



المركز الفلسطيني للتنمية والحريات الإعلامية «مدى»
Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms (MADA)



West Bank Press Freedom Index of 2024



(6th Annual Index)

2025



المركز الفلسطيني للتنمية والحريات الإعلامية «مدم»
Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms (MADA)

PRESS FREEDOM INDEX IN THE WEST BANK 2024

(SIXTH ANNUAL INDEX)

2025

PRESS FREEDOM INDEX IN THE WEST BANK 2024

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The Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms MADA



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
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MAIN FINDING:


The Press Freedom Index in the West Bank for the year 2024 was categorized as Difficult (Red), according to the adopted evaluation criteria—falling within the range of 201 to 400 points. The index score for press freedom in the West Bank, based on the measured domains during 2024, reached 370 points, marking a slight increase of 9 points compared to 2023, when the index stood at 361 points. This represents a 2.5% increase between 2023 and 2024. The rise is attributed to improvements in three key indicators: Incidents of physical assaults against journalists and/or media workers dropped from 9 cases (10%) in 2023 to 2 cases (80%) in 2024¹, cases of torture involving journalists and/or media workers decreased from 4 cases (60%) in 2023 to zero cases (100%) in 2024², a slight improvement was also noted in the number of arrests of journalists and/or media workers, which went from 10 cases (0%) in 2023 to 9 cases (10%) in 2024³.

A slight increase was recorded in the indicator tracking the number of arrests of journalists and/or media workers, rising from 0% (10 cases) in 2023 to 10% (9 cases) in 2024.


Percentage of Achievement in the Press Freedom Index by Region Between 2022 and 2023–2024 in the West Bank



- 1 Source: The Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA. The number of physical assaults in the West Bank decreased to 2 cases in 2024, compared to 9 cases in 2023. Accordingly, the index score for this indicator improved. (According to the adopted methodology, 10% is deducted for each individual case, up to a maximum of 10 individuals, at which point the achievement rate for the indicator becomes 0.0%). Thus, the achievement rate for this indicator increased from 10% to 80%.
- 2 Source: The Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA. The number of torture cases in the West Bank dropped to zero in 2024, compared to four cases in 2023. As a result, the achievement rate for this indicator improved from 60% to 100%.
- 3 Source: The Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA: The number of arrest cases in the West Bank reached 9 in 2024, compared to 10 in 2023. According to the adopted methodology—where 10% is deducted for each individual case, up to a maximum of 10 individuals, resulting in a 0.0% achievement rate when the threshold is reached—the indicator showed a decline in performance, with the achievement rate dropping from 0% to 10%.



Variation in Press Freedom Disparities by Sector in the West Bank Between the Years 2023 and 2024




The index reached a value of 492 points in 2018, before declining to 457 points in 2019—a decrease of 7.1%. It subsequently rose to 520 points in 2020, marking a 13.8% increase. However, it then dropped sharply to 384 points in 2022 (a decrease of 26.2%), followed by a further decline to 361 points in 2023 (a 6.0% drop). A slight uptick was recorded in 2024, with the index reaching 370 points—an increase of 2.5%.

The highest value the index reached over the past five measured years was 520 points in 2020. Since then, the index has declined by 28.8% relative to that peak. At the time, it fell within the “orange” category (sensitive), which includes scores ranging from 401 to 600 points. In 2020, the score stood at 520 out of the total possible points.

According to the 2024 Freedom Index for the West Bank, the report identified 54 indicators with an achievement rate of less than 50%, 15 indicators with an achievement rate of 50% or more, and 3 indicators with an achievement rate of 0%.

Status of Indicator Changes Between 2023 and 2024

Comparison of Indicator Status in the West Bank Between 2023 and 2024



In 2024, 42 indicators—representing 58.3% of the total—showed a decline in the West Bank compared to 2023. These declines are distributed as follows:

- Two (2) indicators with a decrease of more than 20%,
- Three (3) indicators with a decrease between 10.0% and 20.0%, and
- Thirty-Seven (37) indicators with a decrease ranging between 1.0% and 9.0%.

The results also showed that five (5) indicators (6.9%) remained unchanged between 2023 and 2024. These are: Constitutional guarantees for press freedom: 100.0%, alignment of national legislation with international conventions that safeguard press freedom: 0.0%, criminalization of incitement by government officials against the media: 0.0%, legal restrictions on reporting related to ethnic, religious, and/or national security issues: 50.0%, existence of a right-to-information law: 0.0%

Meanwhile, twenty-five (25) indicators (34.7%) recorded an increase, broken down as follows: twenty (20) indicators increased between 1.0% and 9.0%, two (2) indicators increased between 10.0% and 20.0%, and three (3) indicators showed an increase of more than 20%, specifically: a decline in the number of torture cases involving journalists and/or media workers, a decline in the number of summonses and interrogations targeting journalists and/or media workers, and a decline in the number of physical assaults on journalists and/or media workers.

Conversely, two (2) indicators experienced a drop of more than 20%, namely: restrictive actions taken by official authorities, such as the closure or blocking of media outlets, and the imposition of high civil fines on journalists convicted of libel, slander, or defamation.

The 2024 Press Freedom Index results for the West Bank revealed several critical findings: three (3) of the 72 indicators scored zero, due to a continued lack of progress between 2018 and 2024. These include: The absence of alignment between national legislation and international conventions safeguarding press freedom, the lack of legal provisions

criminalizing incitement by government officials against the media, and the absence of a law on the right to access information.

- Judicial protection for press freedom remains weak and ineffective, and in several cases, this weakness has directly contributed to the deterioration of specific indicators, such as the one concerning the blocking and closure of websites.
- Journalists generally refrain from filing complaints about violations and abuse they face. In the few instances where complaints are submitted, they are often not investigated. When investigations do occur, their findings are not disclosed. Furthermore, victims receive no compensation, and no punitive measures are taken against perpetrators, which has negatively impacted the index results.
- Self-censorship remains a significant constraint on press freedom in Palestine, posing a greater threat than official censorship. This is followed by familial or societal pressure on journalists related to sensitive information they may possess. Related indicators continue to decline in their assigned scores.
- Transparency and access to information remain highly problematic, primarily due to the absence of a dedicated right-to-information law. Although there has been a slight improvement in administrative procedures related to information access, the overall score for this domain declined in 2024 and remains classified as “sensitive”.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms (MADA) has worked on developing indicators to measure press freedom in Palestine from 2018 to 2024. These indicators have been adopted to assess the progress or decline in the level of freedom of expression in the country. They measure press freedom in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

These indicators serve to evaluate the state of press freedom in Palestine—specifically in the West Bank and Gaza Strip—through comprehensive analysis and comparison with the results of previous years. However, during the years 2023 and 2024, the indicators were measured only in the West Bank due to the genocidal war being waged against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, which rendered it impossible to carry out the study under the current conditions.

Thousands of martyrs and wounded have fallen, including dozens of journalists who were killed during this war, placing press freedom in Gaza in its worst state—not only compared to previous years, but on a global scale. These circumstances prevented a comprehensive analysis of the state of press freedoms in the Gaza Strip, unlike in previous years when the assessment covered both the West Bank and Gaza equally.

The Press Freedom Index in the West Bank for the year 2024 was built upon the 2023 Palestine Press Freedom Index, based on eight thematic areas and 72 indicators, as follows:

1. Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom
2. Legal and Societal Restrictions on Press Freedom
3. Independence of Media Work
4. Media Outlets and Content Diversity
5. Self-Censorship and Governmental Measures
6. Financing Policies
7. Transparency and Access to Information
8. Journalists' Self-Regulation and Protection

The index evaluation categories were determined based on the total scores across all thematic areas and their respective values, as follows:

- Very Low Rating (Black): Index score between 0–200 points
- Difficult Rating (Red): Index score between 201–400 points
- Sensitive Rating (Orange): Index score between 401–600 points
- Good Rating (Yellow): Index score between 601–800 points
- High Rating (White): Index score between 801–1000 points

» Study Sample

The study sample consisted of 230 participants representing professionals working in the media sector and related institutions in the West Bank. It was distributed as follows: 181 journalists, 35 media institutions, and an additional 14 human rights organizations⁴. The characteristics of this sample were analyzed according to a set of demographic and professional variables, as detailed below:

By gender, the data showed that the majority of participants were male, accounting for 60% (138 males), compared to 40% female (92 females). As to the geographic distribution by governorate, the largest share of the sample was concentrated in the Ramallah and Al-Bireh Governorate at 24.8%, followed by Hebron at 15.2%, and Nablus at 13%. The least represented governorates were Salfit at 3%, and Tubas and the Northern Jordan Valley at 4.3%, reflecting the relative distribution of media professionals and related institutions.

In terms of field of work, most participants reported working in the media sector (78.7%), while 15.2% were managers or editors-in-chief. Participants from Palestinian human rights organizations made up 6.1% of the sample. This distribution indicates a focus on field-level professionals within the media industry.

As to the place of residence, a majority of participants (62.6%) reside in urban areas, while 28.3% live in towns or villages, and 9.1% in refugee camps, reflecting a diverse geographical background among the journalists and media professionals surveyed. While in terms of marital status, the data indicated that 70% of participants were married, 25% were single, 1.8% were divorced, and 3.2% were widowed.

By the educational level, over half of the sample (52.6%) held a bachelor's degree, followed by 29.1% with a master's degree, and 8.7% with a doctorate. The percentage of those with only a high school diploma or associate degree was relatively low, indicating a generally high academic level among the participants.

In terms of the sector of employment, professionally, the sample was distributed as follows: 15.7% in official media institutions, 50.4% in non-official media institutions, and 24.3% were freelance journalists. Additionally, 5.2% reported working in Arab media institutions and 4.3% in foreign media organizations, highlighting the diversity of institutional affiliations.

4 Arab World Observatory for Democracy and Elections, Al-Mezan Center for Human Rights, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, SHAMS Center, Palestinian Journalists' Club, Palestinian NGO Network, Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center, Protection Center for Human Rights, The Independent Commission for Human Rights – Ombudsman Office, Center for the Defense of Liberties and Civil Rights "Hurriyat", The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy, Treatment and Rehabilitation Center for Victims of Torture, Zimam for Innovation and Development, Cooperation for Conflict Resolution, Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA.

According to the age groups, the age group 31–40 years represented the largest segment of the sample at 37.4%, followed by 41–50 years at 22.6%, and those over 51 years at 16.5%. Younger age groups were less represented, suggesting that the sample primarily consists of mid- to highly experienced professionals.

As per the primary media platform, the most commonly used media platform among participants was visual media at 38.3%, followed by digital media at 24.3%, audio media at 20%, and print media at 17.4%—reflecting the diversity of primary media channels in the Palestinian context.

In terms of the years of experience, approximately 41.3% of participants had more than 16 years of experience. Other experience levels were distributed as follows: 22.6% had 11–15 years, 23.9% had 6–10 years, and 12.2% had 1–5 years. This points to a predominantly seasoned and professional sample.

Finally, in terms of the wider geographic distribution, the sample was spread across three main regions of the West Bank: the Central region (39.1%), the Northern region (32.6%), and the Southern region (28.3%), indicating a balanced representation across the geographic expanse of the study area.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

There are a number of essential recommendations that must be highlighted. These are categorized by the relevant authorities, in light of the current conditions, constraints, and overlapping factors that influence the journalistic and media landscape in Palestine.

First: Recommendations to the Palestinian Government:

1. **End Attacks on Journalists:** The government and its security agencies must cease the practice of arresting journalists or assaulting them or their equipment and must take deterrent measures against anyone who assaults journalists.
2. **Enact a Law on the Right to Access Information:** It is essential to pass legislation guaranteeing the right to access information, along with establishing effective mechanisms for its implementation.
3. **Repeal Legislation Restricting Press Freedom:** Any existing laws that allow the closure of websites without a judicial order must be repealed, and new legislation should be adopted to guarantee press freedom in accordance with the provisions of the Palestinian Basic Law.
4. **Align Legislation with International Standards:** Domestic laws must be harmonized with international standards for freedom of expression, as outlined in the international treaties to which the State of Palestine is a party.
5. **Involve Journalists and Civil Society Organizations:** Journalists and civil society organizations must be included in any formal discussions concerning amendments to media-related legislation or the drafting of new relevant laws.
6. **Expedite Judicial Procedures:** It is crucial to accelerate the adjudication of cases related to press freedom, ensure the presence of specialized judges for such cases, and guarantee respect for press freedom throughout judicial processes.
7. **Establish an Independent Media Council:** A Supreme Media Council independent from the government should be established to ensure respect for press freedom and the regulation of media institutions.
8. **Review Government Financing Policies Toward Media:** Government Financing Policies affecting media outlets, including fees and taxes, should be reassessed. Immediate financial support should be provided to media institutions at risk of closure due to financial crises.
9. **Create a Specialized Government Unit:** A specialized government center should be established to receive and follow up on complaints related to attacks on journalists, ensuring serious investigations and referring perpetrators to the judiciary.
10. **Protect Journalists' Rights After Media Closures:** The rights of journalists working in media outlets that may be shut down must be guaranteed. Company laws should be reviewed to ensure safeguards for employee rights in the event of institutional closure.
11. **Public Prosecution to Investigate Complaints:** The Public Prosecution must conduct serious investigations into all submitted complaints and refer cases to the competent judicial bodies upon completion of investigations, to ensure accountability for crimes committed.

12. Hold General Elections: It is imperative to proceed with holding presidential and legislative general elections. Separation of powers and the organization of elections contribute to creating an environment conducive to upholding freedom of expression.

Second: Recommendations to the Journalists' Syndicate:

1. Conduct Free and Fair Periodic Elections. The Syndicate must hold regular, free, and fair elections and activate its role in protecting journalists' rights, as the official organizational body representing them.
2. Defend Journalists' Rights. The Journalists' Syndicate should fulfill its mandate in defending the rights of journalists and representing them before the relevant authorities, especially in cases of abuse or arrest by security or legal entities.
3. Promote Grassroots Digital Diplomacy. Encourage journalists, activists, and influencers on social media to engage in grassroots digital diplomacy to expose the crimes of the occupation, particularly in light of the harassment and violations faced by journalists in Palestine.
4. Provide Training and Professional Development Programs. Organize workshops and training courses for journalists to enhance their professional skills and knowledge in modern media techniques contributing to the development of their performance and the updating of their expertise.
5. Activate Complaint and Grievance Mechanisms. Establish an effective internal mechanism that allows journalists to file complaints and grievances when subjected to threats or harassment, ensuring serious follow-up and accountability for those who violate journalists' rights.
6. Enhance Cooperation with International Organizations. Strengthen collaboration with international organizations that advocate for human rights and press freedom, to highlight the violations against Palestinian journalists and support international efforts to pressure the occupation to improve the media environment in Palestine.
7. Protect Journalists in Conflict Zones. Develop mechanisms to protect journalists working in conflict and high-tension areas, including the provision of personal protective equipment and health insurance for field correspondents.
8. Strengthen Journalistic Unity. Work towards enhancing coordination and cooperation among various Palestinian journalistic and media institutions, with the aim of unifying efforts to confront shared legal and professional challenges.
9. Monitor Media Compliance with Professional Standards. Oversee and evaluate the performance of local media outlets, ensure their adherence to professional journalistic standards and ethics, and hold accountable any media entity that violates these standards.

Third: Recommendations to Palestinian Civil Society:

1. Promote Public Awareness of Journalists' Rights. Strengthen public awareness campaigns on journalists' rights and the importance of protecting press freedom. Clarify the role of journalism in promoting democracy and civic engagement through educational lectures and seminars in schools and universities.
2. Establish an International Solidarity Network. Create an international solidarity

network comprising journalists, human rights organizations, and global media institutions to support Palestinian journalists facing restrictions and assaults, and to provide media and logistical support in cases of threats or arrests.

3. Support Palestinian Journalists in Exile. Offer support to Palestinian journalists forced into exile due to threats or arrests by securing legal and moral protection in host countries.
4. Strengthen Community Oversight and Accountability for Press Freedom Violations. Promote independent documentation of violations and refer them to relevant local authorities to hold violators accountable.
5. Advocate for Comprehensive Legal Reform. Press for legal reforms, including the enactment of a law guaranteeing the right to access information and the amendment of laws that restrict freedom of expression and media work.
6. Launch Public Awareness Campaigns on the Importance of Press Freedom. Implement mass awareness campaigns emphasizing press freedom as a fundamental civil and political right, and its connection to the broader freedom of society.
7. Expand Psychological and Social Support Programs for Journalists. Provide psychological and social support services to journalists, especially in the context of war and the ongoing psychological pressures they face.
8. Establish Effective Partnerships with Media Unions and Institutions. Build strong partnerships with unions and media institutions to implement collective protection initiatives and foster a culture of reporting and advocacy.
9. Empower Women Journalists and Marginalized Groups in Media. Develop targeted programs that enhance the participation of women journalists and marginalized groups, and combat gender-based discrimination and violence in the media work environment.
10. Monitor the Performance of Government and Media from a Human Rights Perspective. Actively engage with press freedom reports and indices to monitor official and media sector performance and promote transparency and reform.
11. Contribute to Journalists' Training on Professional and Digital Safety. Support training programs that equip journalists with the skills to navigate digital surveillance, online threats, and professional safety risks.

Fourth: Recommendations to the International Community:

1. Support Palestinian Civil Society Efforts to Promote Press Freedom. Provide sustainable funding for training programs, professional protection, and legal awareness aimed at enhancing press freedom.
2. Support the Journalists' Syndicate and Media Freedom Organizations. Assist in developing monitoring tools and national indicators related to freedom of expression.
3. Encourage the Palestinian Government to Align Legislation with International Standards. Offer legal advice and policy reform partnerships to promote alignment of media laws with international standards on press freedom.
4. Support the Enactment of a Right to Information Law. Advocate for passing a right to information law as a key governance and transparency benchmark and link it to international aid programs.
5. Provide Technical Support for Independent National Press Freedom Indicators. Help develop independent national tools to measure press freedom, serving as internal accountability mechanisms and inputs for regional and international reporting.
6. Fund Initiatives to Reduce Self-Censorship and Societal Pressure on Journalists. Back public education and advocacy campaigns aimed at minimizing self-censorship and external pressures on journalists.
7. Promote the Exchange of Expertise Between Palestinian and International Media Institutions. Encourage collaboration to strengthen media independence and content diversity through cross-border experience-sharing.

PRESS FREEDOM INDEX IN THE WEST BANK 2024

(SIXTH ANNUAL INDEX)

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms (MADA) developed indicators to measure press freedom in Palestine (including the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip) for the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022, adopting them as tools to assess progress or regression in the state of freedom of expression in the country. These indicators evaluate press freedom in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

These indicators have been used to analyze the level of press freedom in both geographic regions and to compare results across previous years. However, in 2023 and particularly in 2024, the index was measured only in the West Bank due to the ongoing genocidal war against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, which made it impossible to conduct the study under current conditions. Thousands of martyrs and wounded have fallen—among them hundreds of journalists killed during the war—placing press freedom in Gaza not only in its worst state compared to previous years but among the worst globally. These circumstances prevented a comprehensive analysis of press freedoms in Gaza, which in past years had been assessed in parallel with the West Bank.

MADA's press freedom measurement methodology is based on temporal comparison within the same geographic area from year to year. It takes into account relevant international indicators, particularly those used by Reporters Without Borders, Press House, and the UNESCO Media Development Indicators. Additionally, experts reviewed and reformulated these indicators, adding new ones deemed essential and impactful in measuring press freedom in Palestine.

The study focused on monitoring indicators related to performance and Palestinian measures either respecting or impeding press freedom. Israeli occupation-related practices and legislation were excluded from this index, as many aspects cannot be reliably documented. Instead, Israeli violations of press freedom are covered separately in MADA's 2024 Annual Report.

What distinguishes this methodology is its focus on comparisons over time rather than between countries. Its exclusive focus on the Palestinian context facilitates actionable insights and helps inform policies and measures aimed at enhancing press freedom.

