

EUROPEAN  
ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY



المركز الفلسطيني للتنمية والحريات الإعلامية «مدى»  
Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms (MADA)




# West Bank Press Freedom Index of 2023

(5th Annual Index)

May 2024



المركز الفلسطيني للتنمية والحريات الإعلامية «مدم»  
Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms (MADA)



# WEST BANK PRESS FREEDOM INDEX OF 2023

(5th ANUUAL INDEX)

May 2024

# **WEST BANK PRESS FREEDOM INDEX OF 2023**

© All rights reserved 2024

The Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms MADA

## **Working Group**

Dr. Omar Rahal  
Team Leader

Executive Director  
Human Rights and Democracy Media Center SHAMS

Mohammad Asem Daraghmah  
Statistician

Revised and approved by:  
Shireen Al-Khatib

Support and Follow-Up Team

## Table of Contents

<b>Executive Summary:</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>Study Sample:</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>Summary of Findings:</b> .....	<b>7</b>
<b>Recommendations:</b> .....	<b>8</b>
<b>Research Methodology:</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>Classification of Fields of Palestine Press Freedom Index</b> .....	<b>11</b>
<b>Index Calculation Methodology</b> .....	<b>14</b>
<b>Information Collection Mechanism</b> .....	<b>14</b>
<b>Calculation Method of Weights of Indicators</b> .....	<b>15</b>
<b>Samle Design Methodology</b> .....	<b>15</b>
<b>Study Findings</b> .....	<b>22</b>
<b>1 Press Freedom Index in Palestine</b> .....	<b>22</b>
<b>2. Findings of Palestine Press Freedom Index According to the Fields</b> .....	<b>26</b>
2.1 Legal Safeguards for Freedom of the Press .....	26
2.2 Legal and Social Restrictions on Freedom of the Press .....	27
2.1 Operational Independence of the Media .....	30
2.4 The Media and Diversity of Content .....	32
2.5 Government Procedures and Self-censorship .....	34
2.6 Financing Policies .....	36
2.7 Transparency and Access to Information .....	38
2.8 Self-regulation and Protection of Journalists .....	40
<b>3. Comparative Findings of Indicators of Fields over the Years 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022</b> .....	<b>42</b>

3.2 Legal Safeguards for Freedom of the .....	42
Legal and Social Restrictions on Freedom of the Press .....	46
Operational Independence of the Media.....	52
The Media and Diversity of Content.....	56
Government Procedures and Self-censorship.....	59
Financing Policies.....	63
Transparency And Access to Information .....	68
3.8 Self-regulation and Protection of Journalists .....	72
<b>Annexes: .....</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>Annex (1): The Percentage of Indicators by the Field and Territory during the Years 2018-2022&amp;2023 .....</b>	<b>78</b>
<b>Annex No. (2): Indicators and Method of Calculation .....</b>	<b>88</b>
<b>Questionnaire No. (1): .....</b>	<b>95</b>
<b>Questionnaire No. (2): .....</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Questionnaire No. (3): .....</b>	<b>102</b>

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Palestinian Center for Media Freedoms (MADA) worked on preparing indicators measuring press freedom in Palestine, for the years 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022, and 2023, and adopting them to measure the extent of progress and decline in the level of freedom of expression in the country. These indicators measure press freedom in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They were also adopted to measure the extent of progress and decline in the level of press freedom in Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip), where a comprehensive analysis of the level of this freedom in both geographical regions was conducted, and comparison with the results of the index for previous years.

However, this year, 2023, and in particular, the index was measured in the West Bank only due to the genocidal war to which our Palestinian people are exposed in the Gaza Strip, and the impossibility of implementing the study in light of the current conditions, where thousands of martyrs and wounded fell, including dozens of journalists who were killed during this war. This makes freedom of the press in the worst conditions, not just in the Gaza Strip, compared to previous years, but rather on a global level, and all of this prevented a comprehensive analysis of the level of press freedoms in the Gaza Strip over the previous years, as this was happening in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip alike.

The Press Freedom Index in the West Bank in 2023 was built on the basis of the Press Freedom Index in Palestine in 2022 on 8 areas and 72 indicators, which are:

1. Legal safeguards for freedom of the press.
2. Legal and social restrictions on freedom of the press.
3. Operational independence of the media.
4. The media and diversity of content.
5. Government and Self-Censorship.
6. Financing policies.
7. Transparency and access to information.
8. Self-regulation and protection of journalists.

The evaluation categories for the indicator were estimated according to the sum of the points of all areas and their values as follows:

- Very Bad (black): the measurement index is between (0 – 200) points.
- Bad (red): the measurement index is between (201 – 400) points.
- Problematic (orange): the measurement index is between (401 – 600) points.
- Fairly Good (yellow): the measurement index is between (601 – 800) points.
- Good (white): the measurement index is between (801 – 1000) points.

### » **Study Sample**

The sample of the current study consisted of 220 workers in the media sector in the West Bank only, distributed into 172 male and female journalists, and 32 media institutions, in addition to the sample of human rights institutions, which numbered 16 institutions. The representation percentage of the sample was 78.0% working in the media, 15.0% being managers and owners of media institutions, and 7.0%

being from Palestinian human rights institutions. The percentage of males was 64%, while the percentage of females was 36%. Also, 37.3% of the study sample were between the ages of 31 and 40 years, and 24.1% were between the ages of 41 and 50 years, while the percentage of those who were older than 51 years was 23.2% and 11.8% of those who were between the ages of 26 and 30 years, while among those aged between 20 and 25 years, it reached 3.6%. 51.8% hold bachelor's degrees, and 39.1% hold master's degrees or higher.

