes, adequately = 1000) (Yes, partially = 500) (No = 0)	Survey of media workers	Legislation
1.7	The Cybercrime Law has strengthened freedom of the press.	(Yes, to a large extent = 1000) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No = 0)	Survey of media workers	Legislation
1.8	Legal or ethical codes criminalize bribery of media workers intended to influence their professional activities.	(Yes = 1000) (No = 0)	Review of legal texts	Legislation

2 Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom				
No.	Question	Scoring Criteria	Information Verification	Category
2.1	Imposition of excessive civil fines on journalists following convictions for libel, slander, and defamation offenses.	Deduction of (10%) for each person, up to a maximum of (10 persons).	MADA Center violations report	Practices
2.2	Number of arrests of journalists and/or media workers.	Deduction of (10%) for each person, up to a maximum of (10 persons).	MADA Center violations report	Practices
2.3	Number of summonses and interrogations involving journalists and/or media workers.	Deduction of (10%) for each person, up to a maximum of (10 persons).	MADA Center violations report	Practices
2.4	Number of torture cases involving journalists and/or media workers.	Deduction of (10%) for each person, up to a maximum of (10 persons).	MADA Center violations report	Practices
2.5	Number of physical assaults against journalists and/or media workers.	Deduction of (10%) for each person, up to a maximum of (10 persons).	MADA Center violations report	Practices
2.6	Restrictions imposed on or prevention of journalists from covering public events and carrying out their journalistic work.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No restrictions = 1000)	Survey of media workers	Practices
2.7	Confiscation and/or destruction of my equipment and/or journalistic materials due to my journalistic work.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No incidents = 1000)	Survey of media workers	Practices
2.8	Serious investigations conducted by official authorities into complaints submitted by media workers.	(Yes = 1000) (No = 0) (Not applicable)	Survey of media workers	Practices
2.9	Compensation provided by public authorities for material damage resulting from attacks on my equipment.	(Yes = 1000) (No = 0) (Not applicable)	Survey of media workers	Practices

2.10	Punitive measures taken against individuals who assaulted me or one of my colleagues.	(Yes = 1000) (No = 0) (Not applicable)	Survey of media workers	Practices
2.11	Systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists and/or media owners as a result of published writings and/or broadcasts.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No such cases = 1000)	Review of legal texts	Practices
2.12	Online defamation, incitement, or smear campaigns targeting journalists because of publishing sensitive reports.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No such incidents = 1000)	Survey of media workers	Practices
2.13	Restrictive measures imposed by official authorities against media outlets, including closure and/or blocking.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No such measures = 1000)	Survey of media workers	Practices
2.14	Restrictions imposed on access to and/or dissemination of information due to a state of emergency.	(Broad measures imposed = 0) (Limited measures imposed = 500) (No measures imposed = 1000)	Review of legal texts	Practices

3	Operational Independence of Media Outlets			
No.	Question	Scoring Criteria	Information Verification	Category
3.1	Licensing laws that enable government control over the media.	(Yes, clearly = 0) (Yes, but not clearly = 500) (No such laws = 1000)	Review of legal texts	Legislation
3.2	Licensing procedures hinder the establishment and operation of independent media outlets.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No obstacles = 1000)	Survey of media managers and owners	Practices

3.3	Dominance of state-owned media over the country's news and information landscape.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No dominance = 1000)	Survey of media workers, managers and owners	Practices
3.4	Editorial Operational Independence of state media and inclusiveness in covering all segments of society.	(Yes, clearly = 1000) (Yes, but weakly = 500) (No Operational Independence = 0)	Survey of media workers	Practices
3.5	Transparency of media ownership procedures and equal opportunities to establish media outlets without political discrimination.	(Yes, clearly = 1000) (Yes, but inadequately = 500) (No transparency = 0)	Survey of media managers and owners	Legislation
3.6	Diversity of media ownership and the absence of concentration among specific political and/or economic interests.	(Yes, to a large extent = 1000) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No diversity = 0)	Survey of media workers, managers and owners	Practices
3.7	Deliberate concealment of public officials' ownership of media outlets and their affiliations with such outlets.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No such concealment = 1000)	Survey of media workers, managers and owners	Practices

4	Media Outlets and Content Diversity			
No.	Question	Scoring Criteria	Information Verification	Category
4.1	Monopoly over access to information by a limited number of media outlets and influential actors.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No concentration of ownership = 1000)	Survey of media workers, managers and owners	Practices