The methodology for measuring press freedom was built around the following core pillars:

1. Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom

This domain relied on 8 indicators: the guarantees provided by the Basic Law for press freedom; harmonization of national legislation following Palestine's signing of international conventions safeguarding press freedom; the availability of judicial guarantees in Palestinian courts that protect press freedom; the existence of legal provisions criminalizing incitement by government officials against media outlets; the existence of legal texts imposing restrictions on covering ethnic, religious, and/or national security issues; the existence of procedures and instructions allowing journalists to move freely during states of emergency and lockdowns; whether the Cybercrime Law enhanced press freedom; and whether behavioral or legal codes criminalize media professionals accepting bribes to influence their work.

2. Legal and Societal Restrictions on Press Freedom

This domain relied on 14 indicators: the number of cases in which high civil fines were imposed on journalists after being convicted of “libel, slander, and defamation”; the number of arrests of journalists and/or media workers; the number of summonses and investigations involving journalists and/or media workers; the number of torture cases against journalists and/or media workers; the number of physical assaults against journalists and/or media workers⁵; imposing restrictions or preventing journalists from covering public events or doing their work; confiscation and/or destruction of journalistic equipment and/or materials due to journalistic work; serious investigations opened by official authorities into complaints submitted by media workers; compensation provided by public authorities for material damage caused by the destruction of equipment; punitive measures taken against individuals who assaulted the journalist or one of their colleagues; systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists and/or media owners due to writings and/or broadcast content; online defamation, incitement, or smear campaigns against journalists because of their reporting on sensitive topics; restrictive measures such as shutdowns and/or blocking imposed by authorities on media outlets during 2024; and restrictions on accessing and/or transferring information due to the state of emergency.

3. Independence of Media Work

This domain relied on 7 indicators: licensing laws that allow government control over media outlets; licensing procedures that obstruct the establishment or operation of independent media outlets; dominance of state-owned media over the news and information system in the country; whether official media enjoy editorial independence and cover news concerning all segments of the population; clarity of media ownership procedures and equal opportunity to establish media outlets without political discrimination; diversity of media ownership and the absence of concentration in certain political and/or economic directions; and the deliberate concealment of official positions or affiliations of individuals who own or control media outlets.

4. Media Outlets and Content Diversity

This domain relied on 7 indicators: monopolization of access to information by certain media outlets and influential actors; the state’s provision of laws that allow the concentration of media ownership and joint ownership; monopoly over the provision of internet and/or telecommunications services; the availability of internet access for all at low cost and adequate quality; the use of media licensing and frequency allocation by the government as a means of pressure on independent media; diversity in sources, information, and content; and the extent to which various media cover issues related to corruption and/or public fund waste.

5. Self-Censorship and Governmental Measures

This domain relied on 8 indicators: the imposition of editorial censorship within media outlets over published content; media refraining from publishing journalistic materials for fear of being pursued by public authorities; publication of news on websites followed by its withdrawal; journalists being subjected to family and/or social pressure due to published

⁵ The index was used based on data monitored by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA.

information; writers and/or editors being threatened officially or socially because of what they publish; existence of blacklists of (individuals and/or institutions) banned from appearing in all or some media outlets; governmental censorship procedures for publication and/or printed materials that hinder media freedom; and the use of symbols or alternative words on social media platforms to avoid having posts blocked and/or deleted by these platforms.

6. Financing Policies

This domain relied on 9 indicators: high fees imposed for obtaining frequencies and/or registering newspapers and/or websites; imposition of value-added tax on purchasing paper and/or newsprint or broadcasting equipment and other media tools; existence of restrictions on foreign funding and/or support for media outlets; equitable government financial support for media outlets based on market share or share of advertising revenue; allocation of government advertising budgets in a fair manner across media outlets; the use of advertising as a pressure tool to influence editors' decisions; bribery of journalists by influential actors to affect the editorial content of their media work; whether wage levels for journalists and other media workers are high enough to prevent bribery; and pressure on journalists through salary reductions and/or termination of staff contracts.

7. Transparency and Access to Information

This domain relied on 8 indicators: the existence of a law on the right to access information; the existence of laws and legislation enabling journalists to access information; clarity of the restrictions imposed on accessing information; the presence of official spokespeople who provide information to journalists smoothly and quickly; allowing journalists to accompany security forces in their field missions; pressure on journalists to disclose their sources; violations of journalists' private lives by public authorities; and whether public information is shared across media platforms by government officials and competent authorities.

8. Journalists' Self-Regulation and Protection

This domain relied on 11 indicators: the existence of laws allowing journalists to form representative bodies (trade unions) in media institutions; pressure and/or dismissal of media employees due to advertiser protests over their journalistic work; regular periodic elections within the representative bodies of media workers; the independence of representative bodies of media workers from government and political party influence; whether the journalists' union demonstrates professionalism and independence in its work; encouragement of women's access to decision-making positions in media institutions and journalist representative bodies; freedom for workers in official media to join "representative bodies" of journalists; the degree to which the journalists' union represents workers in the media sector; the professionalism and acceptability of the procedures for joining and gaining membership in the journalists' union; the extent to which the union involves media workers in shaping general policies and directions; and the degree of effectiveness of the journalists' union in intervening and defending the rights of its members.

INDEX CALCULATION METHODOLOGY

The index was developed as a result of in-depth discussions involving human rights organizations, academics, journalists, and statistical experts. These discussions, which spanned a significant amount of time, focused on the nature of the indicators adopted for the purpose of measuring press freedom across various themes and categories. The goal was to ensure that the indicators are measurable, allow for annual comparisons, and that their results could be converted into quantifiable scores and weights. This included assigning a weight to each indicator, organizing them into themes and subgroups, determining the weight of each group within the total score, and identifying sources of information for each indicator according to a specific methodology for scoring.

The index comprises 72 indicators, and based on the scoring methodology and expert consultation, it was agreed that the score for each indicator would range from 0 (the lowest possible score) to 1000 (the highest possible score)⁶.

After reviewing various evaluation methods and consulting with a number of technical and statistical experts, a scoring approach was adopted that is similar—but not identical—to that of Reporters Without Borders, adjusted to better align with the Palestinian cultural context. The score categories and their corresponding values were defined as follows:

Very Poor (Black): Score between 0 – 200

Difficult (Red): Score between 201 – 400

Sensitive (Orange): Score between 401 – 600

Good (Yellow): Score between 601 – 800

High (White): Score between 801 – 1000

» Information Collection Mechanism

The process of gathering the necessary information relies on various methods appropriate to each indicator. This information was obtained from primary sources, in addition to sources active in the field of press freedom in Palestine, to ensure the accuracy and credibility of each indicator. The most prominent sources include:

1. Civil society organizations active in the field of press freedom in Palestine, as well as international institutions, particularly for data related to qualitative indicators.
2. A structured questionnaire designed to collect data relevant to quantitative indicators. This involved a specific questionnaire targeted at media professionals working in various media outlets, and a separate questionnaire directed at managers and owners of media institutions.

⁶ By reviewing the annexes—specifically the table of indicators and scoring criteria—which outlines the number of indicators for each domain and the corresponding points.

» Mechanism for Calculating Indicator Weights:

The measurement indicators are based on equal weighting, with each indicator assigned a weight of $(100/72 = 1.3888)$. The contribution percentage of each thematic domain in the overall index is calculated based on the number of indicators under each domain, as illustrated in the table below:

Distribution of the Number of Study Indicators by Thematic Domain, Category, and Percentage Contribution to the Overall Index

Thematic Domain	No. of Indicators		Total	Weight
	Legislation	Practices		
Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom	5	3	8	11.1%
Legal and Societal Restrictions on Press Freedom	2	13	15	20.8%
Independence of Media Work	2	5	7	9.7%
Media and Content Diversity	1	6	7	9.7%
Self-Censorship and Governmental Measures	0	8	8	11.1%
Financial Policies	3	6	9	12.5%
Transparency and Access to Information	2	6	8	11.1%
Journalists' Self-Regulation and Protection	2	10	12	16.7%
Total	17	55	72	100

Calculating the contribution percentage of each indicator to its respective domain, based on the total number of indicators within that domain.

Sample Design Methodology

This section presents the study methodology, study population, sample, research instrument, validity indicators used, variables, study procedures, and statistical treatments, as detailed below:

Study Methodology

For the purposes of this study, the descriptive field methodology was employed to collect data from the study population, identify its characteristics, and examine indicators of press freedom. This approach aligns with the objectives of the study. The methodology for measuring press freedom was based on the following aspects:


1. Legal guarantees for press freedom
2. Legal and societal constraints on press freedom

3. Independence of media operations
4. Media diversity and content variety
5. Self-censorship and governmental procedures
6. Financial policy
7. Transparency and access to information
8. Self-regulation and protection of journalists

Study Sample:

1. Sample of media professionals: The study sample consisted of 230 journalists from the West Bank, distributed as follows: 138 males and 92 females. The sample was selected using a random sampling method.
2. Sample of media institution managers/editors-in-chief/managing editors: This sample included 35 individuals working in media institutions. The sample was selected using a random sampling method.
3. Sample of Palestinian human rights organizations: The sample included 14 human rights institutions, distributed as follows: 10 in the West Bank and 4 in the Gaza Strip.

Sample Distribution by Sector and Governorate



The representation rate of the sample was as follows: 78.7% from media professionals, 15.2% from media institution managers and owners, and 6.1% from Palestinian human rights institutions.

Study Tool:

The study tool was developed to collect data related to measuring press freedom indicators in Palestine. This process began with a review of relevant previous studies, the drafting of a preliminary indicator framework, and its circulation to several relevant entities, such as the Independent Commission for Human Rights, the Human Rights Council, and experts in the field of press freedom.

Subsequently, the measurement tools were refined based on the main axes (legislation, practices, and legal dimensions), resulting in the development of three questionnaires:

1. The first questionnaire was directed to journalists, aiming to measure indicators related to the nature of their journalistic work.
2. The second questionnaire was directed to media institution owners and managers, focusing on the nature of their institutions' operations.
3. The third questionnaire targeted Palestinian human rights institutions and figures to evaluate legal provisions related to press freedom.

Sections of the Questionnaires:

Section One:

This section included the introduction to the questionnaire. It contained several elements outlining the objective of the study, the type of data and information intended to be collected from the study sample, and assurances to the respondents regarding the confidentiality of their responses. It emphasized that the collected data would be used solely for scientific research purposes.

Section Two: Demographic Information of the Sample. This study included two types of variables:

First: Independent Variables

- **Region Variable:** Included respondents from the West Bank, including Jerusalem.
- **Governorate Variable:** Covered all governorates of the West Bank.
- **Gender Variable:** Included two levels (male, female).
- **Age Variable:** Included five levels (20–25 years, 26–30 years, 31–40 years, 41–50 years, over 51 years).
- **Educational Status Variable:** Included five levels:
 1. High school diploma
 2. Associate diploma
 3. Bachelor's degree
 4. Master's degree
 5. Doctorate
- **Workplace Variable: Included five levels:**
 1. Official (governmental) media
 2. Non-official media
 3. Arab institution
 4. Foreign institution
 5. Freelance journalism
- **Primary Media Type Variable: Included four levels:**
 6. Print
 7. Audio

8. Visual
9. Electronic

- **Years of Experience in Journalism Variable: Included four levels:**
 1. 1–5 years
 2. 6–10 years
 3. 11–15 years
 4. More than 16 years
- **Geographic Division Variable: Covered the North, Central, and South of the West Bank.**

Second: Dependent Variables


These were represented by the responses of the sample members to the questionnaire items, categorized according to the study's thematic domains:

1. Legal guarantees for press freedom
2. Legal and societal constraints on press freedom
3. Independence of media operations
4. Media and content diversity
5. Self-censorship and governmental procedures
6. Financial policies
7. Transparency and access to information
8. Journalists' self-regulation and protection

Study Implementation Steps:

The first step involved holding meetings to discuss the study's objectives, the implementation timeline, expected outputs for each phase, and reviewing and refining the proposed methodology developed by the Palestinian Center for Media Freedoms (MADA). These meetings also served to identify the target group of the study, discuss the survey's implementation plan and timeline, and examine study expectations along with the implementation needs and potential challenges — including identifying key stakeholders to be contacted.

The main activities of the study were organized into four general phases, as follows: (Note: Subsequent phases can be translated upon request.)



Phase One: Preliminary Meeting

An initial meeting was held to identify the needs and objectives of conducting the study, followed by a review of the questionnaires in terms of both form and content.

Phase Two: Data Collection Training

The training covered all topics related to fieldwork and completing the questionnaire, including conducting interviews and accurately filling out the forms. The purpose was to equip the team with the necessary skills to ensure the project's success. The training also addressed the study's objectives and its significance.

Phase Three: Data Collection and Entry

Timeline Fieldwork for this survey was carried out during the period from March 15, 2025, to April 15, 2025.

Programming Phase

During this phase, data entry software was developed using computerized templates. Entry protocols were established to ensure accurate and consistent input of the questionnaires. In addition, data-cleaning rules were created to validate the data post-entry, focusing on verifying variables at the form level.

Data Entry Phase

The data entry process began on March 15, 2025, and concluded on April 15, 2025, in parallel with the data collection period.

Data Processing

This phase involved preparing the final report and calculating the index results, and it took place from April 16 to April 25, 2025.


Statistical Analysis

For data processing, the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS V28) was used, employing standard statistical procedures such as frequencies and percentages. This phase also included report preparation and computation of the index results.

Study Sample Distribution


1. Gender Variable

The proportional distribution of study sample participants by gender:
The proportion of males in the study sample is 60%, while the proportion of females is 40%.




2. Age Group Variable

The proportional distribution of study sample participants by age group:
37.4% of the study sample aged between 31 and 40 years, while 22.6% aged between 41 and 50 years.



3. Educational Attainment Variable


The proportional distribution of study sample participants by educational qualification:



52.6% of the study sample hold a Bachelor's degree, while 29.1% hold a Master's degree or higher.

4. Employment Status Variable


The proportional distribution of study sample participants by place of employment:




The percentage of those employed in official media within the sample was 15.7%, while approximately 50.4% worked in the unofficial media sector, and 24.3% were employed in the independent media sector.

5. Geographical Distribution Variable


It is evident from the above table that the study sample was distributed according to the geographical division of the West Bank as follows: 32.6% in the north, 39.1% in the central region, and 28.3% in the south.



Proportional Distribution of Study Sample Participants by Type of Media Outlet



The data indicated that 38.3% of the study sample work in visual media, while 24.3% are employed in electronic media, 20.0% in audio media, and 17.4% in print media.



Proportional Distribution of Study Sample Participants by Years of Experience in Media
The study results showed that 41.3% of the sample have more than 16 years of experience in journalism, 23.9% have between 6 and 10 years, 22.6% between 11 and 15 years, and 12.2% between 1 and 5 years.

STUDY FINDINGS

1. Press Freedom Index in Palestine

The freedom of expression index has witnessed a continuous decline in the number of points recorded by the indicator since 2020 to the present. This clearly reflects and confirms the ongoing and notable deterioration of press freedoms under the previous Palestinian government.

According to the evaluations used in this index, the press freedom score for the West Bank in 2024 fell within the “Difficult” category (Red) — which corresponds to a range between 201 and 400 points. The press freedom index score in the West Bank for the measured domains in 2024 reached 370 points, showing a slight increase of 9 points compared to 361 points in 2023. This represents a 2.5% rise between 2023 and 2024.

This increase is attributed to improvements in three specific indicators across the West Bank:

- The number of physical assaults against journalists and/or media workers rose from 10% (9 cases) in 2023 to 80% (2 cases) in 2024⁷.
- The indicator measuring cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers improved from 60% (4 cases) in 2023 to 100% (no cases) in 2024⁸.
- There was a slight increase in the indicator for arrests of journalists and/or media workers, rising from 0% (10 cases) in 2023 to 10% (9 cases) in 2024⁹.
- Assaults against journalists and/or media workers¹⁰

Indicator	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Total	West Bank	
	2022	2022	2022	2023	2024
Imposition of high civil fines on journalists following convictions for defamation, libel, and slander.	0	0	0	0	2
Number of summons and investigations	10	0	10	10	9
Number of torture cases	9	3	12	7	1
Number of physical assault cases	3	0	3	4	0
Number of summons and investigations	5	2	7	9	2

7 Source: Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA: Number of physical assaults in the West Bank: 2 cases in 2024 compared to 9 cases in 2023. Accordingly, the indicator increased (according to the methodology, 10% is deducted per person up to a maximum of 10 persons, which results in a 0.0% achievement rate for the indicator). Thus, the achievement rate of the indicator rose from 10% to 80%.

8 Source: Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA: Number of torture cases in the West Bank: 0 cases in 2024 compared to 4 cases in 2023. Accordingly, the indicator’s achievement rate increased from 60% to 100%.

9 Source: Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA: The number of torture cases in the West Bank was 0 in 2024 compared to 4 cases in 2023. Accordingly, the achievement rate of the indicator increased from 60% to 100%.


10 Source: Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA, based on data monitored in annual reports.

In 2018, the press freedom index score reached 492 points, then declined to 457 points in 2019, reflecting a 7.1% decrease. The score subsequently rose to 520 points in 2020—an increase of 13.8%—marking the highest score ever recorded for the Press Freedom Index in the West Bank. However, this was followed by a sharp decline to 384 points in 2022, representing a 26.2% decrease, indicating a general downward trend in press freedom levels compared to 2020.


Previous Situation in the Gaza Strip (2018–2022)

The index showed a decline, reaching 403 points in 2022, down 72 points from 2020 (when it stood at 475 points), and down 63 points from 2019 (which recorded 466 points), as well as 72 points below 2018, which also had 475 points. Out of a total of 1,000 points, this reflects a 17.9% decrease in Gaza from its peak in 2020 (475 points) to 403 points in 2022. Despite the decline in both regions, the drop in the West Bank was more significant than in the Gaza Strip.


Press Freedom Index by Region (2018–2022 and 2023–2024) in the West Bank



Percentage of Indicator Achievement in the Press Freedom Index by Region between 2022 and 2023–2024 in the West Bank




Variation in Press Freedom Disparities by Sector in the West Bank Between the Years 2023 and 2024



Status of Indicator Changes Between 2023 and 2024

Comparison of Indicator Status in the West Bank Between 2023 and 2024



Analysis of Changes in Data Compared to the Status of Indicators for the West Bank Between 2023 and 2024

An analysis was conducted on all 72 indicators used to measure the Press Freedom Index in the West Bank between 2023 and 2024. The indicators were categorized based on the degree of change in their achievement rates, distributed among trends of increase, decrease, and stability, as follows:

The results showed that 5 indicators (6.9%) exhibited no change in their achievement rates between 2023 and 2024. These include:

- Guarantees enshrined by the Basic Law for press freedom (100.0%)
- Alignment of national legislation with international charters guaranteeing press

freedom (0.0%)

- Criminalization of government officials inciting against the media (0.0%)
- Imposition of legal restrictions on coverage of ethnic, religious, and/or national security issues (50.0%)
- Existence of a law guaranteeing the right to access information (0.0%)

Meanwhile, 37 indicators (51.4%) registered a decline ranging from 1.0% to 9.0%, representing the largest category of change. The second largest group consisted of 20 indicators (27.8%) that showed an increase between 0.1% and 9.0%, reflecting a noticeable overall decline in many indicators.

Regarding more significant changes, 3 indicators experienced an increase of more than 20%, namely:

- Number of torture cases against journalists and/or media workers
- Number of summons and investigations against journalists and/or media workers
- Number of physical assaults against journalists and/or media workers

Conversely, 2 indicators showed a decline of more than 20%, namely:

- Restrictive actions taken by official authorities such as closure and/or blocking of media outlets
- Imposition of high civil fines on journalists following convictions for defamation, libel, and slander.


Both of these larger changes were relatively rare, representing 4.2% and 2.8% of the indicators for each category, respectively. These percentages indicate that major changes were less frequent compared to smaller or moderate changes.