The percentage of workers in the official media sector in the sample was 17.3%, while the percentage of workers in the informal media sector in the sample was about 49.1%, and 22.3% work in the free media sector, and the rest work between Arab and foreign agencies, representing 11.3% of the sample, and the study sample was distributed according to the geographical division of the West Bank into (33.2% north, 39.5% central, and 27.3% south). Also, 38.2% of the study sample work in visual media, while 22.7% work in electronic media, 20.0% in audio media, and 19.1% in written media, and 31.9% of the sample are more than 16 years old they work in journalism, 23.2% from 6 to 10 years, 21.8% from 11 to 15 years, and 15.9% from 1 to 5 years.

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:

**Press freedom in the West Bank for the year 2023 fell according to the evaluations used in this index to the category: bad (red) which is the classification (between 201 – 400 points). The index measure in the West Bank for press freedom in the areas that were measured during the year 2023 reached. It amounted to (361) points, a decrease of (23) points from the year 2022, when the index had reached (384) points, and thus recorded a decline of 6.0% between the years 2022 and 2023. The highest value the index reached during the past five years that was measured was (520) points in the year 2020. Thus, the index declined in five years by 44.0% of the number of points it reached at that time. In previous indicator evaluations, it was classified as orange (problematic): (between 401 – 600 points), which in 2020 reached (520) points out of the total number of points.**

### » **Additional Findings:**

- 56 verification percentage indicators are less than 50%, 12 verification percentage indicators are greater than 50%, and 4 verification percentage indicators are 0%.
- 66.7% of the indicators, meaning that 48 indicators, decreased in percentage in the West Bank for the year 2023 compared to the year 2022, divided into (two indicators with a decline of more than 20%, 8 indicators with a decline between 10.0% - 20.0%, and 38 indicators with a decline between 1.0% - 9.0%).
- 9.7%, meaning 7 indicators. There was no change in percentages between 2022 and 2023, and the percentage of change was 0.0%.
- 23.6%, meaning 17 indicators in which there was an increase, divided into (9 indicators with an increase between 1.0% - 9.0%, 7 indicators with an increase between 10.0% - 20.0%, and one indicator with an increase of more than 20%).
- The results of the scale for the year 2023 in the West Bank showed a zero point in

3 indicators out of 72, due to the stability of two indicators during the years 2018-2023, which is the compatibility of national legislation with international conventions guaranteeing freedom of the press, and the absence of legal texts criminalizing government officials' incitement against the media. At point zero, and a decline in a third indicator, "lack of compensation by public authorities for material damage caused due to attacks on equipment," at point zero.

- A decline in two indicators: the number of physical attacks against journalists and/or media workers.
- An indicator of the number of cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers during the year 2023.
- Imposing legal restrictions on addressing ethnic and/or religious issues and/or national security.
- Judicial protection of freedom of the press is poor and passive, and this poorness has often contributed to the decline of some indicators, such as the indicator of blocking and closing websites.
- Journalists still do not generally file complaints about the violations and attacks they are exposed to, and even if a few of them do file complaints, they are not investigated. If any of them are investigated, the results of the investigation are not disclosed, and the victim journalists have not been compensated for damages they suffered, and no punitive measures are taken against those who carried out these attacks, which affected the results of the index.
- Self-censorship still severely limits press freedom in Palestine, which poses a greater threat to press freedom than government censorship. Followed by journalists being subjected to family or social pressure due to their possession of certain information. The relevant indicators are still declining in the number of points allocated to them.
- The field of transparency and access to information is characterized by extreme negativity as a result of the absence of a law on the right to access information. Therefore, the field of transparency and access to information declined during the year 2023 within the same sensitive classification despite the slight improvement that occurred in the procedures related to access to information.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS:**


First: Recommendations Directed to the Palestinian Government:

1. Adopting the law on the right to obtain information and providing the necessary mechanisms to implement the law.
2. Compatible the local legislation with international standards related to freedom of expression stipulated in the international agreements to which Palestine has signed.
3. Repeal any effective legal legislation that allows the closure of websites without a judicial ruling and approve legislation guaranteeing freedom of the press in accordance with what is stipulated in the Palestinian Basic Law.
4. Involving journalists and civil society organizations in any official discussion about amending laws related to freedom of the press or issuing new laws.

5. The need for the government and its security services to stop the policy of arresting and detaining journalists or personally assaulting them or their equipment, and to take deterrent measures against anyone who attacks journalists.
6. The need for the Public Prosecution to seriously investigate all complaints it receives, and to refer the files to the competent judicial authorities after completing the investigation to hold people who commit crimes in violation of the law accountable.
7. Establishing a government center specialized in receiving complaints, following them up, investigating them, and referring aggressors to justice.
8. The need for Palestinian courts to expedite deciding cases related to freedom of the press, and the need for specialized judges to look into media cases in which journalists are prosecuted for publishing and carrying out their professional duty, to ensure respect for freedom of the press.
9. Stop all forms of interference in the work of journalists, including refraining from pressuring them and asking them to withdraw the publication of published press materials, or threatening or inciting against them on the basis of publication.
10. Forming a Supreme Media Council independent of the government that guarantees respect for freedom of the press and regulation of the media.
11. Reconsider government financial policies towards the media, especially the fees and taxes imposed on them, and provide immediate financial aid to media institutions threatened with closure due to heavy losses.
12. Guaranteeing the rights of all journalists whose media institutions have been closed and reviewing the corporate law to ensure the presence of a guarantor of the rights of workers in these institutions in the event of their closure.
13. The necessity of moving forward with holding general presidential and legislative elections, given that the separation of powers and holding elections contributes to creating an appropriate environment for respecting freedom of expression.