4.2	State provision of laws enabling monopolization and cross-ownership concentration in the media sector.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No monopolies exist = 1000)	Survey of media workers, managers and owners	Legislation
4.3	Existence of monopolies in the provision of internet and/or telecommunications services.	(Yes, monopoly exists to a large extent = 0) (Yes, monopoly exists to a limited extent = 500) (No monopoly exists = 1000)	Survey of media workers, managers and owners	Practices
4.4	Universal access to the internet at affordable cost and adequate quality.	(Yes, always = 1000) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No = 0)	Survey of media workers, managers and owners	Practices
4.5	Government use of media licensing and frequency allocation as a means of pressure against independent media.	(Yes, used extensively = 0) (Yes, used to a limited extent = 500) (Not used = 1000)	Survey of media managers and owners	Practices
4.6	Diversity of sources, information, and content.	(Yes, applied extensively = 0) (Yes, applied to a limited extent = 500) (No = 1000)	Survey of media workers	Practices
4.7	Extent of media coverage of issues related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds.	(Yes, extensively covered = 1000) (Yes, covered to a limited extent = 500) (No coverage = 0)	Survey of media workers, managers and owners	Practices

5	Self-Censorship and Governmental Measures			
No.	Question	Scoring Criteria	Information Verification	Category
5.1	Imposition of editorial censorship on published media content.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No censorship = 1000)	Survey of media workers, managers and owners	Practices

5.2	Media outlets refrain from publishing journalistic material for fear of prosecution by public authorities.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No refraining = 1000)	Survey of media workers, managers and owners	Practices
5.3	Publication of news on online platforms followed by its subsequent withdrawal.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No = 1000)	Survey of media workers, managers and owners	Practices
5.4	Journalists subjected to family and/or societal pressure because of publishing information.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No = 1000)	Survey of media managers and owners	Practices
5.5	Writers and/or editors subjected to official or societal threats because of published content.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No = 1000)	Survey of media workers, managers and owners	Practices
5.6	Existence of blacklists of persons and/or institutions prohibited from appearing in some or all media outlets.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No blacklists exist = 1000)	Survey of media workers, managers and owners	Practices
5.7	Government censorship procedures governing publication and/or printed materials hinder media freedom.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No such procedures = 1000)	Survey of media managers and owners	Practices
5.8	Use of coded language or alternative expressions on social media platforms to avoid blocking and/or deletion of content.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No = 1000)	Survey of media workers	Practices

6	Funding Policies			
No.	Question	Scoring Criteria	Information Verification	Category
6.1	Imposition of high fees for obtaining broadcasting frequencies and/or registering newspapers and websites.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No = 1000)	Managers and owners of media outlets	Legislation

6.2	Imposition of value-added tax on the purchase of paper, newsprint, broadcasting equipment, and other media equipment.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No tax = 1000)	Managers and owners of media outlets	Legislation
6.3	Restrictions on foreign funding and/or support for media outlets.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No restrictions = 1000)	Survey of media workers, managers and owners	Legislation
6.4	Fair allocation of state financial support to media outlets based on market share or advertising market criteria.	(Yes, always = 1000) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No support = 0)	Survey of media managers and owners	Practices
6.5	Fair distribution of government advertising budgets across media outlets.	(Yes, always = 1000) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No allocation = 0)	Survey of media managers and owners	Practices
6.6	Use of advertising as a means of pressure to influence editors' decisions.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (Not used = 1000)	Survey of media managers and owners	Practices
6.7	Bribery of journalists by influential actors to influence news content in their media work.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No bribery = 1000)	Survey of media workers	Practices
6.8	Salary levels of journalists and other media professionals are sufficient to reduce vulnerability to bribery.	(Yes, adequately = 1000) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No = 0)	Survey of media workers	Practices
6.9	Pressure exerted on journalists through salary reductions and/or termination of employment contracts.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No pressure = 1000)	Survey of media workers	Practices