The study relied on measuring eight domains that reflect press freedom:

- Legal guarantees for press freedom
- Legal and societal restrictions on press freedom
- Independence of media work
- Media and diversity of content
- Self-censorship and government measures
- Financing policies
- Transparency and access to information
- Self-regulation and protection of journalists

The scale for each domain was constructed based on a set of indicators used to measure the respective domains. The total number of indicators across all domains was 72, and the scale was built by calculating a weighted formula for each domain.

Thematic Domains of Press Freedom in Palestine During the Years 2018–2022 and 2023–2024 in the West Bank



Results of the Press Freedom Index in the West Bank for 2024, 2023, and 2022

For the year 2024 in the West Bank:

The index results revealed that 3 indicators out of 72 scored zero points, namely:

1. The existence of legal provisions criminalizing incitement by government officials against the media.
2. The existence of a law guaranteeing the right to access information.
3. Alignment of national legislation with international charters guaranteeing press freedom.

On the other hand, the results showed 100% achievement for 2 indicators:

1. The existence of guarantees enshrined by the Basic Law for press freedom.
2. The absence of cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers.

Additionally, the results indicated the occurrence of attacks against journalists and/or media workers, including 9 cases of arrest, 1 case of summons and investigation, and 2 cases of physical assault¹¹.

¹¹ The index was utilized based on data monitored and collected by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA.

¹¹ Source: Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA: Number of physical assaults – West Bank: 2 cases in 2024 compared to 9 cases in 2023. Accordingly, the index increased (According to the methodology, 10% is deducted per person, up to a maximum of 10 individuals, resulting in an achievement rate of 0.0%. Thus, the indicator improved from an achievement rate of 10% to 80%).

¹¹ Source: Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA: Number of torture cases – West Bank: 0 cases in 2024 compared to 4 cases in 2023. Accordingly, the index increased (The indicator achievement rate rose from 60% to 100%).

¹¹ Source: Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA: Number of arrest cases – West Bank: 9 cases in 2024 compared to 10 cases in 2023. Accordingly, the index increased (According to the methodology, 10% is deducted per person, up to a maximum of 10 individuals, resulting in an achievement rate of 0.0%. Thus, the indicator improved from an achievement rate of 0% to 10%).

For the year 2023 in the West Bank:

The index showed that 3 indicators out of 72 scored zero points, namely:

1. The existence of legal provisions criminalizing incitement by government officials against the media.
2. The existence of a law guaranteeing the right to access information.
3. Compensation by public authorities for material damage caused by attacks on equipment.

Furthermore, 2 indicators maintained a perfect score of 1000 points, these are:

1. The existence of guarantees enshrined by the Basic Law for press freedom.
2. The absence of court rulings imposing fines on journalists for committing publishing crimes during 2023.

The results also revealed attacks against journalists and/or media workers, comprising 8 cases of arrest, 7 cases of summons and investigation, 4 cases of torture, and 9 cases of physical assault¹².

For the year 2022 in Palestine:

The index showed that 5 indicators out of 72 scored zero points, namely:

1. Alignment of national legislation after the State of Palestine's accession to international charters guaranteeing press freedom.
2. The existence of legal provisions criminalizing incitement by government officials against the media.
3. The number of journalists summoned by security or judicial authorities due to their journalistic work during 2022 (9 cases in the West Bank and 3 cases in Gaza, totaling more than 10 cases; according to the methodology, 10% deduction per person with a maximum of 10 persons leads to 0.0% achievement).
4. Imposition of legal restrictions on addressing ethnic, religious, and/or national security issues.
5. The number of arrests of journalists and/or media workers (10 cases in the West Bank and none in Gaza; according to the methodology, a 10% deduction per person with a maximum of 10 persons leads to 0.0% achievement).

In addition, 2 indicators maintained a perfect score of 1000 points:

1. The existence of guarantees enshrined by the Basic Law for press freedom.
2. The absence of court rulings imposing fines on journalists for committing publishing crimes.

2. Results of the Press Freedom Index in Palestine by Thematic Domains

2.1 Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom:

The domain of legal guarantees relied on 8 indicators, with each indicator assigned a relative weight of 0.125, equivalent to 125 points per indicator.

There was a slight increase in the legal guarantees domain score for press freedom in the


¹² The index was utilized based on data monitored and collected by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA.

West Bank during 2024 by 4 points, reaching 317 compared to 313 points in 2023 and 412 points in 2022. This rise is attributed to the increase in the indicator “Existence of judicial guarantees in Palestinian courts protecting press freedom” which rose from 48.7% in 2023 to 52.3% in 2024, while it had reached 62.5% in 2022.

Indicator Achievement Rates:

- The achievement rate for the indicator “Guarantees enshrined by the Basic Law for press freedom” remained stable at 100.0%.
- Three indicators recorded achievement rates equal to or exceeding 50.0%:
- Judicial guarantees in Palestinian courts protecting press freedom: 52.3%
 - Imposition of legal restrictions on addressing ethnic, religious, and/or national security issues: 50.0%
 - Criminalization of behavioral or legal rules allowing media workers to receive bribes to influence their work: 75.6%
- Four indicators recorded achievement rates below 50%:
 - Harmonization of national legislation with international covenants guaranteeing press freedom: 0.0%
 - Criminalization of incitement by government officials against media outlets: 0.0%
 - Existence of procedures and instructions permitting journalists freedom of movement during states of emergency and lockdowns: 29.8%
 - The existence of cybercrime laws enhancing press freedom: 21.2%

At the level of Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip) between 2018 and 2022, the legal guarantees domain of the press freedom index saw a decline of 12 points in 2022, reaching 401 points compared to 413 points in 2020, and 406 points in 2018. Notably, there was also a decline between 2018 and 2019, from 406 points in 2018 to 354 points in 2019.



The largest decrease was recorded in the West Bank, with a decline of 18 points compared to the year 2020, where the index stood at 430 points in 2020, compared to 415 points in 2018, and 344 points in 2019. Meanwhile, the Gaza Strip recorded a modest increase of 1 point, rising from 383 points in 2020 to 384 points in 2022. However, there was a decline of 55 points when comparing 2020 to 2018, where the index had reached 438 points.

The increase in the legal guarantees domain of the Press Freedom Index is attributed to the higher achievement rate of the indicator “Existence of judicial guarantees in Palestinian courts protecting press freedom”, which reached 52.4%, as well as the indicator “Perception that procedures and instructions allow journalists freedom of movement during states of emergency and lockdowns” which reached 50.5% (49.8% in the West Bank vs. 51.8% in Gaza).

The results also revealed a disparity in the achievement rate of the indicator on “Procedures and instructions allowing journalists freedom of movement during emergencies” between the West Bank and Gaza. The West Bank achieved 62.5% of the weighted points, while Gaza achieved only 38.4%, indicating that procedures in Gaza were more restrictive, limiting journalists’ freedom of movement during emergency periods and lockdowns.


Based on the weighted percentage achievement of each indicator, the results show that the following two indicators scored 0% of their weighted points:

- Alignment of national legislation following Palestine’s accession to international covenants guaranteeing press freedom
- Existence of legal provisions criminalizing incitement by government officials against media outlets

In contrast, the indicator “Existence of guarantees enshrined in the Basic Law for press freedom” scored 100% of its weighted points.

Moreover, the indicator “Existence of a cybercrime law that enhances press freedom” received a low achievement rate of 30.0% across Palestine. This was relatively consistent across both regions—28.2% in the West Bank and 33.5% in Gaza—suggesting that the existence of this law has had a counterproductive effect and has not contributed to enhancing press freedom.

Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom in Palestine (2022) and in the West Bank–2023) (2024



This indicator rose from 48.7% in 2023 to 52.3% in 2024, a positive change of 3.6%. However, it had previously reached 62.5% in 2022. While the increase indicates slight improvement in the judicial environment, the decline compared to 2022 suggests an overall downward trend in recent years, and current levels remain insufficient to ensure robust protection for journalists.

Second: Indicators Showing Decline

- Criminalization of Journalists Accepting Bribes to Influence Their Work**
 This indicator dropped from 78.9% in 2023 to 75.6% in 2024, a negative change of 3.3%. In 2022, the level stood at 38.9%, highlighting fluctuations and a broader concern about the enforcement of ethical standards in the media sector.
- Freedom of Movement for Journalists During States of Emergency or Lockdowns**
 Declined slightly from 30.3% in 2023 to 29.8% in 2024, a decrease of 0.5%. In 2022, the indicator was 49.8%, suggesting continued restrictions and lack of progress in ensuring press mobility during crisis situations.
- Existence of Cybercrime Law that Enhances Press Freedom**
 This remained nearly stagnant, moving from 21.4% in 2023 to 21.2% in 2024, a minor decrease of 0.2%. In 2022, it stood at 28.2%, reinforcing concerns that the current cyber legislation continues to fall short of fostering a free press environment.

Third: Indicators That Remained Unchanged

The following indicators recorded no change over the three years and have remained at the same levels without any notable progress:

- Constitutional Guarantees for Press Freedom:** maintained 100% throughout 2022, 2023, and 2024.
- Alignment of National Legislation with International Treaties Ensuring Press Freedom:** remained 0% in all three years, underscoring a persistent lack of alignment with international norms.

- Criminalization of Government Officials Inciting Against the Media: held at 0% across all years, indicating a continued legislative gap in this critical area.
- Legal Restrictions on Coverage of Ethnic, Religious, or National Security Issues: remained stable at 50%, reflecting ongoing limitations on journalistic reporting on sensitive topics.

2.2 Legal and Societal Restrictions on Press Freedom

This domain was assessed using 14 indicators, each weighted at 0.0714 (or 71 points).

In 2024, the West Bank recorded a notable increase in this category, rising to 454 points, compared to 384 points in 2023, representing an 18.2% increase, and 411 points in 2022. Key drivers of this improvement include: Reduction in Physical Assaults on Journalists and/or media workers¹³, only 2 cases in 2024, down from 9 in 2023, improving the indicator's achievement rate from 10% to 80%. In 2022, there were 5 cases (50%), while only 1 case was reported in 2020 (90% achievement).

A decline in the indicator measuring the number of cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers¹⁴ led to an increase in the score for this indicator, as there were no recorded cases in the West Bank during 2024, resulting in a 100.0% achievement rate. In comparison, the number of cases in the West Bank in 2023 was 4, resulting in an achievement rate of 60%, while in 2022 the number of cases stood at 3, with an achievement rate of 70.0%, and in 2020 there was 1 case, with an achievement rate of 90.0%.

There was also a slight improvement in the indicator measuring the absence of arrests of journalists and/or media workers, with the achievement rate rising from 0.0% (10 cases) in 2023¹⁵ to 10.0% (9 cases) in 2024.

At the level of Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip) for the years 2018 to 2022, there was a significant decline in the Press Freedom Legal Restrictions Index in 2022, amounting to 120 points compared to 2020. The index recorded 366 points in 2022, down from 485 points in 2020, and 479 points in 2019.


This decline is attributed to a sharp drop in the West Bank's score—from 577 points in 2020 to 411 points in 2022, a decrease of 166 points. In contrast, the Gaza Strip experienced an increase of 62 points, from 476 points in 2020 to 537 points in 2022.

13 Source: Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA: Number of physical assaults – West Bank: 2 cases in 2024 compared to 9 cases in 2023. Accordingly, the index increased (According to the methodology, 10% is deducted per person, up to a maximum of 10 individuals, resulting in an indicator achievement rate of 0.0%. Thus, the indicator improved from an achievement rate of 10% to 80%).

14 Source: Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA: Number of torture cases – West Bank: 0 cases in 2024 compared to 4 cases in 2023. Accordingly, the indicator improved, with the achievement rate increasing from 60% to 100%.

15 Source: Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA: Number of arrest cases – West Bank: 9 cases in 2024 compared to 10 cases in 2023. Accordingly, the index increased (According to the methodology, 10% is deducted per person, up to a maximum of 10 individuals, resulting in an indicator achievement rate of 0.0%. Thus, the indicator improved from an achievement rate of 0% to 10%).

2. Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom by Region in the West Bank for the Years 2018–2022, 2023, and 2024



Comparative Analysis of Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom in the West Bank: 2022, 2023, and 2024

Regarding the indicator “Serious investigations conducted by official authorities into complaints submitted by media professionals”, the percentage was 26.2% in 2022, decreased to 21.4% in 2023, and then rose to 29.6% in 2024, marking an increase of 8.2%. This notable improvement suggests a slight improvement in the responsiveness of authorities to complaints filed by journalists.

As for the indicator “I was compensated by public authorities for material damage caused by attacks on my equipment”, the percentage stood at 4.5% in 2022, dropped to 0% in 2023, and then slightly increased to 6% in 2024—an improvement of 6%, yet still reflecting a very low level of fulfillment for this compensation indicator.

Regarding the indicator “No restrictions or bans on covering public events or performing journalistic work”, the percentage was 35.1% in 2022, declined to 33.1% in 2023, and rose

again to 38.4% in 2024, an increase of 5.3%. This suggests an improvement in the situation concerning restrictions on media coverage.

In terms of the indicator “No confiscation and/or destruction of my equipment and/or materials due to my journalistic work”, the percentage was 74.7% in 2022, declined to 60.2% in 2023, and rose to 64.8% in 2024, with a 4.6% increase, reflecting a modest improvement in this area.

For the indicator “No restrictive actions taken by official authorities such as closure and/or blocking of media outlets”, the percentage was 64.2% in 2022, increased slightly to 66.2% in 2023, but then sharply dropped to 32% in 2024. This reflects a significant deterioration in this indicator, suggesting a notable increase in restrictive measures against media outlets.

Regarding the indicator “Punitive measures were taken against individuals who assaulted me or one of my colleagues”, the percentage was 5.5% in 2022, rose to 15.9% in 2023, and then slightly declined to 12.7% in 2024, indicating a decrease in the effectiveness of punitive measures against perpetrators of assaults on journalists.

Concerning the indicator “No defamation, incitement, or slander against journalists online due to publishing sensitive reports”, the percentage was 39.2% in 2022, slightly declined to 38.1% in 2023, and rose to 33.2% in 2024, reflecting a minor improvement in this area.

As for the indicator “Journalists or media owners are not systematically prosecuted or imprisoned for their writings and/or broadcasts”, the percentage was 58.7% in 2022, declined to 52.9% in 2023, and dropped significantly to 33.6% in 2024, indicating a major regression in protection from prosecution related to journalistic activities.

Finally, regarding the indicator “No restrictions on accessing and/or transferring information due to the state of emergency”, the percentage was 39.8% in 2022, fell to 31.9% in 2023, and continued to decline to 27.8% in 2024, reflecting a continuous deterioration in access to information.

At the national level in Palestine during the years 2018–2022

- The indicator achievement rate was 0.0% across Palestine during the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022 (due to the presence of arrest cases against journalists and/or media workers), with 10 cases recorded in 2022, all in the West Bank.
- In contrast, the results in 2022 showed an increase in the indicator in the Gaza Strip by 62 points, reaching 537 points compared to 476 points in 2020. This was due to a 100.0% achievement rate for the indicator “No cases of arrests against journalists and/or media workers”, as well as a 100.0% achievement rate for the indicator “Decrease in the number of torture cases against journalists and/or media workers”.
- The indicator “No high civil fines imposed on journalists after being convicted of defamation, slander, or libel” remained constant at 100% for both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as the number of such cases was (0) throughout all four years.
- The indicator achievement rate remained at 0.0% across Palestine for “no summoning or investigation of journalists and/or media workers”, due to the continued existence of such procedures in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 2022, the number of summoning and investigation cases totaled 12 - 9 in the West Bank and 3 in Gaza.
- In 2022, the number of torture cases against journalists and/or media workers was 3

in the West Bank, and none in Gaza, giving the indicator a national achievement rate of 70.0%.

- For the indicator “Number of physical assaults on journalists and/or media workers”, the total was 5 cases in the West Bank and 2 in Gaza, giving the indicator a national achievement rate of 30.0%, compared to 60.0% in 2020.
- The indicator “Imposing restrictions or preventing coverage of public events by journalists and performing their journalistic duties” scored 37.0% nationwide in 2022, compared to 54.0% in 2020.
- A decline was observed in the indicator “Official authorities conducting investigations into submitted complaints” nationwide, from 34.0% in 2020 to 11.0% in 2022.
- A decrease in the indicator “No widespread or arbitrary defamation, incitement, or slander against journalists online due to publishing sensitive reports” was recorded in the West Bank from 58.0% in 2020 to 39.0% in 2022. Similarly, the Gaza Strip saw a decrease from 61.0% in 2020 to 40.0% in 2022.
- The indicator “No restrictive measures such as closure or blocking of media outlets taken by official authorities” also declined nationally from 59.0% in 2020 to 39.0% in 2022. In the West Bank, the rate dropped from 58.0% in 2020 to 39.0% in 2022, while in Gaza, it decreased from 61.0% in 2020 to 40.0% in 2022.
- The indicator “no restrictions on access to and/or transfer of information due to a state of emergency” declined from 49.0% in 2020 to 39.0% in 2022 nationwide. This drop was reflected in the West Bank, where it fell from 48.0% in 2020 to 40.0% in 2022, and in Gaza, where it dropped from 52.0% in 2020 to 37.0% in 2022.

2.3 Independence of Media Operations

The independence of media operations was measured using 7 indicators, each with a relative weight of (0.143), amounting to 143 points per indicator.

There was a decline in the indicator of the independence of media operations in the West Bank in 2024 by 4 points, bringing the score down to 344 compared to 348 points in 2023.

Media Independence Index in the West Bank from 2022 to 2024

The Media Independence Index in the West Bank dropped to 344 points in 2024, a decline of 4 points compared to 348 points in 2023, and a sharp drop of 228 points from its peak value of 572 points in 2020. This also marks a decrease of 66 points from 410 points in 2022, and a 225-point decline from 569 points in 2018. The total decrease from 2020 to 2024 stands at 228 points, reflecting a continued deterioration in media independence during this period.

When examining the sub-indicators, the following trends emerge:

The indicator “absence of licensing laws that enable government control over the media” saw a significant decline, dropping from 44.4% in 2022 to 31.6% in 2023, and then to 22.7% in 2024, with a difference of 8.8% between 2023 and 2024. This decline signals a worsening legal environment that increases the government’s potential to exercise direct control through legislation.

The indicator “licensing procedures that hinder the operation and establishment of independent media outlets” also declined gradually, from 40.0% in 2022 to 30.9% in 2023,

and further to 28.5% in 2024, a drop of 2.4%. This suggests growing administrative and regulatory obstacles to launching independent media.

Conversely, the indicator “absence of state-owned media dominance over the news and information system” saw a continued decline, from 40.4% in 2022 to 38.7% in 2023, and 37.0% in 2024, with a decrease of 1.8%, reflecting the ongoing monopoly of state-owned media over the information landscape.

A significant improvement was observed in the indicator “editorial independence and coverage of diverse societal groups by official media outlets”, which rose from 24.3% in 2022 to 26.6% in 2023, and then to 37.7% in 2024, showing a notable 11.1% increase. This indicates a trend toward improved quality and inclusiveness in official media content.

In contrast, there was a substantial decline in the indicator “transparency in media ownership and the ability to establish media outlets without political discrimination”, which dropped from 47.1% in 2022 to 23.8% in 2023, and then to 16.4% in 2024, representing a 7.4% drop in the last year alone. This suggests increasing opacity and growing barriers in licensing and ownership structures.


The indicator “diversity of media ownership and lack of concentration among specific political or economic factions” showed continuous improvement, rising from 43.4% in 2022 to 45.8% in 2023, and then to 50.0% in 2024, with a 4.2% increase.


Finally, the indicator “no concealment of ownership or connections to official positions within media outlets” recorded a slight improvement from 45.8% in 2023 to 48.6% in 2024, a 2.8% increase.

At the national level (West Bank and Gaza Strip) between 2018 and 2022, the Media Independence Index in Palestine declined by 133 points, from 552 points in 2020 to 419 points in 2022. This marks a total decrease of 146 points compared to 2018, when the index stood at 565 points.