Second: Recommendations Directed to the Journalists Syndicate:

1. Holding free and fair periodic elections for the journalists syndicate and activating the syndicate's role in protecting the rights of journalists as the official organizational body representing journalists.
2. The journalists syndicate performs its assigned role in defending the rights of journalists and representing them before the competent authorities in the event that they are subjected to any abuse or arrest by law enforcement authorities.
3. Encouraging journalists, activists, and influencers in the social media space to use popular digital diplomacy to expose the crimes of the occupation in light of the harassment and crimes to which journalists were subjected in Palestine.



# **WEST BANK PRESS FREEDOM INDEX OF 2023**

**(5th ANNUAL INDEX)**

## RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:

The Palestinian Center for Media Freedoms (MADA) worked on preparing indicators measuring press freedom in Palestine, for the years 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022, and 2023, and adopting them to measure the extent of progress and decline in the level of freedom of expression in the country. These indicators measure press freedom in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. They were also adopted to measure the extent of progress and decline in the level of press freedom in Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip), where a comprehensive analysis of the level of this freedom in both geographical regions was conducted, and comparison with the results of the index for previous years.

However, this year, 2023, and in particular, the index was measured in the West Bank only due to the genocidal war to which our Palestinian people are exposed in the Gaza Strip, and the impossibility of implementing the study in light of the current conditions, where thousands of martyrs and wounded fell, including dozens of journalists who were killed during this war. This makes freedom of the press in the worst conditions, not just in the Gaza Strip, compared to previous years, but rather on a global level, and all of this prevented a comprehensive analysis of the level of press freedoms in the Gaza Strip over the previous years, as this was happening in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip alike.

MADA used a methodology for measuring press freedom based on a temporal comparison in the same geographical area from one year to another, taking into account relevant international indicators, especially those used by the Press House and Reporters Without Borders, and the media development indicators of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization - UNESCO, and what the experts decided was appropriate to measure press freedom in Palestine after redefining and formulating these indicators, and adding a new set of indicators of importance and weight in measuring press freedom in Palestine.

The study relied on monitoring indicators related to performance and Palestinian measures to respect press freedom or measures that prevent it. Performance and measures caused by the Israeli occupation were excluded from this index, such as those related to legislation and many practices, about which information cannot be collected. This was replaced by monitoring Israeli violations of press freedom in the annual report issued by the Palestinian Center for Media Freedoms (MADA) for the year 2023.

What distinguishes the methodology used in measuring press freedom in Palestine is that it is based on the idea of comparison between different time periods, each period lasting one year, and is not based on comparison between different countries, and limiting it to the Palestinian issue facilitates the possibility of benefiting from these results and taking policies and measures. This would contribute to enhancing freedom of the press.

The methodology for measuring press freedom was built on the following axes:

### **Classification of areas for measuring the Press Freedom Index in Palestine:**

#### 1. Legal Safeguards for Freedom of the Press:

The field was measured based on 8 indicators: what is guaranteed by the Basic Law for freedom of the press, the compatibility of national legislation after the State of Palestine signed international conventions guaranteeing freedom of the press, the availability of judicial guarantees in the Palestinian courts that protect freedom of the press, and the

presence of legal texts criminalizing government officials' incitement against the media, the existence of legal texts that impose restrictions on addressing ethnic, religious, and/or national security issues, the existence of procedures and instructions that allow journalists freedom of movement during the imposition of a state of emergency and closures, and the existence of a cybercrime law that has strengthened freedom of the press, behavioral or legal rules criminalize access for workers, in the media receiving bribes to influence their work.

## 2. Legal and Social Restrictions on Freedom of the Press:

The field was measured based on 14 indicators: which are the number of cases of imposing high civil fines on journalists after they were convicted of committing the "crime of slander, cuss, and defamation," the number of arrests of journalists and/or media workers, the number of summonses for investigation against journalists and/or media workers, the number of cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers, the number of physical attacks against journalists and/or media workers.<sup>1</sup> In addition to imposing restrictions or preventing journalists from covering public events and carrying out their journalistic work, confiscating and/or destroying my equipment and/or journalistic materials on the basis of my journalistic work, opening serious investigations by official authorities into complaints submitted by media workers; and compensation by public authorities for material damage caused due to the attack on equipment, punitive measures taken against people who assaulted me or one of my co-workers, systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists or media owners as a result of writing and/or broadcasting materials, defamation, incitement or defamation against journalists via the internet on the grounds of publishing sensitive reports, taking restrictive measures by the official authority such as closing and/or blocking media outlets during the year 2023, and imposing restrictions on obtaining information and/or transferring it as a result of the state of emergency.