7	Transparency and Access to Information			
No.	Question	Scoring Criteria	Information Verification	Category
7.1	Existence of a right to information law.	(Yes = 1000) (No = 0)	Review of legal texts	Legislation
7.2	Existence of laws and regulations enabling journalists' access to information.	(Yes, effectively = 1000) (Yes, but weakly = 500) (No such laws or regulations = 0)	Review of legal texts	Practices
7.3	Clarity of restrictions imposed on access to information.	(Yes, clearly = 1000) (Yes, but unclearly = 500) (No clarity = 0)	Survey of media workers	Legislation
7.4	Availability of official spokespersons who provide information to journalists efficiently and promptly.	(Yes, to a large extent = 1000) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No spokespersons available = 0)	Survey of media workers	Practices
7.5	Permission for journalists to accompany security forces during field operations.	(Yes, always = 1000) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (Not permitted = 0)	Survey of media workers	Practices
7.6	Pressure on journalists to reveal their sources of information.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No pressure = 1000)	Survey of media workers	Practices
7.7	Violations of journalists' privacy by public authorities.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No violations = 1000)	Survey of media workers	Practices
7.8	Public dissemination of information through various media outlets by government officials and competent authorities.	(Yes, to a large extent = 1000) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No dissemination = 0)	Survey of media workers	Practices

8 Journalists' Trade Union Organization				
No.	Question	Scoring Criteria	Information Verification	Category
8.1	Existence of laws allowing journalists to establish representative bodies (trade unions/professional associations) within the media sector.	(Yes = 1000) (No = 0)	Review of legal texts Survey of media workers	Legislation
8.2	Restrictions and/or dismissal of media employees following pressure from advertisers regarding their journalistic work.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No = 1000)	Survey of media workers	Practices
8.3	Regular periodic elections within representative bodies of media workers.	(Held regularly according to the scheduled timeframe = 1000) (Held irregularly with minor delays = 750) (Held irregularly with significant delays = 500) (No elections held at all = 0)	Survey of media workers	Practices
8.4	Operational Independence of representative bodies of media workers from government and political party influence.	(Yes, fully independent = 1000) (Yes, but weakly independent = 500) (No Operational Independence = 0)	Survey of media workers	Practices
8.5	The representative journalists' union operates professionally and independently.	(Yes, to a large extent = 1000) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No professionalism/ Operational Independence = 0)	Survey of media workers	Practices
8.6	Promotion of women's access to decision-making positions within media institutions and representative journalists' bodies.	(Yes, to a large extent = 1000) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No barriers exist = 1000)	Survey of media workers	Practices

8.7	Freedom of employees in state media to join representative journalists' bodies.	(Yes, clearly = 1000) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No such freedom = 0)	Survey of media workers	Practices
8.8	Degree of representation of the trade union/body representing media workers.	(High = 1000) (Weak = 500) (Non-existent = 0)	Survey of media workers	Practices
8.9	Membership and affiliation procedures within the representative body of media workers are fair and professional.	(Yes, clearly = 1000) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No such procedures = 0)	Survey of media workers	Practices
8.10	Degree of involvement of the representative body of media workers in shaping public policies and general directions.	(High = 1000) (Weak = 500) (Non-existent = 0)	Survey of media workers	Practices
8.11	Effectiveness of the representative body of media workers in intervening and defending the rights of its members.	(High = 1000) (Weak = 500) (Non-existent = 0)	Survey of media workers	Practices

» Annex No. (3) – Questionnaire No. (1): For Media Workers

Dear Respondent,

The Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms (MADA) is working on developing indicators to measure press freedom in Palestine. We kindly request your assistance in helping us obtain accurate results for this research related to the “Press Freedom Indicators 2024”. These indicators will be used to measure the extent of progress or regression in press freedom in the country.

We would highly appreciate your objective and impartial responses to the questions included in this questionnaire.

Thank you for dedicating part of your valuable time to support this important research.

Questionnaire Serial Number:

No.	Question	Options
GOV	Governorate:	1. Jenin 2. Tubas and Northern Valleys 3. Nablus 4. Tulkarm 5. Qalqilya 6. Salfit 7. Ramallah & Al-Bireh 8. Jericho & the Central Jordan Valley 9. Jerusalem 10. Bethlehem 11. Hebron
Q1	Sex:	1. Male 2. Female
Q2	Age	
Q3	Place of Residence	1. City 2. Village/Town 3. Refugee Camp
Q4	Marital Status	1. Single 2. Married 3. Divorced 4. Widowed 5. Separated
Q5	Educational Level	1. General Secondary Education 2. Intermediate Diploma 3. BA 4. MA 5. PhD
Q6	Place of Work	1. Official media institution 2. Non-official media institution 3. Arab media institution 4. Foreign media institution 5. Freelance journalist
Q7	Primary Media Outlet You Work For	1. Print 2. Audio 3. Visual 4. Digital / Online
Q8	Number of years of experience in this field	