The sharpest decline was recorded in the West Bank, with a drop of 221 points—the index reached 348 points in 2023, down from 569 points in 2018, and 410 points in 2022. This is compared to its peak of 572 points in 2020, after previously standing at 447 points in 2019.

In Gaza, the index fell by 66 points, reaching 447 points, down from 513 in 2020 and 502 in 2019—a total decline of 111 points from its value of 559 points in 2018.





This change is explained by the decline in the achievement rates of all indicators in the West Bank for the year 2024, falling below 50%:

- A decline in the achievement rate of the indicator (Clarity of media ownership procedures and the possibility of establishing media outlets without political discrimination) continued sharply in the West Bank, from 53.2% in 2022 to 23.8% in 2023, and further to 16.4% in 2024, reflecting a clear deterioration in this indicator in recent years.
- The indicator (Licensing laws that allow government control over media) in the West Bank dropped from 31.6% in 2023 to 22.7% in 2024, indicating continued regression in this area in recent years.
- The indicator (Clarity of media ownership procedures and the possibility of establishing media outlets without political discrimination) witnessed a sustained sharp decline in the West Bank, from 53.2% in 2022 to 23.8% in 2023, and further to 16.4% in 2024, signaling a significant deterioration in this area over recent years.
- A drop in the achievement rate of the indicator (Licensing procedures that hinder the work and establishment of independent media) was recorded in the West Bank in 2024, falling to 28.5%, down from 30.9% in 2023, and compared to 40.0% in 2022.
- The achievement rate of the indicator (Absence of dominance by state-owned media over the news and information system) in the West Bank decreased from 40.4% in 2022 to 38.7% in 2023, and further to 37.0% in 2024.
- The indicator for (Public media outlets enjoying editorial independence and covering the news of all population groups) in the West Bank saw a slight increase to 26.6% in 2023, and then a more notable rise to 37.7% in 2024, indicating a relative improvement in this aspect in recent years.



2.4 Media Outlets and Content Diversity

The field scale relied on 7 indicators, with a relative weight of (0.143) for each indicator, totaling 143 points.

The Media and Content Diversity indicator for press freedom in the West Bank increased

by 34 points in 2024, reaching 454 points, compared to 420 points in 2023, 424 points in 2022, 436 points in 2020, and 435 points in 2019. However, this still reflects a decline of 24 points compared to 2018, which recorded 478 points.

At the Palestine level (West Bank and Gaza Strip) for the years 2018 to 2022, there was a decline of 30 points in the Media and Content Diversity indicator for press freedom in Palestine. The score reached 417 points in 2022, compared to 447 points in 2020, 455 points in 2019, and 481 points in 2018. The largest drop was observed in the Gaza Strip, with a decline of 63 points, from 470 points in 2020 to 406 points in 2022. It also fell from 479 points in 2019, marking a total decline of 84 points compared to 2018, which recorded 490 points.



Comparative Analysis of Media and Content Diversity in the West Bank (2022–2024)

When comparing the media landscape in the West Bank across the years 2022, 2023, and 2024, there appears to be some improvement in certain aspects, while other indicators

show a decline. Overall, the media environment has witnessed slight progress in areas such as reduced media monopoly and improved internet access at better cost and quality. However, significant challenges remain, including internet monopolization and the use of licensing as a tool to pressure independent media outlets.

With regard to the percentage of achievement of the indicator (Availability of internet for all at low cost and adequate quality), this indicator witnessed an improvement, where the percentage was (35.0%) in 2022, then declined in 2023 to (31.2%), and in 2024 improved to reach (42.4%), reflecting a slight improvement in citizens' ability to access the internet.

It is noted that the percentage of achievement of the indicator related to the monopoly of access to information by a few media outlets and influential figures witnessed a slight decline in 2022, where the percentage was (34.2%), then decreased to (30.1%) in 2023, and rose again to (35.6%) in 2024. This change shows a slight improvement in media freedom, though it still indicates the existence of control over the flow of information.

As for the percentage of achievement of the indicator (Government use of licensing as a tool to pressure independent media outlets), the percentage increased from (50.0%) in 2023 to (55.1%) in 2024. This indicates a decline in the government's use of this mechanism to pressure independent media.

Regarding the percentage of achievement of the indicator (Media coverage of issues related to corruption and misuse of public funds), the percentage was (34.4%) in 2022, then declined to (28.3%) in 2023, with a slight improvement in 2024 reaching (33.5%). This change indicates a slight improvement in media interest in covering these sensitive issues.

On the other hand, regarding the percentage of achievement of the indicator (The state providing laws that allow for concentration of monopolies and joint media ownership), this indicator declined from (65.7%) in 2023 to (60.6%) in 2024, while it was (55.5%) in 2022. This decline reflects that the situation still allows media concentration in the hands of a few owners.

As for the achievement of the indicator (Monopoly of internet and telecommunications services), the indicator witnessed a slight decline from (58.7%) in 2023 to (58.2%) in 2024. This indicates that the status of internet service monopoly has not changed significantly.

Regarding the diversity of sources and information related to corruption and misuse of public funds, the percentage was (31.4%) in 2022, then declined to (29.6%) in 2023, and slightly improved in 2024 to (32.2%).


2.5 Self-Censorship and Government Procedures

This domain's scale was based on 8 indicators, each with a relative weight of (0.125) and a value of 125 points.

A decline of (27) points was recorded in the self-censorship and government procedures domain in the West Bank in 2024, reaching (330) points compared to (357) points in 2023, and (343) points in 2022, reflecting a total decline of (226) points from the highest score recorded in 2020, which was (583) points.

At the level of Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip) during the years 2018 and 2022, a decline of (207) points was recorded in the self-censorship and government procedures domain, as it stood at (339) points in 2022 compared to (546) points in 2020, after reaching (546) points in 2020, (501) points in 2019, and (515) points in 2018.

5. Self-Censorship and Government Measures by Region in the West Bank for the Years 2018–2022, 2023, and 2024



This is attributed to the decline in the achievement rate of all indicators for the year 2024, with all eight domain indicators registering achievement rates of less than 50% at the level of the West Bank for 2024:

The lowest-performing indicator is: (The use of alternative symbols and words on social media platforms to avoid post banning and/or deletion by these platforms), which dropped from 17.2% in 2022 to 14.9% in 2023, and further declined to 13.9% in 2024. This suggests a widespread use of alternative words and symbols.

Following that is the indicator: (Media outlets refraining from publishing journalistic material for fear of prosecution by public authorities), with an achievement rate of 27.4%. (Editorial censorship in media outlets regarding published issues) decreased from 38.9% in 2022 to 27.9% in 2023, and slightly increased to 29.4% in 2024.

(Governmental censorship measures on publications and/or publishing hindering media freedom) rose from 21.4% in 2022 to 38.1% in 2023, and then decreased to 32.4% in 2024.

Descriptive Analysis of the Data (Self-Censorship and Governmental Measures – 2022, 2023, 2024)

In this analysis, we compare the rates of self-censorship and governmental measures related to press and media freedom for the years 2022, 2023, and 2024. The data collected reflects several key indicators affecting media freedom, with an emphasis on trends and changes over the years. An increase is considered a positive sign and an improvement in the media environment.

1. Considering governmental censorship measures on publications and/or publishing as an impediment to media freedom:

The percentage was (21.4%) in 2022, then rose significantly to (38.1%) in 2023. In 2024, a slight decrease was observed, bringing the rate to (32.4%). This sharp increase in 2023 indicates a rise in governmental censorship over media outlets, presenting a negative challenge to media freedom, despite the slight improvement in 2024.

2. Absence of official or societal threats against writers or editors due to publishing:

The percentage stood at (40.7%) in 2022, increased to (44.3%) in 2023, and then decreased to (40.3%) in 2024. This fluctuation indicates increased threats to journalists during certain periods.

3. Media outlets not refraining from publishing journalistic material for fear of prosecution by public authorities:

The percentage was (31.4%) in 2022 and remained nearly constant at (31.1%) in 2023. However, it declined to (27.4%) in 2024. This decrease suggests that media outlets have become more cautious when publishing journalistic content.

4. News not being published online and subsequently withdrawn:

The percentage was highest in 2022 at (47.8%), then dropped to (45.9%) in 2023, and further declined to (43.0%) in 2024. This trend indicates instances where news was posted online and then later retracted, pointing to a more constrained information-sharing environment.

5. Absence of editorial censorship in media outlets regarding published issues: In 2022, the percentage indicating no editorial censorship was (38.9%). This fell to (32.0%) in 2023 and continued to decrease to (29.4%) in 2024. The decline indicates an increase in editorial control within the media environment.

6. Journalists not subjected to familial and/or societal pressure in connection with the publication of information:

The percentage was (40.5%) in 2022, increased to (41.8%) in 2023, and slightly decreased to (41.3%) in 2024. This rate indicates the continued presence of social and familial pressure on journalists, representing a negative aspect of the media work environment.

7. Absence of blacklists of individuals and/or institutions banned from appearing in media outlets:



The percentage stood at (36.3%) in 2022, rose to (37.6%) in 2023, and slightly declined to (36.4%) in 2024. This suggests the continued existence of blacklists, indicating that this issue remains a persistent challenge to media freedom.

2.6 Financing Policies

The domain scale was based on 9 indicators, each assigned a relative weight of (0.111), with a total value of 111 points per indicator.

A decrease of (21) points was recorded in the Financing Policies domain scale for journalism in the West Bank in 2024, reaching (300) points in 2024, down from (321) points in 2023, compared to (296) points in 2022. This represents a significant decline of (215) points from the highest score ever recorded in this domain, which was (515) points in the year 2020.

At the level of Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip) for the years 2018 and 2022, a decline of (220) points was recorded in the Financing Policies domain scale for journalism in Palestine, reaching (296) points in 2022 compared to the highest recorded value of (516) points in 2020. In comparison, the domain reached (433) points in 2019 and (457) points in 2018. Meanwhile, an increase of (75) points was recorded in the Gaza Strip between the years 2019 and 2020.



This decline at the level of the West Bank in 2024 is attributed to 7 out of 9 indicators recording achievement rates of less than 50.0% of the total indicator points for this domain in 2024, namely:

- A decrease in the indicator (Government financial support for media outlets distributed fairly based on market share or advertising market), where the rate was 7.2% in the West Bank in 2024, and 9.5% in the West Bank in 2023, compared to 15.7%

in 2022. In Palestine overall, the rate was 20.2% in 2022 and 33.4% in the Gaza Strip.

- A decline in the indicator (Wage levels for journalists and other media professionals) in the West Bank from 16.8% in 2022 to 11.9% in 2023, and further to 9.3% in 2024. It was also low in Palestine in 2022 at 16.2%, including 16.8% in the West Bank and 15.2% in the Gaza Strip.
- A decline in the indicator (Budgets allocated for government advertising in media distributed fairly) in the West Bank from 12.9% in 2022 to 11.9% in 2023, and down to 6.3% in 2024. The rate stood at 14.9% in Palestine in 2022 and 20.9% in the Gaza Strip.
- A significant decrease in the achievement rate of the indicator (Existence of restrictions on foreign funding and/or support for media outlets), with a rate of 29.6% in the West Bank in 2024 compared to 42.9% in 2023, 24.3% in 2022, and 12.5% in the Gaza Strip in 2022. This led to a decrease in the overall achievement rate in Palestine to 21.3% in 2022.
- A slight decline in the achievement rate of the indicator (Imposition of high fees for obtaining frequencies and/or registering newspapers and/or websites) in the West Bank from 31.5% in 2022 to 32.5% in 2023, dropping again to 28.8% in 2024. A notable decrease is also observed in the Gaza Strip, at 25.0% in 2022. The same applies to the achievement rate in Palestine overall, where a notable drop from 29.8% in 2022 is observed.
- The indicator (Exerting pressure on journalists through salary reductions and/or termination of employment contracts) recorded an achievement rate of 33.3% in the West Bank in 2024, compared to 34.0% in 2023. At the level of Palestine, the achievement rate was 36.1%, and 37.5% in the Gaza Strip in 2022.
- A decrease in the achievement rate of the indicator (Imposing VAT on the purchase of paper and/or newsprint or broadcasting equipment and other media equipment) in the West Bank from 29.7% in 2020 to 27.2% in 2022, to 40.5% in 2023, and then slightly down to 39.4% in 2024. A significant drop was also observed in the Gaza Strip, from 50.5% in 2020 to 20.9% in 2022. The same trend applies at the level of Palestine, with a noticeable decline from 35.1% in 2020 to 25.6% in 2022.

Two indicators exceeded a 50% achievement rate in the West Bank in 2024:



- The indicator (Absence of bribery of journalists by actors aiming to influence news content in their media work) recorded an achievement rate of 57.2% in the West Bank in 2024, compared to 56.0% in 2023, and 55.6% in 2022.
- The indicator (Non-use of advertisements as a means of pressure to influence editors' decisions) recorded an achievement rate of 57.2% in the West Bank in 2024, compared to 50.1% in 2023.

2.7 Transparency and Access to Information

The domain scale was based on 8 indicators, each assigned a relative weight of (0.125), with a total value of 125 points per indicator.

The indicator scale in the West Bank declined by (10) points, from (365) points in 2023 to (355) points in 2024. This represents a decrease of (15) points compared to 2022, which recorded (370) points, and a decline of (97) points compared to 2020. It is also lower by (138) points compared to the highest value reached, which was (493) points in 2019.

At the level of Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip) for the years 2018 and 2022, a significant decrease of (89) points was recorded in the transparency and access to information domain scale. It reached (365) points in 2022, compared to (454) points in 2020, and further declined by (36) points compared to (490) points in 2019, and by (11) points compared to (465) points in 2018. Additionally, a more substantial decline was observed in the Gaza Strip, amounting to (112) points between 2020 and 2022, dropping from (429) points to (317) points.



This decline at the level of the West Bank in 2024 is attributed to all indicators recording achievement rates of less than 50.0% of the total indicator points for this domain in 2024, namely:

- The indicator (Existence of a law guaranteeing the right to access information) remained constant at (0) points in the West Bank throughout the years from 2018 to 2024.
- The lowest achievement rate was for the indicator (Allowing journalists to accompany

security forces on field missions) in the West Bank, declining from 29.4% in 2022 to 23.5% in 2023, and slightly rising to 23.7% in 2024. The same applies at the level of Palestine, where a significant decline is observed from 51.2% in 2020 to 31.1% in 2022. A decline is also noted in the Gaza Strip from 44% in 2020 to 34.4% in 2022.

- Following this is the indicator (Existence of laws and regulations enabling journalists to access information), with achievement rates in the West Bank dropping from 30.6% in 2022 to 26.3% in 2023, and slightly increasing to 29.0% in 2024.
- A decrease in the indicator (Clarity of restrictions imposed on access to information) in the West Bank, from 41.5% in 2022 to 39.7% in 2023, and down to 35.3% in 2024. A decline is also noted in the Gaza Strip from 44.8% in 2020 to 42.9% in 2022. Similarly, at the level of Palestine, a significant decline is observed from 50.4% in 2020 to 42.0% in 2022.
- A slight increase in the indicator (Contribution of official spokespersons in providing necessary information for journalistic work) in the West Bank, from 46.6% in 2022 to 44.0% in 2023, returning to 46.6% in 2024. At the level of Palestine, a decrease is observed from 64.8% in 2020 to 48.8% in 2022, and in the Gaza Strip from 69.6% in 2020 to 53.1% in 2022.
- A notable decrease in the indicator (Not being subjected to direct or indirect pressure to reveal information sources that were obtained and published) in the West Bank, from 47.2% in 2022 to 44.7% in 2023, and further down to 41.4% in 2024. The same pattern is observed at the level of Palestine, where the indicator declined significantly from 74.4% in 2020 to 45.8% in 2022. A sharp decline is also noted in the Gaza Strip, from 76% in 2020 to 42.9% in 2022.
- As for the indicator (Perception of violations of journalists' privacy by public authorities) in the West Bank, it declined from 51.2% in 2020 to 41.2% in 2023, and further to 38.1% in 2024. At the level of Palestine, the indicator decreased from 51.2% in 2020 to 40.8% in 2022, with varying rates between the West Bank and Gaza Strip at 42.0% and 38.4%, respectively.



2.8 Journalists' Self-Regulation and Protection

The domain scale was based on 11 indicators, each assigned a relative weight of (0.0909), with a total value of 90 points per indicator.

There continues to be a decline in the domain scale of journalists' self-regulation in the West Bank for the year 2024, with a decrease of (9) points from (370) points in 2023 to (361) points in 2024. This represents a drop of (40) points compared to 2022, which recorded (401) points, and a decrease of (257) points compared to the highest score of (618) points reached in 2018.

At the level of Palestine (West Bank and Gaza Strip) for the years 2018 and 2022, a significant decline was observed in the domain scale of journalists' self-regulation in Palestine, with a decrease of (122) points from (529) points in 2020 to (407) points in 2022, and a drop of (174) points compared to 2019, which recorded (581) points. A further and larger decline of (218) points was recorded compared to 2019, which reached (588) points. In the Gaza Strip, a decline was recorded from (523) points in 2020 to (417) points in 2022, amounting to a decrease of (106) points, and a drop of (149) points compared to 2019, which recorded (566) points.

8. Journalists' Self-Regulation by Region in the West Bank for the Years 2018–2022, 2023, and 2024



The results show a clear decline in the achievement rate of all indicators—each recording less than 50.0%—in the West Bank for the year 2024 in the domain of trade union organization of journalists. The years 2022, 2023, and 2024 witnessed some notable changes in the indicators related to journalism and trade union freedoms.

Key findings and ranking of indicators by degree of decline:

- (Indicator 8.2): (Restriction and/or dismissal of media employees due to advertiser objections to their journalistic work) – In 2022, the achievement rate was (41.5%), then it rose to (46.4%) in 2023, but witnessed a significant decline to (34.8%) in 2024, indicating a notable setback in this area in 2024 compared to previous years.
- (Indicator 8.8): (Degree of representation of the trade union body for media workers) – In 2022, the achievement rate was (42.6%), then decreased to (41.1%) in 2023, and dropped further to (36.0%) in 2024. This indicates a steady decline in the degree of union representation for media workers over the years.

3. (Indicator 8.4): (Independence of representative bodies of media workers from government and political party influence) – In 2022, the rate was (25.5%), then declined to (24.9%) in 2023, and dropped again to (21.3%) in 2024. This reflects a continuous decline in the independence of representative bodies from political and governmental interference.
4. (Indicator 8.7): (Freedom for workers in official media to join journalists' representative bodies) – In 2022, the achievement rate was (47.7%), then decreased to (41.5%) in 2023, and further declined to (39.2%) in 2024. This shows a slight deterioration in the freedom of official media employees to join representative bodies.
5. (Indicator 8.10): (Degree of trade union engagement of media workers in shaping general policies and directions) – In 2022, the rate was (31.3%), then slightly decreased to (30.9%) in 2023, and dropped again to (29.2%) in 2024. This indicates a low level of trade union participation in policymaking.
6. (Indicator 8.9): (Procedures for joining and membership in the trade union body for media workers are acceptable and professional) – In 2022, the achievement rate was (51.9%), then declined to (41.1%) in 2023, and dropped slightly to (40.1%) in 2024. This indicates a decline in the acceptance and professionalism of union membership procedures in recent years.
7. (Indicator 8.1): (Existence of laws allowing journalists to form representative (labor union) bodies in the media sector) – In 2022, the rate was (41.1%), then dropped slightly to (40.8%) in 2023, and continued its mild decline to (40.4%) in 2024. This indicates a slight drop in the legal framework supporting the formation of journalists' representative bodies over the past three years.
8. (Indicator 8.11): (Effectiveness of the trade union body in defending the rights of its members) – In 2022, the rate was (45.1%), then declined to (39.6%) in 2023, but increased to (41.8%) in 2024. This reflects a slight improvement in the trade union's effectiveness in defending journalists' rights.
9. (Indicator 8.6): (Promotion of women's access to decision-making positions in media institutions and representative journalist bodies) – In 2022, the achievement rate was (49.3%), then declined to (43.7%) in 2023, but increased again to (47.1%) in 2024, indicating an improvement in the encouragement of women's access to leadership roles in the media sector.
10. (Indicator 8.5): (The journalists' trade union body is professional and independent in its work) – In 2022, the rate was (33.1%), then decreased significantly to (22.2%) in 2023, while it rose to (26.7%) in 2024. This relative improvement does not yet signify a substantial gain in professionalism and independence of the trade union body due to the low overall achievement rate.
11. (Indicator 8.3): (Regular and periodic elections in the representative bodies of media workers) – In 2022, the achievement rate was (36.8%), then increased to (39.4%) in 2023, and saw a greater increase to (44.9%) in 2024, indicating a slight improvement in the organization of regular elections for representative bodies in recent years.