## 3. Operational Independence of the Media:

The field was measured based on 7 indicators: which are the licensing laws that allow the government to control the media, licensing procedures that hinder the work and establishment of independent media outlets, the dominance of state-owned media outlets over the news and information system in the country, official media outlets enjoying editorial independence and covering news from all segments of the population, clarity of media ownership procedures and the opportunity to establish media outlets without political discrimination, diversity of media outlets in terms of ownership and lack of concentration among specific political and/or economic trends, and concealment of official positions' ownership of media outlets and intentional concealment of their connection to these media outlets.

## 4. The Media and Diversity of Content:

The field was measured based on 7 indicators: which are the monopoly of access to information by a number of media outlets and influential people, the state's provision of laws that allow the concentration of monopolies and joint ownership of the media, the existence of a monopoly in providing internet and/or communication services and making internet use available to everyone at a low cost and good quality, the government uses

<sup>1</sup> The index was used based on data monitored by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms - MADA.

licensing of media ownership and frequencies as a means of pressure on independent media, the diversity of sources, information and content, and the degree to which different media outlets cover issues related to corruption and/or waste of public money.

#### 5. Government and Self-censorship:

The field was measured based on 8 indicators: which are imposing editorial control in the media on issues published through them, refraining from publishing press materials for fear of being subjected to prosecution by public authorities, publishing news on websites and having it retracted, exposing journalists to family and/or social pressures on the grounds of publishing information, writers and/or editors being subjected to official or societal threats on the grounds of publishing, the existence of blacklists of (people and/or institutions) that are prevented from appearing on various media outlets or some of them, governmental regulatory procedures for publishing and/or publications that hinder freedom media, and using alternative symbols and words on social media sites in order to avoid blocking and/or deletion of the post by these sites.

#### 6. Financing Policy:

The field was measured based on 9 indicators: which are imposing high fees for obtaining frequencies and/or registering newspapers and/or websites, imposing an added tax on the purchase of paper and/or newsprint or broadcasting equipment and other media equipment, the presence of restrictions on financing and/or foreign support for the media, government financial support for the media in a fair manner based on market share or from the advertising market, allocating budgets for government advertising in the media in a fair manner, using advertisements as a means of pressure to influence editors' decisions, bribery of journalists from influential actors on the news content of their media work, wage levels for journalists and other media professionals are high enough to avoid bribery, and exerting pressure on journalists by reducing salaries and/or terminating employee contracts.

#### 7. Transparency and Access to Information:

The field was measured based on 8 indicators: which are the existence of a law on the right to access information, the existence of laws and legislation that allow journalists to access information, the clarity of restrictions imposed on obtaining information, the presence of official media spokespersons who provide information to journalists smoothly and quickly, allowing journalists to accompanying the security services in their field missions, pressure on journalists to reveal their sources of information, violation of the privacy of journalists by public authorities, and the sharing of public information on various media outlets by government officials and competent authorities.

#### 8. Self-regulation and Protection of Journalists:

The field was measured based on 11 indicators: which are the existence of laws that allow journalists to form representative bodies (syndicates) in the media, restrictions and/or dismissal of media employees against the backdrop of advertisers' protest against their journalistic work, regular periodic elections in the representative bodies of media workers, the independence of the representative bodies of media workers from the influence of the government and political parties, the syndicates representing journalists are characterized by professionalism and independence in work, encouraging women's access to decision-making positions in media institutions and representative institutions

for journalists, freedom for workers in the official media to join “representative bodies” for journalists, the degree of representation of the union body for workers in the media, procedures for affiliation and membership to the syndicates for workers in the media are acceptable and professional, the degree of involvement of the union body for workers in the media in formulating policies and general trends, and the degree of effectiveness of the syndicates of media workers in intervening and defending the rights of members.

### » **Index Calculation Methodology:**

The measure came as a result of in-depth discussions in which human rights organizations, academics, journalists, and statistical experts participated. It took a long time and focused on the nature of the indicators that were adopted to measure press freedom within the axes and classifications so that the indicators are measurable and annual comparisons can be made, their results are converted into numbers and weights, clarifying the nature of the weight of each indicator, the distribution of indicators into titles, issues, and groups, the weight of each group from the total point, and the sources of information for each indicator for measurement according to a specific methodology for weighing each indicator. The index contains 72 indicators, and according to the methodology of points and their estimation, it was agreed that the points for each indicator should range between (0), which is the lowest point the indicator can obtain, and (1000).<sup>2</sup>

After reviewing the evaluation methods and based on consulting a number of technical and statistical experts on the evaluation methods, an evaluation mechanism was adopted that was close to the mechanism adopted by Journalists Without Borders, but slightly different, so that the approved values would be close to the Palestinian cultural understanding. The point categories and their values were as follows:

- Very Bad (black): the measurement index is between (0 – 200) points.
- Bad (red): the measurement index is between (201 – 400) points.
- Problematic (orange): the measurement index is between (401 – 600) points.
- Fairly Good (yellow): the measurement index is between (601 – 800) points.
- Good (white): the measurement index is between (801 – 1000) points.

### » **Information Collection Mechanism:**

Gathering the necessary information depends on different means appropriate to each indicator. This information was obtained from its primary sources, in addition to sources active in the field of press freedom in Palestine to maintain the accuracy and credibility of each indicator, the most prominent of which are:

1. Civil society organizations active in the field of press freedom in Palestine and international institutions, especially information related to qualitative indicators.
2. A form to collect information related to quantitative indicators, by designing a special form for media workers, and also a special form for managers and owners of media institutions.