1		
No.	Question	Options
1.6	Do existing procedures and directives allow journalists freedom of movement during states of emergency and lockdowns?	Yes, adequately Yes, partially No

1.7	Has the existence of the Cybercrime Law enhanced press freedom?	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No
2	Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom	
No.	Question	Options
2.7	Based on your experience, have you observed restrictions or prevention of journalists from covering public events and carrying out their journalistic work?	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No
2.6	Have you or a colleague experienced confiscation and/or destruction of journalistic equipment or materials due to journalistic work?	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No
2.8	Have official authorities conducted serious investigations into complaints submitted by media workers?	1. Yes 2. No 3. Not applicable
2.9	Have you been compensated by public authorities for material damage resulting from attacks on your equipment?	1. Yes 2. No 3. Not applicable
2.10	Have you been informed that punitive measures were taken against individuals who assaulted you or a colleague?	1. Yes 2. No 3. Not applicable
2.13	Based on your observation, has there been an increase in online defamation, incitement, or smear campaigns against journalists following sensitive reporting?	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No
2.15	Based on your observation, have restrictions been imposed on access to or dissemination of information due to a state of emergency?	1. Yes, extensively 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No
3	Operational Independence of Media Outlets	
No.	Question	Options
3.2	In your view, do licensing procedures hinder the establishment and operation of independent media outlets?	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No
3.3	Do you observe dominance of state-owned media over the country's news and information system?	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No dominance
3.4	Do official media outlets enjoy editorial Operational Independence and cover all segments of society?	1. Yes, clearly 2. Yes, weakly 3. No Operational Independence

3.6	Is there diversity in media ownership, without concentration in specific political and/or economic interests?	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No dominance
3.7	Is there deliberate concealment of media ownership by public officials or their affiliations with media outlets?	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No dominance
4	Media Outlets and Content Diversity	
No.	Question	Options
4.1	Is there a monopoly over access to information by a limited number of media outlets and influential actors?	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, weakly 3. No concentration of ownership
4.3	Do you perceive a monopoly in internet and/or telecommunications services?	1. Yes, significant monopoly 2. Yes, limited monopoly 3. No monopoly
4.4	Is internet access available at low cost and adequate quality?	1. Yes, always 2. Yes, sometimes 3. No
4.6	Is there diversity in sources, information, and media content in your work environment?	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, weakly 3. No diversity
4.7	Do media outlets cover issues related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds?	1. Yes, extensively 2. Yes, limited coverage 3. No coverage
5	Self-Censorship and Governmental Measures	
No.	Question	Options
5.1	Does your editor impose internal editorial censorship on published content?	Yes, always Yes, sometimes No
5.2	Does your media outlet refrain from publishing material due to fear of prosecution?	1. Yes, always 2. Yes, sometimes 3. No
5.3	Have news items been published online and later withdrawn?	Yes, significantly Yes, to a limited extent No
5.4	Have journalists experienced family and/or social pressure due to published information?	Yes, significantly Yes, to a limited extent No
5.5	Have writers or editors been subjected to official or societal threats due to published content?	Yes, significantly Yes, to a limited extent No

5.6	Are there blacklists of individuals and/or institutions banned from appearing in media outlets?	Yes, significantly Yes, poorly No
5.8	Is coded language or alternative wording used on social media to avoid blocking or deletion?	Yes, significantly Yes, poorly No
6	Funding Policies	
No.	Question	Options
6.7	Have journalists been bribed by influential actors to influence news content?	Yes, significantly Yes, poorly No
6.8	Are salary levels sufficient to prevent journalists from being vulnerable to bribery?	Yes, significantly Yes, to a limited extent No
6.9	Have you or colleagues experienced salary reductions and/or contract termination?	Yes, significantly Yes, to a limited extent No
7	Transparency and Access to Information	
No.	Question	Options
7.3	Are restrictions on access to information clear in practice?	1. Yes, clearly 2. Yes, unclear 3. No clarity
7.4	Have official spokespersons contributed to providing information smoothly and quickly?	Yes, significantly Yes, poorly No
7.5	Have journalists been allowed to accompany security forces on field operations?	Yes, always Yes, sometimes Not allowed
7.6	Have you been pressured to disclose your information sources?	Yes, significantly Yes, poorly No
7.7	Do you feel journalists' privacy is violated by public authorities?	Yes, significantly Yes, poorly No
7.8	Is public information shared by government officials and relevant authorities through media outlets?	Yes, significantly Yes, poorly No
8	Journalists' Trade Union Organization	
No.	Question	Options
8.1	Are there laws allowing journalists to form representative bodies (trade unions/professional associations)?	Yes No