3. Comparison of Domain Indicators for the Years 2018–2024

3.1: Legal Guarantees for Press Freedom


3.1.1: A consistent trend was observed in the indicator “Existence of guarantees provided by the Basic Law for press freedom” during the years 2018–2024.

This indicator was measured based on the legal section of the questionnaire, and the percentage of achievement reached 100%. The results of the open-ended responses unanimously confirmed the existence of guarantees enshrined in the Basic Law for the protection of press freedom. The Basic Law guarantees freedom of opinion and expression, the right to establish media outlets, and prohibits their closure except by judicial decision. It also ensures personal freedom and equality before the law.


The Basic Law provides constitutional protection standards, whereby it “guarantees the right to establish newspapers and other media outlets for all individuals, and protects the freedom of visual, audio, and written media. It also upholds the freedom of printing, publishing, distribution, and broadcasting, as well as the rights of media professionals. It prohibits censorship of the media and forbids warning, suspension, confiscation, cancellation, or the imposition of restrictions on media outlets, except in accordance with the law and through a judicial ruling, as stated in Article 27”.




3.1.2: The percentage of achievement for this indicator was 0%. This result stems from a unanimous consensus in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip regarding the lack of alignment between national legislation and the international conventions guaranteeing press freedom, which the State of Palestine has signed. These institutions collectively agreed that national legislation has not been harmonized with the international treaties safeguarding press freedom following Palestine’s accession to them. As a result, this indicator consistently received a 0% achievement rate throughout the years 2018–2024.




3.1.3: The indicator measuring “The existence of judicial guarantees in Palestinian courts that protect press freedom” in the West Bank increased in 2024 to 52.3%, compared to 48.7% in 2023, while it stood at approximately 62.5% in 2022. It is notable that this indicator in Palestine for the years 2018 to 2022 showed an upward trend, rising from 40.0% in 2018 to 52.0% in 2022. This increase is attributed primarily to a significant improvement in the West Bank, where the achievement rate rose from 41.0% in 2018 to 63.0% in 2022. Meanwhile, in the Gaza Strip, the percentage remained unchanged in 2018 and 2020, standing at approximately 38.0%.




3.1.4: The percentage of achievement for the indicator “Existence of legal provisions criminalizing incitement by government officials against the media” in Palestine was 0.0%. This outcome is the result of a unanimous consensus in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip that there are no legal provisions criminalizing incitement by government officials against media outlets. Consequently, this indicator recorded a 0.0% achievement rate throughout the four-year period from 2018 to 2022, and the same result was reported in the West Bank for the year 2024.




3.1.5: The percentage of achievement for the indicator “Existence of legal provisions imposing restrictions on coverage of ethnic or religious issues, national security, or sensitive topics such as children and gender” remained consistently at 50.0% in Palestine during the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022, as well as in the West Bank for the years 2023–2024. This indicator was assessed based on the legal section of the questionnaire, with both the West Bank and Gaza Strip scoring 50.0%. The open-ended responses unanimously indicated the presence of such restrictions, but described them as “limited in scope”.



3.1.6: The results showed a continuous decrease in the percentage of achievement of the indicator (procedures and instructions allow journalists to move freely during the imposition of a state of emergency and lockdowns) in the West Bank, from 80.0% in the year 2020 to 30.3% in the year 2023, and a further decline to 29.8% in the year 2024. The indicator also decreased at the level of Palestine in the year 2022 compared to 2020, from 64.8% in the year 2020 to 50.0% in the year 2022, while it increased in the Gaza Strip from 37.6% during the year 2020 to 52.0% in the year 2022. This means that the application of procedures in the West Bank in the year 2022 was eased, while in the Gaza Strip it was tightened compared to the year 2020.



3.1.7: The results show that the indicator (considering the existence of the Cybercrime Law as a factor that has enhanced press freedom) in the West Bank witnesses a slight increase in the percentage from 20.0% in the year 2020 to 21.4% in the year 2023, before declining again to 21.2% in 2024. At the level of Palestine in 2022, there was an increase in the percentage of achievement of the indicator to 30.0%, while it was approximately 21.6% in 2020, with close percentages between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where the 2022 figures reached approximately 28.0% in the West Bank and 33.0% in the Gaza Strip. This indicates that the existence of the law cannot be considered to have led to positive results or to have significantly enhanced press freedom, but only to a limited extent.




3.1.8: The results indicated a decline in the indicator (behavioral or legal rules regarding media workers receiving bribes to influence their work) in the West Bank in the year 2024 to 75.6%, after it was 78.9% in 2023 and around 50.4% in 2020. Meanwhile, this indicator declined at the level of Palestine in the year 2022 by 38.0%, whereas it was 50.4% in the year 2020. The percentage also decreased in the Gaza Strip in 2022 compared to 2020, from approximately 50.4% in 2020 to 33.0% in 2022.



3.2 Legal and Societal Restrictions on Press Freedom

The following is a presentation of the results for each indicator:

3.2.1: A decline in the achievement rate of the indicator (no imposition of high civil fines on journalists after being convicted of the crimes of defamation, slander, and libel), reaching 80.0% in 2024, after remaining stable at 100% for both the West Bank and Gaza Strip.




3.2.2: The achievement rate of the indicator was 0.0% at the level of Palestine during the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022 (due to cases of arrests of journalists and/or media workers)¹⁶.

Despite a decrease in the achievement rate of the indicator in the West Bank from 61.0% in 2020 to 0.0% in 2022, it rose to 20% in 2023 with eight documented cases, then dropped to 10% in 2024 with nine documented cases. According to the methodology, 10% is subtracted for each person up to a maximum of 10 persons; since the number of cases was nine, 90% was deducted from the achievement rate, resulting in a 10.0% achievement rate for the indicator.

Meanwhile, during the years 2018–2022, it was found that the achievement rate in the Gaza Strip increased from 0.0% in 2020 to 100.0% in 2022, which affected the overall achievement rate for Palestine. Cases of arrests of journalists and/or media workers still occurred in the Gaza Strip, whereas no cases of arrests were documented in the West Bank during 2022.

¹⁶ The index was used based on data monitored by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA.

(West Bank documented 10 cases, while there were no cases in Gaza, making a total of 10 cases. According to the methodology, 10% is subtracted for each person up to a maximum of 10 persons, resulting in an achievement rate of 0.0% for the indicator).




3.2.3: An increase in the achievement rate of the indicator to 90.0% in the West Bank for the year 2024 (due to cases of summons and investigations against journalists and/or media workers)¹⁷.

This was because the number of summons cases declined to one case, resulting in an achievement rate of 90.0% in the West Bank for 2024, after there were summons and investigations against journalists and/or media workers totaling 7 cases in the West Bank in 2023 (thus the achievement rate was 30%).

In 2022, the total number of summons and investigation cases in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was 12 cases, distributed as 9 cases in the West Bank and 3 cases in Gaza.

According to the calculation method, subtracting 10% for each summons and investigation case, the achievement rate for this indicator at the level of Palestine was 0% during the four years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022. (With 9 cases in the West Bank and 3 in Gaza, making the total more than 10 cases, and according to the methodology, subtracting 10% per person up to a maximum of 10 persons results in an achievement rate of 0.0% for the indicator).



3.2.4: The achievement rate of the indicator (absence of cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers)¹⁸ increased, with no cases recorded (resulting in an achievement rate of 100%) in the West Bank in 2024.

Meanwhile, there were cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers totaling 4 cases in the West Bank in 2023 (resulting in an achievement rate of 60%), a decrease from 3 cases in 2022 with an achievement rate of 70.0%, and one case in 2020 with an achievement rate of 90.0%.

At the level of Palestine, the indicator rate was 70% during the years 2020 and 2022. According to the calculation method, 10% is deducted for each case of torture. There was


17 The index was used based on data monitored by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA.

18 The index was used based on data monitored by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA.

a discrepancy in the rates between the West Bank at 70%, compared to 100% in the Gaza Strip, where the number of torture cases against journalists and/or media workers was 3 in the West Bank and none in Gaza.




3.2.5: The indicator (number of physical assaults against journalists and/or media workers)¹⁹ increased. There are still physical assaults against journalists and/or media workers, with 2 cases recorded in the West Bank in 2024 (thus, the achievement rate of the indicator is 80.0%), while the number of cases reached 9 in the West Bank in 2023 (thus, the achievement rate of the indicator is 10%), a decrease from the year 2022, when the number of cases was 5 with an achievement rate of 50.0%, while there was one case in 2020 with an achievement rate of 90.0%. The indicator scored 30.0% at the level of Palestine in 2022, while it was around 78.0% during the year 2018.



3.2.6: The results show that the indicator (imposing restrictions or preventing journalists from covering public events and performing their journalistic work) increased in the West Bank in 2024 to 38.4%, compared to 33.0% in 2023, while in 2020 it reached approximately 55.0%.

At the level of Palestine, this indicator recorded 37.0% in 2022, compared to 54.0% in 2020, with a disparity between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where the achievement rate of the indicator was 40.0% in the West Bank and 35.0% in the Gaza Strip.

¹⁹ The index was used based on data monitored by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms – MADA.



3.2.7: A decrease in the achievement rate of the indicator (not being subjected to the confiscation and/or destruction of my equipment and/or journalistic materials due to my journalistic work) in the West Bank. The rate was (74.7%) in 2022, then dropped to (60.2%) in 2023, before rising again to (64.8%) in 2024. The indicator also decreased at the level of Palestine, where we note a decline from 83% in 2020 to 72% in 2022.

A decrease in the indicator is also observed in the Gaza Strip, from 83.0% in 2020 to 66.0% in 2022.




3.2.8: The results indicated a slight increase in the achievement rate of the indicator (the official authorities conducting an investigation into the submitted complaint) in the West Bank. The rate was (26.2%) in 2022, then decreased to (21.4%) in 2023, before rising to (29.6%) in 2024.

At the level of Palestine, the indicator rose from 23.0% in 2020 to 28.0% in 2022. A sharp increase is also observed in the Gaza Strip, from 14% in 2020 to 33% in 2022, which contributed to the slight increase in the overall indicator at the level of Palestine from 23.0% in 2020 to 28.0% in 2022.




3.2.9: A continuous decrease in the achievement rate of the indicator (compensation by public authorities for material damage caused by the assault on my equipment) in the West Bank. The rate was (4.5%) in 2022, then dropped to (0%) in 2023, before rising again to (6%) in 2024.

At the level of Palestine, a decline from 12% was observed in 2019 to 3% in 2022, while in the Gaza Strip, the achievement rate of the indicator decreased from 11% in 2018 to 0% in 2022.




3.2.10: A decline in the achievement rate of the indicator (punitive measures against individuals who assaulted journalists or their colleagues at work) in the West Bank, from 10.0% in 2018 to 16.0% in 2023, then down to 12.7% in 2024. At the level of Palestine, a decrease is observed from 13.0% in 2018 to 11% in 2022. This is due to the decline in the achievement rate of the indicator in the West Bank, where it dropped from 38.0% in 2020 to 6.0% in 2022.

Meanwhile, in the Gaza Strip, the achievement rate of the indicator decreased from 25% in 2020 to 22% in 2022.



3.2.11: A slight increase in the achievement rate of the indicator (no systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists and/or media owners as a result of their writings and/or broadcasts) in the West Bank. The rate was (58.7%) in 2022, then decreased to (52.9%) in 2023, before declining further to (33.6%) in 2024. This indicator was measured based on the legal section questionnaire, where the percentage of indicator achievement for the weighted points was 59.0% in the West Bank and 34.0% in the Gaza Strip for the year 2022. The responses ranged between the options: "Yes, to a large extent" and "Yes, but to a limited extent".




3.2.12: A decline in the achievement rate of the indicator (absence of expansion and arbitrariness in defamation, incitement, or slander against journalists online due to their publication of sensitive reports) in the West Bank. The rate was (39.2%) in 2022, then decreased to (38.1%) in 2023, before falling again to (33.2%) in 2024. There was also a decrease in this indicator at the Palestine level from 59.0% in 2020 to 39.0% in 2022. A decline is also observed in the Gaza Strip, where the achievement rate dropped from 61% in 2020 to 40% in 2022.




3.2.13: A slight increase in the achievement rate of the indicator (absence of restrictive measures by official authorities such as closure or blocking against media outlets) at the level of the West Bank. The rate was (64.2%) in 2022, then rose to (66.2%) in 2023, before dropping to (32.0%) in 2024.

At the Palestine level, a decrease is noted from 75.0% in 2018 to 60.0% in 2022. Similarly, the achievement rate in the Gaza Strip declined from 75.0% in 2018 to 34.0% in 2022.




3.2.14: The indicator rate (imposition of restrictions on obtaining and/or transmitting information due to the state of emergency) decreased in the West Bank. The rate was (39.8%) in 2022, then dropped to (31.9%) in 2023, before declining further to (27.8%) in 2024. At the Palestine level, it decreased from 49.0% in 2020 to 39.0% in 2022. This decline in the West Bank was from 48.0% in 2020 to 40.0% in 2022, while in the Gaza Strip it fell from 52.0% in 2020 to 37.0% in 2022.



3.3 Independence of Media Work

Below is a presentation of the results for each indicator.


3.3.1: A decrease in the achievement rate of the indicator (not considering media licensing laws as biased toward government control over these media outlets) in the West Bank. The rate was 44.4% in 2022, then dropped to 31.6% in 2023, before declining further to 22.7% in 2024. Meanwhile, in the Gaza Strip, the achievement rate of this indicator rose from 48.3% in 2020 to 50.0% in 2022, which influenced the overall achievement rate for Palestine, causing it to decrease to 45.2% in 2022 compared to 53.8% in 2020.




3.3.2: A decrease in the achievement rate of the indicator (not considering licensing laws as allowing government control over media outlets) in the West Bank. The rate was 40% in 2022, then dropped to 30.9% in 2023, before declining further to 28.5% in 2024. Meanwhile, in the Gaza Strip, the achievement rate of this indicator fell from 50.3% in 2020 to 33.3% in 2022. We also observe a decline in the achievement rate at the Palestine level in 2022 to 38.3%, down from 58% in 2020.




3.3.3: A very slight decline in the achievement rate of the indicator (considering the absence of dominance by state-owned media over the country's news and information system) in the West Bank. The rate was 40.4% in 2022, then decreased to 38.7% in 2023, before dropping again to 37.0% in 2024. Meanwhile, in the Gaza Strip, the achievement rate fell from 37.8% in 2020 to 36.4% in 2022. Thus, we observe a slight decline in the achievement rate at the Palestine level from 39.2% in 2020 to 39.1% in 2022.




3.3.4: An increase in the achievement rate of the indicator (official media enjoy editorial independence and cover news of all segments of society) in the West Bank. The rate was 24.3% in 2022, then rose to 26.6% in 2023, before increasing again to 37.7% in 2024. However, a sharp decline is observed in the achievement rate at the Palestine level, dropping from 69.2% in 2020 to 25.1% in 2022. Similarly, in the Gaza Strip, there was a sharp decrease in the achievement rate from 66.4% in 2020 to 26.8% in 2022.




3.3.5: A sharp decline in the achievement rate of the indicator (clarity of media ownership procedures and the opportunity to establish media outlets without political discrimination) in the West Bank. The rate was 47.1% in 2022, then dropped sharply to 23.8% in 2023, before declining again to 16.4% in 2024. A decrease is also noted in the achievement rate at the Palestine level from 68.5% in 2020 to 53.2% in 2022. Meanwhile, the achievement rate in the Gaza Strip increased from 58.7% in 2020 to 70.8% in 2022.



3.3.6: A slight increase in the achievement rate of the indicator (presence of diversity in media ownership) in the West Bank. The rate was 43.4% in 2022, then rose slightly to 45.8% in 2023, before increasing again to 50% in 2024. There was a very slight decrease in the achievement rate at the Palestine level, declining from 48.3% in 2020 to 48.2% in 2022. Meanwhile, the achievement rate in the Gaza Strip increased from 51.7% in 2020 to 58.0% in 2022.




3.3.7: A decline in the achievement rate of the indicator (non-concealment of ownership of official positions in media outlets and deliberate hiding of their connections to these outlets) in the West Bank. The rate was 46.8% in 2022, then decreased to 45.8% in 2023, before rising again to 48.6% in 2024. The same trend applies to the achievement rate at the Palestine level, where it declined from 49% in 2020 to 43.7% in 2022. A decrease is also observed in the achievement rate in the Gaza Strip, dropping from 44.8% in 2020 to 37.5% in 2022.




3.4 Media Outlets and Content Diversity:

Below is a presentation of the results for each indicator.

3.4.1: An increase in the achievement rate of the indicator (there is monopolization of access to information by certain media outlets and influential figures) in the West Bank. The rate was 34.2% in 2022, then declined to 30.1% in 2023, before rising again to 35.6% in 2024. The same applies to the achievement rate at the Palestine level, where a decline is noted from 33.6% in 2020 to 31.7% in 2022. A decrease is also observed in the Gaza Strip, where the rate dropped from 29.4% in 2020 to 26.6% in 2022.




3.4.2: A decline in the achievement rate of the indicator (the state provides laws that allow the concentration of monopolies and joint ownership of media outlets) in the West Bank. The rate was 55.5% in 2022, then rose to 65.7% in 2023, before decreasing again to 60.6% in 2024. The same applies to the achievement rate at the Palestine level, where an increase is observed from 54.5% in 2020 to 57.1% in 2022. An increase is also noted in the Gaza Strip, where the achievement rate rose from 53.8% in 2020 to 66.6% in 2022.




3.4.3: A slight decrease in the achievement rate of the indicator (presence of monopoly in providing internet and/or telecommunications services) in the West Bank. The rate was 56.3% in 2022, then slightly increased to 58.7% in 2023, before decreasing again to 58.2% in 2024. The same applies to the achievement rate at the Palestine level, where a notable


increase is observed from 42.7% in 2020 to 54.2% in 2022. A slight increase is also noted in the Gaza Strip, where the rate rose from 47.6% in 2020 to 50.0% in 2022.




3.4.4: An increase in the achievement rate of the indicator (internet access is available to all and at a low cost) in the West Bank. The rate was 35% in 2022, then decreased to 31.2% in 2023, before rising again to 42.4% in 2024. At the Palestine level, there is a noticeable increase in the achievement rate from 29.4% in 2020 to 34.4% in 2022. However, a slight decrease is observed in the Gaza Strip, where the rate dropped from 35.7% in 2020 to 34.7% in 2022.




3.4.5: An increase in the achievement rate of the indicator (the government uses media ownership licensing and frequencies as a means of pressure on independent media) in the West Bank. The rate was 50% in 2022, remained the same in 2023, and then rose to 55.1% in 2024. However, a decrease is observed in the achievement rate at the Palestine level, from 65% in 2020 to 46.8% in 2022. A significant decrease is also noted in the Gaza Strip, where the rate dropped from 67.8% in 2020 to 37.5% in 2022.



3.4.6: There was an increase in the achievement rate of the indicator (diversity in sources, information, and content related to corruption and/or public fund misuse) in the West Bank. The rate was 31.4% in 2022, then decreased to 29.6% in 2023, before rising again to 32.2% in 2024. At the Palestine level, there was a decrease, with the achievement rate reaching 32.5%, while in the Gaza Strip the rate stood at 34.7%.