---

2 By reviewing the appendices, the table of indicators and scoring, which shows the number of indicators for each field and the points.

## » Calculation Method of Weights of Indicators:

The measurement indicators depend on the equal weight of the index ( $100/72 = 1.3888$ ), and the percentage contribution of each field of study is calculated according to the number of indicators affiliated with it, as shown in the following table:

Table No. (1): Distribution of the numbers of study indicators by field, classification, and percentage contribution to the overall field:

Field	Number of Indicators		Total	Field Weight
	Legislations	Practices		
Legal Safeguards for Freedom of the Press.	5	3	8	%11.1
Legal and Social Restrictions on Freedom of the Press.	2	13	15	20.8%
Operational Independence of the Press.	2	5	7	9.7%
The Media and Diversity of Content.	1	6	7	9.7%
Government and Self-censorship.	0	8	8	11.1%
Financing Policies.	3	6	9	12.5%
Transparency and Access to Information.	2	6	8	11.1%
Self-regulation and Protection of Journalists.	2	10	12	16.7%
Total	17	55	72	100

Calculating the contribution percentage of each indicator for each field based on the total number of field indicators.

## Sample Design Methodology:

This part includes a presentation of the study methodology, the study population, the sample, the study tool, the validity implications used, the study variables and procedures, and statistical treatments. This is explained below: -


**Study methodology:** for the purposes of this study, a descriptive field approach was used to collect data from the study population, identify its characteristics, and determine indicators of press freedom. This method suits the purposes of the study. The methodology for measuring press freedom was built on the following axes: -

1. Legal Safeguards for Freedom of the Press.
2. Legal and Social Restrictions on Freedom of the Press.
3. Operational Independence of the Media.
4. The Media and Diversity of Content.
5. Government and Self-censorship.
6. Financing Policies.
7. Transparency and Access to Information.
8. Self-regulation and Protection of Journalists.

## The study sample:

1. Sample of media workers: the sample for the current study consisted of (220 male and female journalists) from the West Bank, distributed among (140 males and 80 females). The sample was chosen randomly.
2. Sample of directors of media institutions/editor-in-chiefs/editing directors of media institutions: the sample of the current study consisted of 32 individuals working in a media institution. The sample was chosen randomly.
3. Sample of Palestinian human rights institutions: the sample consisted of 16 human rights institutions distributed among 13 in the West Bank and 3 in the Gaza Strip.

Sample Distribution According to Sector and Governorate



The representation rate of the sample was 78.0% of media workers, 15.0% of directors and owners of media institutions, and 7.0% of Palestinian human rights institutions.

Study tool: the study tool was developed to collect data related to measuring press freedom indicators in Palestine, after reviewing previous studies, preparing a draft framework of indicators and sending it to many relevant bodies such as the Independent Commission for Human Rights, the Human Rights Council, and experts in the field of press freedom, and then developing measurement tools according to the main axes (legislation, practices, and legal aspect), and this resulted in three questionnaires directed to male and female journalists for the purpose of measuring indicators related to the nature of their journalistic work. The second tool was directed to the owners of media institutions, which relate to the nature of the work of these institutions, and the third tool was directed to Palestinian human rights institutions and figures for the purpose of evaluating legal materials related to freedom of the press.

## Questionnaire Sections:

The first section: it included the introduction to the questionnaire and contains a set of elements that define the goal of the study and the type of data and information that would be collected from members of the study sample, and to reassure respondents of the confidentiality of the information and that it will only be used for the purposes of scientific research.

Section Two: demographic information for the sample. This study includes two types of variables:

First: the independent variables

- The region variable, which included (the West Bank, including Jerusalem)
- The governorate variable, which included all governorates of the West Bank.
- The sex variable, which included two levels (male, female).
- The age variable, which included five levels (from 20 to 25 years, from 26 to 30 years, from 31 to 40 years, from 41 to 50 years, and older than 51 years).
- The educational status variable, which included five levels (1. general secondary school, 2. intermediate diploma, 3. bachelor's degree, 4. master's degree, 5. doctorate).
- The workplace variable, which included five levels (1. official media, 2. unofficial media, 3. Arab institution, 4. foreign institution, 5. freelance media).
- The main media variable, which included four levels (1. written 2. audio 3. visual 4. electronic).
- The variable number of years working in the field of journalism, and it included four levels (1. from 1 to 5 years, 2. from 6 to 10 years, 3. from 11 to 15 years, 4. more than 16 years).
- The geographic division variable included (north, center, and south) of the West Bank.

### **Second: Dependent Variables:**

It is represented by the sample members' responses to the tool's items according to the fields of study:

1. First field: Legal Safeguards for Freedom of the Press.
2. Second field: Legal and Social Restrictions on Freedom of the Press.
3. Third field: Operational Independence of the Media.
4. Fourth field: The Media and Diversity of Content.
5. Fifth field: Government and Self-censorship.
6. Sixth field: Financing Policies.
7. Seventh field: Transparency and Access to Information.
8. Eighth field: Self-regulation and Protection of Journalists.

### **Steps to Implement the Study:**

The first step included holding meetings to discuss the objectives of the study and the timetable for implementation, in addition to determining the outputs for each stage of the study, reviewing and revising the work methodology proposed by the Palestinian Center for Media Freedoms (MADA), and defining the target group in the study. The survey's executive plan and implementation timetable were also discussed. During these meetings, the study's expectations are discussed in addition to the needs and challenges related to implementation, including the important parties that must be communicated with.