8.2	Have media employees been dismissed due to pressure from advertisers over their journalistic work?	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
8.3	How are elections in media workers' representative bodies conducted?	1. Regularly and on time
		2. Irregularly with slight delays
		3. Irregularly with significant delays
		4. Not held at all
8.4	Are media workers' representative bodies independent from government and political parties?	1. Fully independent
		2. Weakly independent
		3. Not independent
8.5	Does the journalists' union operate professionally and independently?	1. Yes, significantly
		2. Yes, weakly
		3. No
8.6	Are women encouraged to reach decision-making positions in media institutions and representative bodies?	1. Yes, significantly
		2. Yes, weakly
		3. No
8.7	Do employees in state media have freedom to join journalists' representative bodies?	1. Yes, clearly
		2. Yes, weakly
		3. No
8.8	What is the level of representation of the media workers' union body?	1. High
		2. Weak
		3. Non-existent
8.9	Are membership and affiliation procedures within the union considered fair and professional?	1. Yes, significantly
		2. Yes, weakly
		3. No
8.10	To what extent is the union involved in shaping public policies?	1. High
		2. Weak
		3. Non-existent
8.11	How effective is the union in defending the rights of its members?	1. High
		2. Weak
		3. Non-existent

» **Annex No. (4): Questionnaire No. (2) – Media Institution Managers / Editors-in-Chief / Managing Editors**

Dear Respondent,

The Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms (MADA) is preparing indicators to measure press freedom in Palestine. We kindly ask for your assistance in contributing to this research entitled “Press Freedom Indicators 2024”. The results will be used to assess progress or regression in press freedom in the country.

We appreciate your objective and accurate responses. Thank you for dedicating part of your time to support this research.

Questionnaire Serial No,:

No.	Question	Options
GOV	Governorate:	1. Jenin 2. Tubas and Northern Valleys 3. Nablus 4. Tulkarm 5. Qalqilya 6. Salfit 7. Ramallah & Al-Bireh 8. Jericho & the Central Jordan Valley 9. Jerusalem 10. Bethlehem 11. Hebron
Q1	Sex:	1. Male 2. Female
Q2	Age	
Q3	Place of Residence	1. City 2. Village/Town 3. Refugee Camp
Q4	Marital Status	1. Single 2. Married 3. Divorced 4. Widowed 5. Separated
Q5	Educational Level	1. General Secondary Education 2. Intermediate Diploma 3. BA 4. MA 5. PhD
Q6	Place of Work	1. Official media 2. Non-official media 3. Arab media institution 4. Foreign media institution 5. Freelance journalist
Q7	Primary Media Outlet You Work For	1. Print 2. Audio 3. Visual 4. Digital / Online
Q8	Number of years of experience in this field	

3 Operational Independence of Media Outlets		
No.	Question	Options
3.2	Based on your professional experience, licensing procedures for the establishment and operation of independent media outlets are:	1. Significantly obstructive 2. Moderately obstructive 3. Do not obstruct 4. Do not obstruct
3.3	Based on your observations of media performance, state media dominance over the country's news and information system is:	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No dominance
3.5	Clarity of media ownership procedures and the opportunity to establish media outlets without political discrimination is:	1. Clear 2. Inadequately clear 3. Not clear
3.6	There is diversity in media ownership and no concentration under specific political and/or economic interests:	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No
3.7	There is deliberate concealment of official ownership of media outlets and their affiliations:	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No
4	Media Outlets and Content Diversity	
No.	Question	Options
4.1	Is there a monopoly over access to information among certain media outlets and influential actors?	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No concentration of ownership
4.3	I feel there is a monopoly in the provision of internet and/or telecommunications services:	1. Yes, significant monopoly 2. Yes, limited monopoly 3. No monopoly
4.4	Internet access is available at low cost and with adequate quality:	1. Always 2. Sometimes 3. No
4.5	The government uses licensing of media ownership and frequencies as a means of pressure against independent media:	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, weakly 3. Not used as a means of pressure
4.6	There is diversity in sources, information, and media content:	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, but weakly 3. No diversity