3.4.7: There was an increase in the achievement rate of the indicator (the existence of media coverage by various outlets of issues related to corruption and/or public fund misuse) in the West Bank. The rate was 34.4% in 2022, then declined to 28.3% in 2023, before rising again to 33.5% in 2024. However, at the Palestine level, the achievement rate increased from 33.6% in 2020 to 34.3% in 2022, and in the Gaza Strip it rose from 32.2% in 2020 to 34.3% in 2022.




3.5 Self-Censorship and Governmental Measures

This indicator was measured based on the questionnaire items related to censorship tools over journalistic work, as follows:

3.5.1: A significant decline in the achievement rate of the indicator (imposing editorial censorship in media outlets on the issues published through them) in the West Bank. The percentage was 38.9% in 2022, then decreased to 32.0% in 2023, before dropping further to 29.4% in 2024. The same trend applies to the achievement rate at the Palestine level, where a noticeable decline was observed from 58.4% in 2020 to 38.6% in 2022. Similarly, in the Gaza Strip, a sharp decline was recorded from 60% in 2020 to 37.9% in 2022.




5.2.3: A decrease in the achievement rate of the indicator (media outlets refraining from publishing journalistic materials for fear of prosecution by public authorities) in the West Bank. The rate was 31.4% in 2022, then decreased slightly to 31.1% in 2023, before declining further to 27.4% in 2024. There was a sharp decline in the achievement rate of this indicator at the Palestine level, where a significant drop was observed from 68.0% in 2020 to 30.0% in 2022. Similarly, a notable decrease occurred in the Gaza Strip, from 65.6% in 2020 to 27.0% in 2022.




3.5.3: A decrease in the achievement rate of the indicator (removal of news and articles after they have been published on websites) in the West Bank. The rate was 47.8% in 2022, then decreased to 45.9% in 2023, before declining further to 43% in 2024. There was a sharp decline in the achievement rate of this indicator at the Palestine level, with a noticeable drop from 64.8% in 2020 to 48.3% in 2022. Similarly, a significant decrease was observed in the Gaza Strip, from 64% in 2020 to 49.2% in 2022.




3.5.4: A decrease in the achievement rate of the indicator (journalists facing family or social pressure due to published information) in the West Bank. The rate was 40.5% in 2022, then increased to 41.8% in 2023, before decreasing again to 41.3% in 2024. There was a sharp decline in the achievement rate of this indicator at the Palestine level, dropping from 56.8% in 2020 to 38.1% in 2022. A decrease was also noted in the Gaza Strip, from 48.8% in 2020 to 33.1% in 2022.




3.5.5: A significant decrease in the achievement rate of the indicator (writers being subjected to official or societal threats due to their publications) in the West Bank. The rate was 40.7% in 2022, then rose to 44.3% in 2023, before dropping again to 40.3% in 2024. At the Palestine level, the achievement rate declined from 57.6% in 2020 to 42.6% in 2022. In the Gaza Strip, the achievement rate remained steady at 46.8% for both 2020 and 2022.




3.5.6: A decrease in the achievement rate of the indicator (existence of blacklists of persons and/or institutions banned from appearing on some or all media outlets) in the West Bank. The rate was 36.3% in 2022, then rose to 37.6% in 2023, before dropping to 36.4% in 2024. The same trend applies to the achievement rate at the Palestine level, where it decreased from 56.0% in 2020 to 39.5% in 2022. A slight decrease was also observed in the Gaza Strip, from 46.4% in 2020 to 46.3% in 2022.



3.5.7: An increase in the achievement rate of the indicator (governmental regulatory measures on publishing and/or printed materials hindering media freedom) in the West Bank. The rate was 21.4% in 2022, then rose to 38.1% in 2023, before declining again to 32.4% in 2024. However, there was a noticeable decrease in the achievement rate at the Palestine level, dropping from 54.4% in 2020 to 18.1% in 2022. A sharp decrease was also observed in the Gaza Strip, falling from 36% in 2020 to 8.3% in 2022.




3.5.8: There has been a decline in the indicator “Use of alternative symbols and words on social media platforms to avoid content being banned and/or deleted by these platforms” in the West Bank. The rate stood at 17.2% in 2022, then decreased to 14.9% in 2023, and further declined to 13.9% in 2024. At the level of Palestine as a whole, the indicator dropped from 20.8% in 2020 to 16.1% in 2022, indicating a significant use of alternative words and symbols on social media platforms to avoid content bans and/or deletion by these platforms. In the Gaza Strip, the indicator recorded a rate of 13.8%, compared to 17.2% in the West Bank.




3.6 Financing Policies


3.6.1: A decrease was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator “Imposition of high fees for obtaining a wireless frequency or registering a newspaper” in the West Bank. The rate was 31.5% in 2022, rose slightly to 32.5% in 2023, before declining again to 28.8% in 2024. At the level of Palestine as a whole, a decline in the indicator was also observed, decreasing from 42.3% in 2020 to 29.8% in 2022. A sharp drop was also noted in the Gaza Strip, where the indicator fell from 40.5% in 2020 to 31.5% in 2022.




6.2.3: A decrease was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator “Imposition of value-added tax (VAT) on the purchase of paper and/or newsprint or broadcasting equipment and other media-related equipment” in the West Bank. The rate stood at 27.2% in 2022, rose significantly to 40.5% in 2023, before declining slightly to 39.4% in 2024. At the national level (Palestine), a notable decline was observed, with the rate dropping from 35.1% in 2020 to 25.6% in 2022. In the Gaza Strip, the indicator also showed a sharp decline, falling from 50.5% in 2020 to 20.9% in 2022.




3.6.3: A notable decrease was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator “Existence of restrictions on funding and/or foreign support for media outlets” in the West Bank. The rate was 24.3% in 2022, then rose sharply to 42.9% in 2023, before declining again to 29.6% in 2024. At the national level (Palestine), a significant drop was observed, with the rate decreasing from 63.1% in 2020 to 21.3% in 2022. In the Gaza Strip, the indicator also showed a sharp decline, falling from 59.5% in 2020 to 12.5% in 2022.




3.6.4: A continued decline was observed in the achievement rate of the indicator “Fair government financial support for media outlets based on market share or advertising market share” in the West Bank. The rate was 15.7% in 2022, dropped to 9.5% in 2023, and further declined to 7.2% in 2024. At the national level (Palestine), the indicator also declined, with a noticeable drop from 28.8% in 2020 to 20.2% in 2022. However, in the Gaza Strip, the indicator showed an increase, rising from 17.1% in 2020 to 33.4% in 2022.



3.6.5: A continued decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator “Allocation of government advertising budgets to media outlets in a fair manner” in the West Bank. The rate stood at 12.9% in 2022, then decreased to 11.9% in 2023, before dropping further to 6.3% in 2024. A similar trend is observed at the national level (Palestine), where the indicator dropped sharply from 27% in 2020 to 14.9% in 2022. In the Gaza Strip, a slight decrease was recorded, with the rate falling from 22.5% in 2020 to 20.9% in 2022.




3.6.6: An increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator “Non-use of advertising as a means of pressure to influence editorial decisions” in the West Bank. The rate was 47.2% in 2022, rose to 50.1% in 2023, and further increased to 57.2% in 2024. However, at the national level (Palestine), the indicator declined significantly, dropping from 69.4% in 2020 to 46.9% in 2022. In the Gaza Strip, a similar sharp decline was observed, with the rate falling from 77.5% in 2020 to 47.2% in 2022.




3.6.7: A slight increase was observed in the achievement rate of the indicator “Absence of bribery offered to journalists by influential actors to affect news content in their media work” in the West Bank. The rate stood at 55.6% in 2022, remained relatively stable at 56.0% in 2023, and then rose to 59.2% in 2024. However, a sharp decline was recorded at the national level (Palestine), where the rate dropped from 86.5% in 2020 to 56.1% in


2022. In the Gaza Strip, a similar decrease was noted, with the rate falling from 85.6% in 2020 to 57.2% in 2022.



3.6.8: A continued decline was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator “Wage levels for journalists and other media professionals are high enough to prevent bribery (i.e., income sufficiency)” in the West Bank. The rate was 16.8% in 2022, dropped to 11.9% in 2023, and further declined to 9.3% in 2024. A similar trend is observed at the national level (Palestine), where the indicator showed a sharp decline from 57.7% in 2020 to 16.2% in 2022. In the Gaza Strip, the indicator also dropped significantly, falling from 58.6% in 2020 to 15.2% in 2022.



3.6.9: A decrease was recorded in the indicator “Have you and/or any of your colleagues in the institution where you work been subjected to salary reductions and/or termination(s)” in the West Bank, dropping from 56.8% in 2020 to 34.0% in 2023, before slightly declining further to 33.3% in 2024. At the national level (Palestine), the indicator achievement rate was 36.1%, indicating the existence of salary reductions and/or terminations. The indicator showed a low achievement rate of 37.5% in the Gaza Strip compared to 35.4% in the West Bank.




3.7 Transparency and Access to Information


3.7.1: The indicator “Existence of a law guaranteeing the right to access information” has consistently scored 0 points in Palestine over the four-year period from 2018 to 2024, with 0 points recorded in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for the same years. The results unanimously indicate that there is no law guaranteeing the right to access information.




3.7.2: A decrease was observed in the achievement rate of the indicator “Existence of laws and legislations enabling journalists’ access to information” in the West Bank. The rate was 30.6% in 2022, declined to 26.3% in 2023, before rising again to 29.0% in 2024. However, at the national level (Palestine), the achievement rate of this indicator increased from 20% in 2020 to 26.6% in 2022. Meanwhile, a decline was noted in the Gaza Strip, where the rate dropped from 16.8% in 2020 to 0% in 2022.



3.7.3: A decrease was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator “Clarity of restrictions imposed on access to information” in the West Bank. The rate was 41.5% in 2022, then declined to 39.7% in 2023, before further dropping to 35.3% in 2024. Similarly, a decline was observed in the Gaza Strip, where the rate fell from 44.8% in 2020 to 42.9% in 2022. The same trend applies at the national level (Palestine), with a significant decrease from 50.4% in 2020 to 42.0% in 2022.




3.7.4: A decrease was observed in the achievement rate of the indicator “Contribution of the presence of official media spokespersons in providing the necessary information for journalistic work” in the West Bank. The rate was 46.6% in 2022, declined to 44.0% in 2023, before returning to 46.6% in 2024. The same trend applies at the national level (Palestine), where the indicator decreased from 64.8% in 2020 to 48.8% in 2022. In the Gaza Strip, a decline was also noted, with the rate falling from 69.6% in 2020 to 53.1% in 2022.




3.7.5: A decline was observed in the achievement rate of the indicator “Allowing journalists to accompany security forces on field missions” in the West Bank. The rate was 29.4% in 2022, then decreased to 23.3% in 2023, before slightly rising to 23.7% in 2024, reflecting a downward trend in this indicator in recent years. In the Gaza Strip, the rate was 34.4% in 2022, while the national level (Palestine) recorded a rate of 31% in the same year.

Similarly, at the national level, a significant decline was noted, with the indicator dropping from 51.2% in 2020 to 31.1% in 2022. In the Gaza Strip, the rate decreased from 44% in 2020 to 34.4% in 2022.




3.7.6: A decrease was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator “Non-exposure to direct or indirect pressure to disclose sources of information obtained and published” in the West Bank. The rate was 47.2% in 2022, declined to 44.7% in 2023, before further dropping to 41.4% in 2024, reflecting an increase in exposure to direct or indirect pressure to reveal sources of information obtained and published. In the Gaza Strip, the rate was 42.9% in 2022, while the national level (Palestine) recorded a rate of 45.8% in the same year.



3.7.7: As for the indicator “Perception of violation of journalists’ privacy by public authorities” in the West Bank, the rate was 42.0% in 2022, then declined to 41.2% in 2023, before dropping further to 38.1% in 2024, indicating a continued sense of privacy violations of journalists by public authorities. In the Gaza Strip, the rate was 38.4% in 2022, while at the national level (Palestine) it was 41% in the same year.



3.7.8: As for the indicator “Presence of public information sharing across various media platforms by government officials and competent authorities” in the West Bank, the rate was 36.2% in 2022, then declined slightly to 36.0% in 2023, before dropping further to 33.1% in 2024, reflecting some decline in this indicator during the recent period. In the Gaza Strip, the rate was 42.0% in 2022, while at the national level (Palestine), it stood at 38% in the same year. Additionally, at the national level, the rate decreased from 52.0% in 2020 to 38.2% in 2022, with varying percentages between the West Bank and Gaza Strip at 36.2% and 42.0%, respectively.




3.8 Journalists' Self-Regulation and Protection


3.8.1: A decline was observed in the achievement rate of the indicator “Existence of laws allowing journalists to form representative bodies (labor unions)” in the West Bank. The rate was 41.1% in 2022, slightly decreased to 40.8% in 2023, before dropping again to 40.4% in 2024, reflecting a stable situation without significant improvement. In the Gaza Strip, the rate was 51.8% in 2022, while at the national level (Palestine) it stood at 44.6% in the same year. Similarly, at the national level, the indicator showed a sharp decline from 60.4% in 2020 to 44.6% in 2022. In the Gaza Strip, a decrease was also noted, from 57.1% in 2020 to 51.8% in 2022.




8.2.3: An increase was observed in the achievement rate of the indicator “Dismissal of media employees due to protests by declared entities against their journalistic work” in the West Bank. The rate was 41.5% in 2022, then rose to 46.4% in 2023, before declining again to 34.8% in 2024, reflecting a decrease in this phenomenon in 2024 after its rise in 2023. In the Gaza Strip, the rate was 45.5% in 2022, while at the national level (Palestine) it stood at 43% in the same year. The achievement rate of this indicator at the national level decreased notably from 65.9% in 2020 to 42.9% in 2022. Similarly, a clear decline was observed in the Gaza Strip, dropping from 65.9% in 2020 to 45.5% in 2022.



3.8.3: An increase was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator “Conducting regular periodic elections within the journalists’ representative body (union)” in the West Bank. The rate was 36.8% in 2022, then rose to 39.4% in 2023, before further increasing to 44.9% in 2024, reflecting a gradual improvement in the regularity of the electoral process. In the Gaza Strip, the rate was 34.5% in 2022, while at the national level (Palestine) it stood at 36% in the same year. Regarding the national-level indicator, a slight decrease was noted from 37.4% in 2020 to 36.0% in 2022. Meanwhile, the Gaza Strip witnessed an increase from 30.8% in 2020 to 34.5% in 2022.




3.8.4: A slight decrease was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator “Independence of representative bodies of media workers from the influence of government and political parties” in the West Bank. The rate was 25.5% in 2022, then declined to 24.9% in 2023, before further dropping to 21.3% in 2024, indicating deterioration in this aspect over recent years. In the Gaza Strip, the rate was 18.0% in 2022, while at the national level (Palestine) it stood at 23% in the same year. Similarly, at the national level, the indicator showed a decline from 27.5% in 2020 to 23.0% in 2022. A sharp decrease was also observed in the Gaza Strip, from 29.7% in 2020 to 18.0% in 2022.




3.8.5: A decline was observed in the achievement rate of the indicator “The journalists’ representative union body is characterized by professionalism and independence in its work” in the West Bank. The rate was 33.1% in 2022, then dropped to 22.2% in 2023, before improving again to 26.7% in 2024, reflecting instability in this indicator. In the Gaza Strip, the rate was 33.8% in 2022, while at the national level (Palestine) it stood at 33% in the same year. However, there was an increase in the achievement rate of this indicator at the national level, rising from 29.7% in 2020 to 33.4% in 2022. Similarly, an increase was observed in the Gaza Strip, from 28.6% in 2020 to 33.8% in 2022.




3.8.6: A decrease was observed in the achievement rate of the indicator “Encouragement of women’s access to decision-making positions in media institutions and journalists’ representative bodies” in the West Bank. The rate was 49.3% in 2022, then declined to 43.7% in 2023, before rising again to 47.1% in 2024, indicating volatility in this indicator without steady improvement. In the Gaza Strip, the rate was 55.5% in 2022, while at the national level (Palestine) it stood at 51% in the same year. It is noted that the national achievement rate decreased from 53.8% in 2020 to 51.4% in 2022, whereas an increase was observed in the Gaza Strip, from 52.7% in 2020 to 55.5% in 2022.




3.8.7: A decrease was recorded in the achievement rate of the indicator “Freedom for media workers in official media to join journalists’ representative bodies” in the West Bank. The rate was 47.7% in 2022, then declined to 41.5% in 2023, before further dropping to 39.2% in 2024, reflecting a recent decline in this indicator. In the Gaza Strip, the rate was 49.2% in 2022, while at the national level (Palestine) it stood at 48% in the same year. Additionally, the national level indicator increased from 46.2% in 2020 to 48.2% in 2022, with varying rates of 47.7% in the West Bank compared to 49.2% in the Gaza Strip.




3.8.8: A decline was observed in the indicator “Degree of representation of the union body for media workers” in the West Bank. The rate was 42.6% in 2022, then decreased to 41.1% in 2023, before further dropping to 36.0% in 2024, reflecting a continuous deterioration in this aspect. In the Gaza Strip, the rate was 47.8% in 2022, while at the national level (Palestine) it stood at 44% in the same year. At the national level, the indicator was 44.3% in 2022, with varying rates of 42.6% in the West Bank compared to 47.8% in the Gaza Strip.




3.8.9: A decline was observed in the indicator “Considering the procedures for affiliation and membership to the union body for media workers as acceptable and professional” in the West Bank. The rate was 51.9% in 2022, then decreased to 41.1% in 2023, before further dropping to 40.1% in 2024, indicating a regression in this indicator over recent years. In the Gaza Strip, the rate was 46.0% in 2022, while at the national level (Palestine), it stood at 50% in the same year. A decline was noted at the national level from 56.0% in 2020 to 49.9% in 2022, with varying rates of 51.9% in the West Bank compared to 46.0% in the Gaza Strip.



3.8.10: A slight decrease was observed in the indicator “Involvement of the union body for media workers in shaping policies and general directions” in the West Bank. The percentage was 31.3% in 2022, then declined to 30.9% in 2023, before further decreasing to 29.2% in 2024, indicating a continued decline in the involvement of the union body for media workers in policy and general direction formulation. In the Gaza Strip, the percentage was 36.1% in 2022, and the rate at the Palestine level was 33% in the same year. The indicator at the Palestine level fell sharply from 69.2% in 2020 to 32.9% in 2022, with similar rates of 31.3% in the West Bank compared to 36.1% in Gaza.



3.8.11: A decrease was observed in the indicator “Effectiveness of the union body for media workers in intervening and defending the rights of its members” in the West Bank. The percentage was 45.1% in 2022, then declined to 39.6% in 2023, before rising again to 41.8% in 2024, reflecting an improvement in the level of effectiveness. In the Gaza Strip, the percentage was 45.5% in 2022, and the rate at the Palestine level was 45% in the same year. At the Palestine level, there was a decrease from 79.1% in 2020 to 45.2% in 2022, with similar rates of 45.1% in the West Bank compared to 45.5% in Gaza.



ANNEXES

Annex No. (1): Indicator Achievement Rate by Domain and Region during the Years 2018–2022, and 2023/2024 – West Bank.