The main activities of the study fell under four general stages as follows:

Study Tool Preparation in its Final Form Stage	Data Collection and Definition of the Size of the Study Sample Individuals Stage	Information Analysis and Report Drafting Stage	Report Draft Discussion Stage
--	--	--	----------------------------------


- The First Stage: an initial meeting was held where work was done to determine the needs and objectives for implementing the study, and then to begin reviewing the questionnaire in form and content.
- The second stage: - Training on Data Collection: the training was conducted to include all topics related to fieldwork and completing the form; and it included conducting an interview and completing the form with the aim of training the crew on all the skills necessary to ensure the success of the project. The training was conducted with the objective of implementing the study and its importance.
- The Third Stage: - Data Collection and Entry Stage:
- Time Reference:
- This survey was carried out in the field during the period between March 23rd, 2023, and April 23rd, 2023.
- Programming Stage: during this stage, entry software was prepared using computerized forms, and entry rules were worked on to ensure that forms were entered well. Cleaning rules were also developed to examine data after entering it, as these rules work to examine variables at the form level.
- Entry Stage: the data entry process began on March 23rd, 2023, and ended on April 23rd, 2023, which was the data collection period.
- Data Processors: the period for preparing the report and calculating the index results is during the period from April 23rd, 2023, and May 6th, 2023.
- Statistical Processors: in order to process the data, the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS V28) software was used, using statistical treatments (frequencies and percentages), namely the period for preparing the report and calculating the index results.

### **Distribution of the study sample.**

1. Sex Variable:


Percentage Distribution of Study Sample Individuals According to the Sex

The percentage of males in the study sample was 64%, while the percentage of females in the study sample was 36%.



2. Age Variable:


Percentage Distribution of Study Sample Individuals According to the Age and Region



37.3% of the study sample are between 31 to 40 years old, and 24.1% are between 41 to 50 years old.

### 3. The Educational Status Variable:


Percentage Distribution of Study Sample Individuals According to the Educational Qualification and Region



51.8% of the study sample held bachelor's degrees, and 39.1% of the sample held a master's degree or higher.

### 4. The Workplace Variable:


Percentage Distribution of Study Sample Individuals According to the Workplace and Region



The percentage of workers in the official media sector in the sample was 17.3%, while the percentage of workers in the unofficial media sector in the sample was about 49.1%, and 22.3% in the freelance media sector.

5. The Geographical Division Variable:


Percentage Distribution of Study Sample Individuals According to the Geographical Division



It is clear from the previous table that the study sample was distributed according to the geographical division of the West Bank, divided into:


(33.2% North, 39.5% Central, and 27.3% South).

Percentage Distribution of Individuals in the Study Sample According to the Type of Media Outlet in which they Work and the Region



The data indicated that 38.2% of the study sample worked in visual media, while 22.7% worked in electronic media, 20.0% in audio media, and 19.1% in written media.

Percentage Distribution of Individuals in the Study Sample According to the Number of Work Years in Media and the Region



The results of the study showed that 31.9% of the sample worked in journalism for more than 16 years, 23.2% from 6 to 10 years, 21.8% from 11 to 15 years, and 15.9% from 1 to 5 years.


## FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

### 1. Press Freedom Index in Palestine:


The freedom of expression measure witnessed a continuous decline in the number of points recorded by the index from 2020 until today, which indicates and confirms the decline of press freedoms during the era of the previous Palestinian government on an ongoing and noteworthy basis. The West Bank index for press freedom in the areas that were measured during the year 2023 reached an amount of (361) points, a decrease of (23) points from the year 2022, which amounted to (384) points, a decrease of (136) points from the year 2020, which amounted to (520) points, also a decrease of (73) points for the year 2019, which amounted to (457) points, and also an amount of (108) points for the year 2018, which amounted to (492) points out of a total of 1000 points. The extent of the decline in the West Bank was from (159) points, the highest amount the index reached (520) points in the year 2020, to (361) points in the year 2023, that is, a decline rate of 30.6%. In the period between 2020 and 2023.

The index also witnessed a decline in the Gaza Strip during the period from 2018 to 2022, as it to reach (403) points in the year 2022, down by (72) points from the year 2020, which amounted to (475) points, also down by (63) points for the year 2019, which amounted to (466) points, and also an amount of (72) points for the year 2018, which amounted to (475) points out of a total of 1000 points. While the amount of decline in the Gaza Strip reached (72) points, with a decline rate of 17.9%, from the highest amount the index reached (475) points in 2020 to (403) points in the year 2022. Thus, the percentage of decline in the index in the West Bank is higher than in the Gaza Strip.


Press Freedom Index by Region 2018 - 2022 and 2023 in the West Bank




Percentage of Verification Score in the Press Freedom Index by Region between the years 2022 and 2023 in the West Bank



Change in Differences in Press Freedom by Field in the West Bank between 2022 and 2023



### Change in Differences in Press Freedom by Field and Region between 2020 and 2022



The study was based on measuring eight areas that reflect freedom of the press: legal safeguards for freedom of the press, legal and social restrictions on freedom of the press, operational independence of the media, media and diversity of content, government and self-censorship, financing policies, transparency and access to information, and self-regulation and protection of journalists. The indicator for each of the above-mentioned fields was built on a set of indicators that were used to measure the fields shown above, and their total for all fields was 72 indicators. The index was built on calculating the weight equation for each field.