4.7	Media outlets cover issues related to corruption and/or misuse of public funds:	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No coverage
5	Self-Censorship and Governmental Measures	
No.	Question	Options
5.1	Editorial censorship is imposed within the media outlet I work for on published content:	1. Always 2. Sometimes 3. Never
5.2	The media outlet I work for refrains from publishing journalistic material for fear of legal prosecution:	1. Always 2. Sometimes 3. No abstention
5.3	News published on online platforms is subsequently withdrawn:	1. Frequently 2. Occasionally 3. Never
5.4	Journalists are subjected to family and/or social pressure due to the publication of information:	1. Frequently 2. Occasionally 3. Never
5.5	Writers and/or editors are subjected to official or societal threats due to publication:	1. Frequently 2. Occasionally 3. Never
5.6	There are blacklists of individuals and/or institutions banned from appearing in media outlets:	1. Yes, extensively 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No
5.7	Government censorship procedures for publications and/or printed materials hinder media freedom:	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, weakly 3. No
6	Funding Policies	
No.	Question	Options
6.1	High fees are imposed for obtaining broadcasting frequencies and/or registering newspapers and websites:	1. Always 2. Sometimes 3. Never
6.2	Value-added tax is imposed on the purchase of paper, newsprint, broadcasting equipment, and other media equipment:	1. Always 2. Sometimes 3. No tax
6.3	There are restrictions on foreign funding and/or support for media outlets:	1. Always 2. Sometimes 3. No restrictions
6.4	Fair government financial support is provided to media outlets based on market share or advertising market criteria:	1. Always 2. Sometimes 3. No support

6.5	Government advertising budgets are allocated fairly across media outlets:	1. Always 2. Sometimes 3. No allocation
6.6	Advertising is used as a means of pressure to influence editorial decisions:	1. Always 2. Sometimes 3. Not used
6.9	You or any of your colleagues have experienced salary reductions and/or termination of employment under the current situation:	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, to a limited extent 3. No
7	Transparency and Access to Information	
No.	Question	Options
7.3	In practice, there is clarity regarding restrictions imposed on access to information:	1. Yes, clearly 2. Yes, but not clearly 3. No clarity

» Annex No. (5): Sampling of the Survey of Journalists and Media Institutions

Two surveys were conducted for data collection:


First (main) survey: a representative sample of journalists working in the media sector. The sample size reached 202 journalists working in the media field in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Participants were selected randomly from lists of journalists obtained from the Journalists' Syndicate. Telephone interviews were conducted with the selected journalists to complete the research questionnaire. The interviews were conducted by researchers in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Second survey: a representative sample of media institutions. This survey covered 35 media institutions operating in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Characteristics of the Journalists' Sample


First: Distribution by Region

The sample was distributed geographically, with 59.9% from the West Bank compared to 40.1% from the Gaza Strip. See figure below.




Second: Distribution by Governorate

The highest proportion of respondents was from Gaza Governorate (16.8%), followed by Ramallah (15.8%), and Hebron (12.4%), while Salfit, Jericho, and North Gaza recorded the lowest shares at 0.99% each. See figure below.




Third: Distribution by Gender

Males represented the majority of the sample at 55.4%, compared to 44.6% females. See figure below.




Fourth: Age Distribution

The most represented age group was 31–40 years (47.5%), followed by 41–50 years (20.3%), then 26–30 years (16.8%). The least represented group was 20–25 years (5.9%). See figure below.




Fifth: Place of Residence

The majority of participants resided in cities (77.7%), compared to refugee camps (11.4%) and villages/towns (10.9%). See figure below.




Sixth: Educational Level

Bachelor’s degree holders constituted the largest group (67.3%), followed by Master’s degree holders (18.3%), then intermediate diploma holders (7.9%). PhD holders accounted for 3.0%, while general secondary education represented 3.5%. See figure below.




Seventh: Place of Work

The highest proportion was freelance journalists (28.2%), followed by official media institutions (27.2%), non-official media (17.3%), Arab institutions (14.9%), and foreign institutions (12.4%). See figure below.



Eighth: Main Media Outlet Type

The distribution across media types was relatively balanced: visual media (31.2%), digital media (30.7%), print media (28.2%), and audio media (9.9%). See figure below.



Ninth: Years of Experience

The most represented group had 6–10 years of experience (36.1%), followed by 1–5 years (25.7%), then 11–15 years (15.8%). Those with more than 21 years of experience accounted for 12.4%, while the 16–20 years group represented 9.9%. See figure below.