Legal Safeguards for Freedom of the Press	West Bank						Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
1.1 Legal guarantees for press freedom provided by the Basic Law.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100.0%	100.0%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
1.2 Alignment of national legislation with international conventions that guarantee press freedom.	0%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
1.3 Judicial safeguards in Palestinian courts that protect freedom of the press.	41%	39%	44%	63%	48.7%	52.3%	38%	67%	44%	38%	40%	48%	44%	52%
1.4 Criminalization of incitement by government officials against media outlets.	0%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
1.5 Imposition of legal restrictions on addressing ethnic and/or religious issues and/or national security.	50%	50%	50%	50%	50.0%	50.0%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%
1.6 Existence of procedures and instructions that allow journalists to move freely during states of emergency and lockdowns.			80%	50%	30.3%	29.8%			38%	52%			65%	50%

1.7 The existence of a cybercrimes law that has enhanced press freedom.			20%	28%	21.4%	21.2%			25%	33%			22%	30%
1.8 Ethical or legal codes criminalize the acceptance of bribes by media workers to influence their work.			50%	39%	78.9%	75.6%			50%	33%			50%	38%
Level of Achievement of Weighted Scores	415	344	430	412	313	317	438	376	383	384	406	354	413	401

Legal Restrictions on Freedom of the Press	West Bank						Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
2.1 Imposition of high civil fines on journalists following convictions for defamation, libel, and slander.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	80.5%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
2.2 Number of arrest cases against journalists and/or media workers.	0%	0%	61%	0%	20%	10.0%	40%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2.3 Number of summons and interrogation cases involving journalists and/or media workers.	0%	0%	0%	10%	30%	90.0%	0%	0%	0%	70%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2.4 Number of torture cases involving journalists and/or media workers.			90%	70%	60%	100.0%			80%	100%			70%	70%
2.5 Number of physical assaults on journalists and/or media workers.	80%	70%	90%	50%	10%	80.0%	75%	73%	70%	80%	78%	73%	61%	30.0%

Legal Restrictions on Freedom of the Press	West Bank						Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
2.6 Imposing restrictions or preventing journalists from covering public events and carrying out their journalistic duties.			55%	35%	33%	38.4%			52%	40%			54%	37%
2.7 Confiscation and/or destruction of my equipment and/or journalistic materials due to my media work.	78%	73%	83%	75%	60%	64.8%	73%	70%	83%	66%	76%	72%	83%	72%
2.8 Serious investigations conducted by official authorities into complaints submitted by media workers.	58%	61%	27%	26%	21.4%	29.6%	68%	58%	14%	33%	64%	60%	23%	28%
2.9 I was compensated by public authorities for material damage caused by the assault on my equipment.	13%	7%	39%	4%	0.0%	6.0%	11%	17%	11%	0%	12%	10%	30%	3%
2.10 Punitive measures taken against individuals who assaulted me or one of my colleagues at work.	10%	30%	38%	6%	15.9%	12.7%	17%	33%	25%	22%	13%	31%	34%	11%
2.11 Systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists or media owners as a result of their writing and/or broadcasting.	100%	100%	51%	59%	52.9%	33.6%	90%	100%	51%	34%	90%	100%	51%	55%

Legal Restrictions on Freedom of the Press	West Bank						Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
2.12 Online defamation, incitement, or slander against journalists due to their publication of sensitive reports.	42%	37%	58%	39%	38.1%	33.2%	42%	37%	61%	40%	42%	37%	59%	39%
2.13 Restrictive actions such as closures and/or blocking taken by official authorities against media outlets.	75%	0%	73%	64%	66.2%	32.0%	75%	0%	69%	34%	75%	0%	72%	60%
2.14 Restrictions imposed on access to and/or dissemination of information as a result of the state of emergency.			48%	40%	31.9%	27.8%			52%	37%			49%	39%
Level of Achievement of Weighted Scores	471	477	577	411	384	454	446	487	476	537	463	479	485	366

Independence of Media Operations	West Bank						Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
3.1 Licensing laws that allow government control over media outlets.	54%	42%	58%	44%	31.6%	22.7%	54%	52%	48%	50%	54%	46%	54%	45%
3.2 Licensing procedures hinder the operation and establishment of independent media outlets.	58%	45%	62%	40%	30.9%	28.5%	56%	53%	50%	33%	57%	49%	58%	38%

3.3 Dominance of state-owned media over the country's news and information system.	72%	44%	41%	40%	38.7%	37.0%	64%	50%	38%	36%	69%	46%	39%	39%
3.4 State media enjoy editorial independence and provide coverage for all segments of the population.	34%	35%	71%	24%	26.6%	37.7%	28%	30%	66%	27%	32%	33%	69%	25%
3.5 Transparency of media ownership procedures and the opportunity to establish media outlets without political discrimination.	42%	45%	71%	47%	23.8%	16.4%	56%	55%	59%	71%	47%	49%	69%	53%
3.6 Diversity of media ownership, with no concentration under specific political and/or economic affiliations.	67%	49%	46%	43%	45.8%	50.0%	78%	66%	52%	58%	71%	56%	48%	48%
3.7 Concealment of official figures' ownership of media outlets and intentional hiding of their affiliations.	52%	54%	51%	47%	45.8%	48.6%	36%	45%	45%	37%	46%	50%	49%	44%
Level of Achievement of Weighted Scores	569	447	572	410	348	344	559	502	513	447	565	470	552	419

Media Outlets and Content Diversity	West Bank						Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
4.1 Monopoly over access to information by certain media outlets and influential individuals.	54%	47%	36%	34%	30.1%	35.6%	50%	46%	29%	27%	53%	46%	34%	32%
4.2 The state provides legal frameworks that allow for concentrated monopolies and joint ownership of media outlets	25%	29%	55%	56%	65.7%	60.6%	25%	33%	54%	67%	25%	31%	55%	57%
4.3 Existence of monopolies in the provision of internet and/or telecommunications services.	31%	20%	40%	56%	58.7%	58.2%	44%	26%	48%	50%	36%	22%	43%	54%
4.4 Internet access is available to all, at low cost and with appropriate quality.	38%	22%	26%	35%	31.2%	42.4%	48%	43%	36%	35%	41%	30%	29%	35%
4.5 The government uses media ownership and frequency licensing as a means of pressure on independent media.	44%	57%	64%	50%	50.0%	55.1%	51%	47%	68%	37%	46%	53%	65%	47%
4.6 Diversity of sources, information, and content related to corruption and/or public funds mismanagement.			50%	31%	29.6%	32.2%			61%	35%			54%	32%
4.7 Extent of media coverage of issues related to corruption and/or waste of public funds.			34%	34%	28.3%	33.5%			32%	34%			34%	34%
Level of Achievement of Weighted Scores	478	435	436	424	420	454	490	479	470	406	481	455	447	417

Self-Censorship and Governmental Measures	West Bank						Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
5.1 Imposition of editorial censorship in media outlets on the issues published through them.	44%	36%	58%	39%	32.0%	29.4%	30%	44%	60%	38%	39%	39%	58%	39%
5.2 Media outlets refrain from publishing journalistic materials out of fear of prosecution by public authorities.	51%	52%	73%	31%	31.1%	27.4%	42%	45%	66%	27%	48%	49%	68%	30%
5.3 Publishing news on websites and subsequently retracting it.	53%	58%	66%	48%	45.9%	43.0%	48%	50%	64%	49%	51%	55%	65%	48%
5.4 Journalists facing familial and/or societal pressure as a result of publishing information.	51%	50%	61%	41%	41.8%	41.3%	52%	38%	49%	33%	51%	45%	57%	38%
5.5 Writers and/or editors subjected to official or societal threats due to their publications.	53%	64%	63%	41%	44.3%	40.3%	48%	64%	46%	46%	51%	64%	58%	43%
5.6 Existence of blacklists (individuals and/or institutions) banned from appearing in certain or all media outlets.	46%	52%	62%	36%	37.6%	36.4%	40%	51%	46%	46%	44%	51%	56%	40%

5.7 Government censorship procedures for publishing and/or print media hinder freedom of the press.	74%	47%	60%	21%	38.1%	32.4%	64%	53%	36%	8%	71%	49%	54%	18%
5.8 Use of alternative symbols and keywords on social media to avoid content being banned and/or deleted by these platforms.			24%	17%	14.9%	13.9%			14%	14%			21%	16%
Level of Achievement of Weighted Scores	543	520	583	343	357	330	465	476	476	328	515	501	546	339

Financing Policies	West Bank						Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
6.1 Imposition of high fees for obtaining frequencies and/or registering newspapers and/or websites.	38%	47%	43%	31%	32.5%	28.8%	54%	44%	41%	25%	44%	45%	42%	30%
6.2 Imposition of value-added tax on the purchase of paper and/or newsprint or broadcasting equipment and other media-related equipment.	48%	56%	30%	27%	40.5%	39.4%	42%	37%	50%	21%	46%	48%	35%	26%
6.3 Existence of restrictions on foreign funding and/or support for media outlets.	56%	34%	64%	24%	42.9%	29.6%	42%	56%	59%	13%	51%	43%	63%	21%

6.4 Fair government financial support for media based on market share or share in the advertising market.	16%	20%	30%	16%	9.5%	7.2%	14%	14%	17%	33%	15%	18%	29%	20%
6.5 Allocation of government advertising budgets to media outlets in a fair manner.	60%	44%	28%	13%	11.9%	6.3%	58%	36%	23%	21%	59%	41%	27%	15%
6.6 Use of advertising as a means of pressure to influence editors' decisions.	57%	49%	68%	47%	50.1%	57.2%	64%	66%	77%	46%	59%	56%	69%	47%
6.7 Bribery of journalists by influential actors to affect the editorial content of their work.	90%	87%	86%	56%	56.0%	59.2%	89%	86%	86%	57%	89%	86%	86%	56%
6.8 Wage levels for journalists and other media professionals are high enough to prevent susceptibility to bribery.	29%	23%	58%	17%	11.9%	9.3%	36%	28%	59%	15%	32%	25%	58%	16%
6.9 Pressure exerted on journalists through salary cuts and/or termination of contracts.			57%	35%	34.0%	33.3%			50%	38%			55%	36%
Level of Achievement of Weighted Scores	459	432	515	296	321	300	440	437	512	298	457	433	516	296

Transparency and Access to Information	West Bank						Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
7.1 Existence of a law guaranteeing the right to access information.	0%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
7.2 Existence of laws and legislation that allow journalists to access information.	0%	21%	22%	31%	26.3%	29.0%	25%	17%	17%	0%	10%	20%	20%	26%
7.3 Clarity of the restrictions imposed on access to information.	47%	64%	53%	42%	39.7%	35.3%	47%	53%	45%	43%	47%	60%	50%	42%
7.4 Availability of official spokespersons who provide information to journalists smoothly and promptly.	53%	52%	62%	47%	44.0%	46.6%	64%	61%	70%	53%	58%	55%	65%	49%
7.5 Permission for journalists to accompany security forces during their field missions.	44%	43%	54%	29%	23.3%	23.7%	37%	33%	44%	34%	41%	40%	51%	31%
7.6 Pressure on journalists to disclose their sources of information.	85%	71%	74%	47%	44.7%	41.4%	75%	82%	76%	43%	81%	75%	74%	46%
7.7 Violation of journalists' privacy by public authorities.			51%	42%	41.2%	38.1%			50%	38%			51%	41%
7.8 Sharing of public information across various media platforms by government officials and relevant authorities.			57%	36%	36.0%	33.1%			42%	42%			52%	38%
Level of Achievement of Weighted Scores	458	493	467	370	365	355	475	483	429	317	465	490	454	365

Union Organization of Journalists	West Bank						Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2024	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
8.1 Existence of laws allowing journalists to form representative bodies (labor unions) within media institutions.	100%	100%	62%	41%	40.8%	40.4%	100%	100%	57%	52%	100%	100%	60%	45%
8.2 Restriction and/or dismissal of media employees due to advertiser protests over their journalistic work.	75%	61%	65%	41%	46.4%	34.8%	75%	71%	66%	46%	75%	65%	66%	43%
8.3 Regular periodic elections in the representative bodies of media workers.	50%	36%	42%	37%	39.4%	44.9%	0%	17%	31%	34%	30%	30%	37%	36%
8.4 Independence of representative bodies of media workers from government and political party influence.	49%	55%	26%	25%	24.9%	21.3%	48%	46%	30%	18%	49%	52%	27%	23%
8.5 The journalists' union body operates professionally and independently.	43%	38%	30%	33%	22.2%	26.7%	40%	36%	29%	34%	42%	37%	30%	33%
8.6 Encouragement of women's access to decision-making positions in media institutions and journalists' representative bodies.	81%	75%	55%	49%	43.7%	47.1%	62%	67%	53%	55%	74%	72%	54%	51%
8.7 Freedom for employees in state-run media to join representative bodies for journalists.			48%	48%	41.5%	39.2%			42%	49%			46%	48%
8.8 The degree of representation of media workers by the union body.			57%	43%	41.1%	36.0%			60%	48%			58%	44%

8.9 Membership and affiliation procedures to the journalists' union are deemed acceptable and professional.			54%	52%	41.1%	40.1%			59%	46%			56%	50%
8.10 The degree of involvement of the union body in shaping public policies and general media directions.			68%	31%	30.9%	29.2%			69%	36%			69%	33%
8.11 The effectiveness of the union body in intervening and defending the rights of its members.			79%	45%	39.6%	41.8%			78%	45%			79%	45%
Level of Achievement of Weighted Scores	618	588	533	401	370	361	543	566	523	417	588	581	529	407

ANNEX NO. (2): INDICATORS AND SCORING CRITERIA

1 Legal Guarantees for Freedom of the Press				
No.	Questions:	Calculation Marks	Information Documentation	Sector
1.1	Guarantees enshrined in the Basic Law ensuring freedom of the press.	Exists = 1000 No guarantees = 0	Review of legal texts	Legislation
1.2	Alignment of national legislation with international charters safeguarding press freedom.	Yes, to a large extent = 1000 Yes, partially = 500 Not done = 0	Review of legal texts	Practices
1.3	Judicial guarantees in Palestinian courts protecting freedom of the press.	Exists to a large extent = 1000 Exists to a moderate extent = 750 Exists to a weak extent = 500 Does not exist = 0	Review of legal texts	Legislation
1.4	Criminalization of incitement by government officials against media outlets.	Yes = 1000 No = 0	Review of legal texts	Practices
1.5	Legal restrictions imposed on coverage of ethnic, religious, and/or national security issues.	Yes, to a large extent = 0 Yes, to a limited extent = 500 Does not exist = 1000	Review of legal texts	Practices
1.6	Existence of procedures and instructions permitting journalists freedom of movement during states of emergency and lockdowns.	Yes, sufficiently = 1000 Yes, partially = 500 Does not exist = 0	Opinion survey Media Workers	Legislation
1.7	Presence of cybercrime laws that have strengthened press freedom.	Yes, to a large extent = 1000 Yes, to a limited extent = 500 No = 0	Opinion survey Media Workers	Legislation
1.8	Codes of conduct or legal provisions criminalizing bribery of media workers to influence their professional work.	Yes = 1000 No = 0	Review of legal texts	Legislation
2 Legal Restrictions on Freedom of the Press				
No.	Questions:	Calculation Marks	Information Documentation	Sector
2.1	Imposing high civil fines on journalists after being convicted of the crimes of defamation, slander, and libel.	Deduction of (10%) per person, with a maximum of (10 persons)	Mada Center report on violations	Practices

2.2	Number of arrests of journalists and/or media workers.	Number Deduction of (10%) per person, with a maximum of (10 persons)	Mada Center report on violations	Practices
2.3	Number of summons and investigations against journalists and/or media workers.	Number Deduction of (10%) per person, with a maximum of (10 persons)	Mada Center report on violations	Practices
2.4	Number of cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers.	Number Deduction of (10%) per person, with a maximum of (10 persons)	Mada Center report on violations	Practices
2.5	Number of physical assaults against journalists and/or media workers.	Number Deduction of (10%) per person, with a maximum of (10 persons)	Mada Center report on violations	Practices
2.6	Imposing restrictions or preventing journalists from covering public events and performing their journalistic work.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (Does not exist = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
2.7	Confiscation and/or destruction of my equipment and/or journalistic materials due to my journalistic work.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (Does not exist = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
2.8	Serious investigations opened by official authorities into complaints filed by media workers.	(Yes = 1000) (No = 0) Not applicable	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
2.9	Compensation received from public authorities for material damage caused by attacks on my equipment.	(Yes = 1000) (No = 0) Not applicable	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
2.10	Disciplinary actions taken against persons who attacked me or one of my colleagues at work.	(Yes = 1000) (No = 0) Not applicable	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
2.11	Systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists or media owners as a result of their writings and/or broadcasts.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (Does not exist = 1000)	Review of legal texts	Practices
2.12	Defamation, incitement, or online attacks against journalists due to publishing sensitive reports.	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (Does not exist = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
2.13	Restrictive measures taken by official authorities such as closure and/or blocking against media outlets?	(Yes, to a large extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (Does not exist = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices

2.14	Imposing restrictions on access to information and/or its transmission due to a state of emergency.	1. Yes, widely taken measures = 0 2. Yes, narrowly taken measures = 500 3. No measures taken = 1000	Review of legal texts	Practices
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3	Independence of Media Work			
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No.	Questions:	Calculation Marks	Information Documentation	Sector
3.1	Licensing laws that allow government control over media.	Yes, clearly = 0 Yes, unclearly = 500 Not present = 1000	Review of legal texts	Legislation
3.2	Licensing procedures that hinder the operation and establishment of independent media.	Yes, to a large extent = 0 Yes, to a limited extent = 500 Not present = 1000	Opinion survey Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
3.3	Dominance of state-owned media over the country's news and information system.	Yes, to a large extent = 0 Yes, to a limited extent = 500 No dominance = 1000	Opinion survey Media workers Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
3.4	The official media enjoy editorial independence and cover news related to all segments of society.	Yes, clearly = 1000 Yes, weakly = 500 No independence = 0	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
3.5	Clarity of media ownership procedures and the opportunity to establish media without political discrimination.	Yes, clearly = 1000 Yes, inadequately = 500 No clarity = 0	Opinion survey Managers and owners of media institutions	Legislation
3.6	Diversity of media ownership and lack of concentration in specific political and/or economic tendencies.	Yes, to a large extent = 1000 Yes, to a limited extent = 500 Not present = 0	Opinion survey Media workers Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
3.7	Concealment of ownership of official positions in the media and deliberate hiding of their association with these media outlets.	Yes, to a large extent = 0 Yes, to a limited extent = 500 Not present = 1000	Opinion survey Media workers Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices

4	Media Outlets and Content Diversity			
No.	Question	Calculation Marks	Information Documentation	Sector
4.1	Monopoly over access to information by certain media outlets and influential individuals.	(Yes, to a great extent = 0) (Yes, but weakly = 500) (No ownership concentration = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
4.2	The state provides legislation that enables media monopolies and cross-ownership concentration.	(Yes, to a great extent = 0) (Yes, but weakly = 500) (No monopolies = 1000)	Review of legal textx	Legislation
4.3	Existence of monopolies in providing internet and/or telecommunications services.	(Yes, there is a strong monopoly = 0) (Yes, there is a limited monopoly = 500) (No monopoly = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
4.4	Access to the internet is available to all at a low cost and with adequate quality.	(Yes, always = 1000) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No = 0)	Opinion survey Media workers Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
4.5	The government uses media ownership licensing and frequency allocation as a means to pressure independent media.	(Yes, used extensively = 0) (Yes, used weakly = 500) (Not used = 1000)	Opinion survey Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
4.6	Diversity of sources, information, and content.	(Yes, used extensively = 0) (Yes, used but weakly = 500) (Not used = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
4.7	Extent to which various media outlets cover issues related to corruption and/or public fund mismanagement.	(Yes, to a great extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (No coverage = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices

5 Self-Censorship and Governmental Measures				
No.	Question	Calculation Marks	Information Documentation	Sector
5.1	Imposing editorial censorship in the media on the issues published through them.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (Does not exist = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
5.2	Media outlets refrain from publishing journalistic materials for fear of being prosecuted by public authorities.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No abstention = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
5.3	Publishing news on websites and then retracting it.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
5.4	Journalists being subjected to family and/or social pressure due to publishing information.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No = 1000)	Opinion survey Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
5.5	Writers and/or editors being subjected to official or societal threats as a result of their publications.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
5.6	The existence of blacklists of (individuals and/or institutions) banned from appearing on various media outlets or some of them.	(Yes, to a great extent = 0) (Yes, to a weak extent = 500) (Does not exist = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
5.7	Government censorship procedures on publishing and/or printed materials hinder media freedom.	(Yes, to a great extent = 0) (Yes, to a weak extent = 500) (Does not exist = 1000)	Opinion survey Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
5.8	Using symbols and alternative words on social media to avoid content bans and/or deletions by these platforms.	(Yes, to a great extent = 0) (Yes, to a weak extent = 500) (No = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices

6	Financing Policies			
No.	Question	Calculation Marks	Information Documentation	Sector
6.1	Imposing high fees for obtaining frequencies and/or registering newspapers and/or websites.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No = 1000)	Managers and owners of media institutions	Legislation
6.2	Imposing value-added tax on the purchase of paper and/or newspaper paper or broadcasting equipment and other media tools.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No tax = 1000)	Managers and owners of media institutions	Legislation
6.3	The existence of restrictions on foreign funding and/or support for media outlets.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (Does not exist = 1000)	Opinion survey Managers and owners of media institutions	Legislation
6.4	Fair government financial support to media outlets based on market share or the advertising market.	(Yes, always = 1000) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No support = 0)	Opinion survey Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
6.5	Allocating budgets for government advertisements in media outlets in a fair manner.	(Yes, always = 1000) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (No allocation = 0)	Opinion survey Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
6.6	Using advertisements as a means of pressure to influence editors' decisions.	(Yes, always = 0) (Yes, sometimes = 500) (Not used = 1000)	Opinion survey Managers and owners of media institutions	Practices
6.7	Bribing journalists by active parties to influence the news content in their media work.	(Yes, to a great extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (Does not exist = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
6.8	Journalists' and other media professionals' wages are high enough to avoid bribery.	(Yes, appropriately = 1000) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (Does not exist = 0)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices

6.9	Exerting pressure on journalists through salary cuts and/or termination of employment contracts.	(Yes, to a great extent = 0) (Yes, to a limited extent = 500) (Does not exist = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
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7 Transparency and Access to Information				
No.	Questions	Calculation Marks	Information Documentation	Sector
7.1	Existence of a law guaranteeing the right to access information.	Yes = 1000 No = 0	Review of legal texts	Legislation
7.2	Existence of laws and legislation that allow journalists to access information.	Yes, effectively = 1000 Yes, poorly = 500 Not available = 0	Review of legal texts	Practices
7.3	Clarity of the restrictions imposed on accessing information.	Yes, clearly = 1000 Yes, unclearly = 500 No clarity = 0	Opinion survey Media workers	Legislation
7.4	Presence of official spokespersons who provide information to journalists smoothly and promptly.	Yes, largely = 1000 Yes, slightly = 500 No = 0	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
7.5	Permission for journalists to accompany security forces during field missions.	Yes, always = 1000 Yes, sometimes = 500 Not allowed = 0	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
7.6	Pressure on journalists to reveal their sources of information.	Yes, largely = 0 Yes, slightly = 500 Not available = 1000	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
7.7	Violation of journalists' privacy by public authorities.	Yes, largely = 0 Yes, slightly = 500 No = 1000	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
7.8	Availability of public information shared across various media platforms by government officials and relevant authorities.	Yes, largely = 1000 Yes, slightly = 500 No = 0	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices

8	Union Organization of Journalists			
No.	Question	Calculation Marks	Information Documentation	Sector
8.1	Existence of laws allowing journalists to form representative bodies (labor unions) in media outlets.	(Yes = 1000) (No = 0)	Review of legal texts Opinion survey Media workers	Legislation
8.2	Restrictions and/or dismissal of media employees due to protests by certain parties against their journalistic work.	(Yes, to a great extent = 0) (Yes, to a small extent = 500) (No = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
8.3	Regular and periodic elections in the representative bodies of media workers.	(Elections are held regularly on their scheduled date = 1000) (Elections are held irregularly with a slight delay from their scheduled date = 750) (Elections are held irregularly with a large delay from their scheduled date = 500) (Elections are not held at all = 0)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
8.4	Independence of the representative bodies of media workers from government and political party influence.	(Yes, fully = 1000) (Yes, to a small extent = 500) (None = 0)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
8.5	The union representing journalists is characterized by professionalism and independence in its work.	(Yes, to a great extent = 1000) (Yes, to a small extent = 500) (No access = 0)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
8.6	Encouragement of women's access to decision-making positions in media institutions and journalists' representative bodies.	(Yes, to a great extent = 0) (Yes, to a small extent = 500) (Not prevented = 1000)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
8.7	Freedom for employees in official media to join journalists' "representative bodies."	(Yes, clearly = 1000) (Yes, to a small extent = 500) (Not existing = 0)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
8.8	Degree of representation of the union for media workers.	(High = 1000) (Low = 500) (None = 0)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices

8.9	Membership and affiliation procedures to the union of media workers are acceptable and professional.	(Yes, clearly = 1000) (Yes, to a small extent = 500) (Not existing = 0)	Opinion survey Media workers	Legislation
8.10	Degree of involvement of the union in shaping policies and general directions.	(High = 1000) (Low = 500) (None = 0)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices
8.11	Degree of effectiveness of the union in intervening and defending the rights of its members.	(High = 1000) (Low = 500) (None = 0)	Opinion survey Media workers	Practices

Questionnaire No. (1): For Media Workers

Dear respondent,

The Palestinian Center for Media Freedoms (MADA) is working on preparing indicators to measure press freedom in Palestine. We kindly ask for your assistance in reaching results in this research related to the topic "Press Freedom Indicators 2024", to be used to assess the progress or regression in press freedom in the country. This will be done by answering the questions with complete objectivity.

Thank you for giving us part of your valuable time.

Serial No.:

No.	Questions	Choices
GOV	Governorate:	1. Jenin 2. Tubas and Northern Jordan Valley 3. Nablus 4. Tulkarm 5. Qalqilya 6. Salfit 7. Ramallah and Al-Bireh 8. Jericho and Central Jordan Valley 9. Jerusalem 10. Bethlehem 11. Hebron
Q1	Sex:	1. Male 2. Female
Q2	Age	
Q3	Place of Residence	1. City 2. Village/Town 3. Camp
Q4	Social Status	1. Single 2. Married 3. Divorced 4. Widowed 5. Separated
Q5	A c a d e m i c Qualification	1. High School 2. Associate Diploma 3. Bachelor's Degree 4. Master's Degree 5. Doctorate (Ph.D.)
Q6	Workplace	1. Official Media 2. Non-Official Media 3. Arab Organization 4. Foreign Organization 5. Freelance Journalist
Q7	The main media outlet you work for	1. Print 2. Audio 3. Visual 4. Electronic

Q8	Number of years working in this field.	
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1 Legal Guarantees for Freedom of the Press		
No.	Question	Answers
1.6	Do procedures and regulations allow journalists to move freely during states of emergency and lockdowns?	Yes, sufficiently
		Yes, partially
		None
1.7	Has the existence of the Cybercrimes Law enhanced press freedom?	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
2 Legal Restrictions on Press Freedom		
No.	Question	Answersv
2.7	Through your observation, have you noticed the imposition of restrictions or prevention of journalists from covering public events and performing their journalistic duties?	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
2.6	Have you or one of your colleagues experienced the confiscation and/or destruction of your equipment and/or journalistic materials due to your journalistic work?	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
2.8	Have serious investigations been opened by official authorities into complaints submitted by media workers?	Yes
		No
		Not applicable
2.9	Have you been compensated by public authorities for the material damage caused by the assault on your equipment?	Yes
		No
		Not applicable
2.10	Have the official authorities informed you that punitive measures were taken against individuals who assaulted you or one of your colleagues at work?	Yes
		No
		Not applicable
2.13	Through your observation, have you noticed an expansion or abuse in defamation, incitement, or slander against journalists online due to their publication of sensitive reports?	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No

2.15	Through your observation of media performance, do you notice restrictions on access to and transmission of information as a result of the state of emergency?	Yes, restrictions imposed extensive
		Yes, restrictions imposed to a limited extent
		Not imposed / No restrictions imposed
3	Independence of Media Work	
No.	Questions	Answers
3.2	Through my work in the media, I find that licensing procedures hinder the operation and establishment of independent media outlets.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
3.3	Through my observation of media performance, I notice a dominance of state-owned media over the news and information system in the country.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No dominance
3.4	Do official media outlets enjoy editorial independence and provide coverage of all segments of the population?	Yes, clearly
		Yes, poorly
		No independence
3.6	There is diversity in media ownership, and it is not concentrated in specific political and/or economic orientations.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
3.7	There is intentional concealment of official figures' ownership or affiliation with media outlets.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
4	Media Outlets and Content Diversity	
No.	Question	Answers
4.1	Is there a monopoly on access to information by certain media outlets and influential individuals?	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No concentration
4.3	I feel there is a monopoly in the provision of internet and/or telecommunications services.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No monopoly
4.4	I have access to the internet at a low cost and with adequate quality.	Yes, always
		Yes, sometimes
		No
4.6	Through my work in the media, I observe a diversity of sources, information, and content.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No diversity

4.7	Through my observation of media performance, I notice coverage by various media outlets of issues related to corruption and/or public fund mismanagement.	Yes, significantly
		Yes limitedly
		No coverage
5	Self-Censorship and Government Measures	
No.	Questions	Answers
5.1	The editor at the media outlet where I work imposes internal editorial censorship on published issues.	Yes, always
		Yes, sometimes
		No
5.2	The media outlet where I work refrained from preparing or publishing journalistic material for fear of prosecution.	Yes, always
		Yes, sometimes
		No
5.3	Through my media work, news articles were published on websites and later withdrawn.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
5.4	Through my media work, journalists have been subjected to family and/or social pressure due to publishing information.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
5.5	Through my media work, writers and/or editors have been subjected to official or societal threats because of their publications.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
5.6	Through my media work, I encountered blacklists of (individuals and/or institutions) who are banned from appearing on various or specific media outlets.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
5.8	Use of alternative symbols and words on social media to avoid having posts blocked and/or deleted by these platforms.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
6	Financing Policies	
No.	Questions	Answers
6.7	Through your media work, have journalists been bribed by influential parties to affect the news content in their media work?	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
6.8	Are the salary levels for journalists and other media professionals sufficient enough to prevent bribery?	Yes, appropriately
		Yes, limitedly
		No

6.9	Have you or any of your colleagues in the institution you work for experienced salary reductions and/or contract terminations?	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
7	Transparency and Access to Information	
No.	Questions	Answers
7.3	Through practical experience, there is clarity regarding the restrictions imposed on access to information.	Yes, clearly
		Yes, unclearly
		No clarity
7.4	The presence of official media spokespersons has contributed to providing information to journalists smoothly and quickly.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
7.5	In my media work, journalists have been allowed to accompany security forces on their field missions.	Yes, always
		Yes, sometimes
		Not allowed
7.6	I have been subjected to direct or indirect pressure to reveal the sources of information I obtained or published.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
7.7	I feel there is a violation of journalists' privacy by public authorities.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
7.8	There is sharing of public information on various media outlets by government officials and relevant authorities.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
8	Union Organizations fo Journalists	
No.	Questions	Answers
8.1	There are laws that allow journalists to form representative bodies (labor unions) in the media.	Yes
		No
8.2	Through your media work, employees have been dismissed from media outlets due to protests by declared parties against their journalistic work.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No

8.3	The nature of the election procedures in the representative bodies of media workers.	Held regularly on the scheduled date
		Held irregularly with a slight delay from the scheduled date
		Held irregularly with a significant delay from the scheduled date
		Elections are not held at all
8.4	The representative bodies of media workers are independent from the influence of the government and political parties.	Yes, completely
		Yes, poorly
		No
8.5	I find that the union representing journalists is characterized by professionalism and independence in its work.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No access
8.6	There is encouragement for women to access decision-making positions in media institutions and journalists' representative bodies.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
8.7	Media workers in official media have the freedom to join "representative bodies" for journalists.	Yes, clearly
		Yes, poorly
		No
8.8	The level of representation of the union for media workers.	High
		Poor
		Absent
8.9	The procedures for joining and membership in the union for media workers are acceptable and professional.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
8.10	The degree to which the union for media workers participates in shaping general policies and directions.	High
		Poor
		Absent
8.11	The degree of effectiveness of the union for media workers in intervening and defending the rights of its members.	High
		Poor
		Absent

Questionnaire No. (2): For Media Institution Managers / Editors-in-Chief / Managing Editors: Media Institutions

Dear respondent,

The Palestinian Center for Media Freedoms (MADA) is working on preparing indicators to measure press freedom in Palestine. We kindly ask for your assistance in reaching results for this research related to the topic of "Press Freedom Indicators for the Year 2024," to be adopted for measuring progress and setbacks in the level of press freedom in the country. This will be done through answering the questions with full objectivity. Thank you for granting us part of your time.

Serial No.:

No.	Questions	Choices
GOV	Governorate:	1. Jenin 2. Tubas and Northern Jordan Valley 3. Nablus 4. Tulkarm 5. Qalqilya 6. Salfit 7. Ramallah and Al-Bireh 8. Jericho and Central Jordan Valley 9. Jerusalem 10. Bethlehem 11. Hebron
Q1	Sex:	1. Male 2. Female
Q2	Age	
Q3	Place of Residence	1. City 2. Village/Town 3. Camp
Q4	Social Status	1. Single 2. Married 3. Divorced 4. Widowed 5. Separated
Q5	Academic Qualification	1. High School 2. Associate Diploma 3. Bachelor's Degree 4. Master's Degree 5. Doctorate (Ph.D.) Top of Form Bottom of Form
Q6	Workplace	1. Official Media 2. Non-Official Media 3. Arab Organization 4. Foreign Organization 5. Freelance Journalist
Q7	The main media outlet you work for	1. Print 2. Audio 3. Visual 4. Electronic
Q8	Number of years working in this field.	

3 Independence of Media Work		
No.	Questions	Answers
3.2	Through my media work, I find that licensing procedures hinder the operation and establishment of independent media.	Hinders significantly
		Hinders limitedly
		Does not hinder
		I don't know

3.3	Through my monitoring of media performance, I notice the dominance of state-owned media over the news and information system in the country.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No dominance
3.5	Clarity of media ownership procedures and the availability of opportunities to establish media without political discrimination.	1. Yes clearly
		2. Yes, inappropriately
		3. No clarity
3.6	There is diversity in media ownership and it is not concentrated under specific political and/or economic orientations.	Yes significantly
		Yes limitedly
		None
3.7	There is intentional concealment of the ownership of official positions in the media and their connections to these media outlets.	Yes significantly
		Yes limitedly
		None
4	Media Outlets and Content Diversity	
No.	Questions	Answers
4.1	Is there a monopoly on access to information among certain media outlets and influential figures?	Yes significantly
		Yes poorly
		No concentration
4.3	I feel there is a monopoly in providing internet and/or telecommunications services.	Yes significantly
		Yes limitedly
		No monopoly
4.4	I have access to the internet at a low cost and with suitable quality.	Yes, always
		Yes, sometimes
		No
4.5	The government uses media ownership licenses and frequencies as a means of pressure on independent media.	Yes significantly
		Yes poorly
		Not used as a means of pressure
4.6	Through my media work, there is diversity in sources, information, and content.	Yes significantly
		Yes poorly
		No diversity
4.7	Through my monitoring of media performance, I notice coverage by different media outlets of issues related to corruption and/or public money waste.	Yes significantly
		Yes limitedly
		No coverage

5 Self-Censorship and Government Measures		
No.	Questions	Answers
5.1	The editor in the media outlet I work for imposes internal editorial censorship on the issues published.	Yes always
		Yes sometimes
		No
5.2	The media outlet I work for refrains from preparing or publishing journalistic materials for fear of prosecution by public authorities.	Yes always
		Yes sometimes
		No
5.3	Through my media work, news articles have been published on websites and then taken down.	Yes significantly
		Yes limitedly
		No
5.4	Through my media work, journalists have faced family and/or social pressures due to publishing information.	Yes significantly
		Yes limitedly
		No
5.5	Through my media work, writers and/or editors have been subjected to official or societal threats because of publishing.	Yes significantly
		Yes limitedly
		No
5.6	Through my media work, I have encountered blacklists of (persons and/or institutions) that are banned from appearing in some or all media outlets.	Yes significantly
		Yes poorly
		No
5.7	Government regulatory procedures for publishing and/or printed materials hinder media freedom.	Yes significantly
		Yes poorly
		No
6 Financing Policies		
No.	Questions	Answers
6.1	Imposing high fees for obtaining frequencies and/or registering newspapers and/or websites.	Yes always
		Yes sometimes
		No
6.2	Imposing value-added tax (VAT) on purchasing paper and/or newspaper paper, broadcasting equipment, and other media equipment.	Yes always
		Yes sometimes
		No tax
6.3	Existence of restrictions on funding and/or foreign support for media outlets.	Yes always
		Yes sometimes
		No

6.4	Fair government financial support for media outlets based on market share or advertising market.	Yes always
		Yes sometimes
		No support
6.5	Allocation of government advertising budgets to media outlets in a fair manner.	Yes always
		Yes sometimes
		No allocation
6.6	Using advertisements as a means of pressure to influence editors' decisions.	Yes always
		Yes sometimes
		Not used
6.9	Have you or any of your colleagues in your institution been subjected to salary reductions and/or contract terminations under the current situation?	Yes significantly
		Yes limitedly
		No
7	Transparency and Access to Information	
No.	Questions	Answers
7.3	Based on practical experience, is there clarity regarding the restrictions imposed on accessing information?	Yes clearly
		Yes unclearly
		No clarity

Questionnaire No. (3): Specific to Palestinian Human Rights Institutions

Dear Respondent,

The Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms (MADA) is working on developing indicators to measure the press freedom in Palestine. We kindly ask for your assistance in helping us reach reliable findings in this research titled "Indicators on Press Freedom in Palestine – 2024". These findings will be used to assess the progress or regression in press freedom in the country.

We greatly appreciate you taking the time to answer the questions with full objectivity.

Thank you.

	Question	Answers
Q1	Name of the institution / respondent:	
Q2	Name of the respondent	
Q3	Job title of the respondent:	
Q4	Phone number:	
Q5	Email address:	
Q6	Name of the researcher:	
1.1	Guarantees provided by the Basic Law for freedom of the press.	1. 2. 3.
1.2	Alignment of national legislation with international conventions that guarantee freedom of the press.	1. Yes significantly 2. Yes partially 3. No
1.3	Judicial guarantees in Palestinian courts that protect freedom of the press.	1. Yes significantly 2. Yes moderately 3. Yes poorly 4. No
1.4	Criminalization of incitement by government officials against media outlets.	1. 2. 3.
1.5	Imposition of legal restrictions on addressing ethnic and/or religious issues and/or national security.	1. 2. 3.
1.8	Ethical or legal rules criminalize media workers receiving bribes to influence their work.	1. Yes 2. No
2.1	Imposing high civil fines on journalists after being convicted of "defamation, libel, and slander."	1. Yes 2. No 3. I don't know

	Question	Answers
2.2	Number of arrest cases against journalists and/or media workers.	MADA Center Number:
2.3	Number of summons and investigations involving journalists and/or media workers.	MADA Center Number:
2.4	Number of torture cases against journalists and/or media workers.	MADA Center Number:
2.5	Number of physical assaults against journalists and/or media workers.	MADA Center Number:
2.11	Systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists or media owners as a result of their writings and/or broadcasts.	1. Yes significantly 2. Yes limitedly 3. No
2.13	Have restrictive measures such as shutdowns and/or website blocking been taken by the authorities against media outlets during 2023?	1. Yes, wide-scale actions were taken 2. Yes, limited actions were taken 3. No actions were taken
3.1	Licensing laws that allow the government to control media outlets.	1. 2. 3.
4.2	Availability of laws that allow the concentration of monopolies and shared ownership of media outlets.	1. Yes significantly 2. Yes poorly 3. No
7.1	Existence of a law guaranteeing the right to access information.	1. Yes 2. No 3. I don't know
7.2	Existence of laws and legislation that allow journalists access to information.	1. Yes effectively 2. Yes poorly 3. No
8.1	Existence of laws allowing journalists to form representative (labor union) bodies within media institutions.	1. Yes 2. No 3. I don't know