### Fields of Press Freedom in Palestine during the Years 2018 - 2022 and 2023 in the West Bank



The findings of the index in the West Bank for the year 2023 revealed a zero point in 3 indicators out of 72, which are:

1. The existence of legal texts that criminalize government officials' incitement against the media.
2. The existence of a law on the right to obtain information.
3. Compensation by public authorities for the material damage caused due to the attack on my equipment.

However, the results of the index in the West Bank for the year 2023 revealed a stability of 1000 points for two indicators:

1. The existence of guarantees by the Basic Law for freedom of the press.
2. There are no judicial rulings imposing financial fines on journalists for committing publishing crimes during the year 2023.

On the other hand, the results of the index in the West Bank for the year 2023 revealed the presence of attacks against journalists and/or media workers, represented by 8 cases of arrest, 7 cases of summons and investigation, 4 cases of torture, and 9 cases of physical assault<sup>3</sup>.

While the results of the index in Palestine for the year 2022 revealed a zero point in 5 indicators out of 72, which are:

1. Harmonizing national legislation after the State of Palestine signed the international conventions guaranteeing freedom of the press.
2. The existence of legal texts that criminalize government officials' incitement against the media.
3. The number of journalists who were summoned by security or judicial services due to their journalistic work during the year 2022: (9 cases in the West Bank and 3 cases in the Gaza Strip, so the total is greater than 10 cases). According to the methodology, 10% is subtracted for each person, with a maximum of 10 people, therefore, the percentage of achieving the indicator is 0.0%.
4. Imposing legal restrictions on addressing racial, religious, and/or national security issues.
5. The number of cases of arrests against journalists and/or media workers: (the West Bank is 10 cases and there is no case in the Gaza Strip, so the total is 10 cases). According to the methodology, 10% is subtracted for each person, with a maximum of 10 people, therefore, the percentage of achieving the indicator is 0.0%.

On the other hand, the results of the index in Palestine for the year 2022 revealed a stability of 1000 points for two indicators:

1. The existence of guarantees by the Basic Law for freedom of the press.
2. There are no judicial rulings imposing financial fines on journalists for committing publishing crimes.

---

3 The indicator was used based on data monitored by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms - MADA.


## 2. Findings of Palestine Press Freedom Index According to the Field:

### 2.1 Legal Safeguards for Freedom of the Press:

The guarantees field was measured based on 8 indicators, and the relative weight of each indicator was (0.125) with a value of 125 points for each indicator.

The measure of the field of legal guarantees for freedom of the press in the West Bank declined during the year 2023 by (99) points to become (313) points compared to (412) points in 2022. This is due to a decline in the percentage of the indicator (the presence of judicial guarantees in the Palestinian courts that protect freedom of the press) from 62.5% to 48.7%, and also the indicator (the existence of procedures and instructions that allow journalists freedom of movement during the imposition of a state of emergency and closures) from 49.8% to 30.3%, and also the indicator (the existence of a cybercrime law has enhanced freedom of the press) from 38.9% to 21.4%.

As for the level of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) for the years 2018 and 2022, there was a significant decline in the field of legal guarantees for press freedom in Palestine during the year 2022 by (12) points to become (401) points compared to (413) points in 2020, and in comparison with (406) points in the year 2018, noting that there was a decline in this area compared to the years 2018 and 2019, from (406) points in the year 2018 to (354) points in the year 2019.




The largest decrease was in the West Bank by (18) points from the year 2020, as it reached (430) points in the year 2020 compared to (415) points in the year 2018, and (344) points in the year 2019, while the Gaza Strip recorded an increase of (1) Points from (383) points in 2020 to (384) points in 2022, while there was a decline in comparison between 2020 and 2018 by (55) points, as the result at that time reached (438) points.

This increase in the field of legal guarantees for press freedom is due to an increase in the percentage of achieving the feeling indicator in (the availability of judicial guarantees in the Palestinian courts that protect freedom of the press) by 52.4%, and also the indicator of (feeling that the procedures and instructions that allow journalists freedom of movement during the imposition of a state of emergency and closures) by 50.5% (49.8% in the West Bank compared to 51.8% in the Gaza Strip).

The results showed a discrepancy in the percentage of the index achieving weighted points between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the indicator (procedures and instructions allow journalists freedom of movement during the imposition of a state of emergency and closures), where the West Bank obtained 62.5% of the points, while the Gaza Strip obtained 38.4% of the points. This means that the implementation of the procedures in

the Gaza Strip was strict and limited the freedom of movement of journalists during the imposition of the state of emergency and closures.

The results showed and based on calculating the percentage of the index's score of achieving weighted points, we find that both the indicator (lack of compatibility with national legislation after the State of Palestine signed the international conventions guaranteeing freedom of the press) and the indicator (the presence of legal texts criminalizing government officials' incitement against the media) obtained 0% of weighted points. While the indicator (the existence of guarantees guaranteed by the Basic Law for freedom of the press) obtained 100% of the weighted points for this indicator.



The results show that the indicator (considering the presence of the cybercrime law has enhanced freedom of the press) received a low percentage to the point of achieving weighted points of 30.0% at the level of Palestine, and similar between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as these percentages reached 28.2% in the West Bank and 33.5% in the Gaza Strip. Which indicates that the existence of the law has led to adverse results and that it has not enhanced freedom of the press.

## 2.2 Legal and Social Restrictions on Freedom of the Press:

The legal and social restrictions on freedom of the press field was measured based on 14 indicators, with a relative weight of (0.0714) for each indicator and a value of 71 points.

The field of legal guarantees for freedom of the press in the West Bank declined during the year 2023 by (27) points to become (384) points compared to (411) points in 2022. This is due to a decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator "(increase in the number of cases of physical attacks against journalists/ and/or workers in the media)<sup>4</sup>.

The number reached 9 cases in the West Bank in 2023 (thus, the percentage of achieving the index was 10%), a decrease from the year 2022, when the number of cases reached 5, with a percentage of achieving 50.0%, while there was one case in 2020, with a percentage of achieving 90.0%. There was also a decline in the indicator (increase in the number of cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers)<sup>5</sup>, as the number reached 4


4 The indicator was used based on data monitored by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms - MADA.


5 The indicator was used based on data monitored by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms - MADA.

cases in the West Bank in 2023 (thus, the percentage of achieving the index was 60%), a decline from the year 2022, when it reached the number of cases is 3, with a rate of achieving 70.0%, while there was one case in 2020, with a rate of achieving 90.0%, and also the indicator of (no confiscation and/or destruction of my equipment and/or press materials due to my journalistic work), from 74.7% to 60.2%, and also a low percentage of achieving the indicator of (no punitive measures taken against people who assaulted me or one of my co-workers) increased from 5.5% to 15.9% during the years 2022 and 2023, respectively.

Whereas at the level of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) for the years 2018 and 2022, there was a significant decline in the measure of the area of legal restrictions on freedom of the press in Palestine during the year 2022 by (120) points compared to the year 2020, reaching (366) points in 2022 compared to (485) points in 2020, and 479 points in 2019.

This is due to the decrease in the index in the West Bank from (577) points in 2020 to (411) during the year 2022 by (166), while the index in the Gaza Strip increased (62) points from (476) points in 2020 to (537) during the year 2022.





This is due to a significant decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicators in the West Bank in 2023, which are:

Indicators obtained low percentages, including the indicator (compensation by public authorities for the material damage sustained as a result of the attack on my equipment), 0.0%, the indicator (the number of physical attacks against journalists and/or media workers) reached 10.0%, and the indicator (punitive measures taken against people who assaulted me or one of my co-workers) reached 15.9%, and the indicator (an increase in the number of cases of arrests against journalists and/or media workers) achieved a percentage of 20.0%, and the indicator (number of summonses and investigations against journalists and/or media workers) achieved an indicator of 30.0%.

At the level of Palestine during the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022

- The percentage of achieving the index was 0.0% at the level of Palestine during the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022 (due to the presence of cases of arrests of journalists and/or media workers), as there were 10 cases in the year 2022, all of them in the West Bank.
- While the results in 2022 showed an increase in the index in the Gaza Strip by (62) points, to become (537) points compared to (476) points in 2020, due to the high percentage of achieving the indicator (no cases of arrests against journalists and journalists or workers in the media) by 100.0%. There is also an increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (reduction in the number of cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers) to 100.0%.
- Consistency in the percentage of achieving the indicator (not imposing high civil fines on journalists after they were convicted of committing the crime of slander, slander,

and defamation), at 100% for both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where it was found that the number of cases was (0) over the course of the four years.

- A stability in the percentage of achieving an indicator of 0.0% at the level of Palestine (the presence of cases of summons and investigation against journalists and/or workers in the media), due to the fact that there are still procedures for summoning and investigation against journalists and/or workers in the media in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where in the year 2022 the number of summonses and investigation cases reached (12) cases, distributed into (9) cases in the West Bank, and (3) cases in the Gaza Strip.
  - In the year 2022, the number of cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers reached (3) cases in the West Bank, and there were no cases in the Gaza Strip, and therefore the indicator at the Palestine level obtained 70.0%.
  - As for the indicator (the number of physical attacks against journalists and/or media workers), the number of cases reached (5) cases in the West Bank, and two cases in the Gaza Strip. Therefore, the indicator at the Palestine level reached 30.0%, while during the year 2020 it was about 60.0%.
1. The indicator (imposing restrictions or preventing journalists from covering public events and carrying out their journalistic work) at the Palestine level was 37.0% in the year 2022, while it was 54.0% during the year 2020.
  2. A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the official authorities conduct an investigation into the submitted complaint) at the level of Palestine, as we notice a decrease from 34.0% during the year 2020 to 11.0% in 2022.
  3. A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the absence of widespread and arbitrary distortion, incitement, or slander against journalists via the Internet on the basis of their publishing sensitive reports) in the West Bank from 58.0% in 2020 to a percentage of achieving 39.0% in 2022. It is also noted that the decrease in the percentage of achieving this indicator in the Gaza Strip from 61.0% in 2020 to 40.0% in 2022.
- A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (not taking restrictive measures by the official authority, such as closing or blocking media outlets) at the level of Palestine, as we notice a decrease from 59.0% during the year 2020 to 39.0% in 2022, and it also decreased in the West Bank from 58.0% in the year 2020 to a percentage of achieving 39.0% in 2022. It is also noted that the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip has decreased from 61.0% in 2020 to 40.0% in 2022.
  - The indicator percentage (imposing restrictions on obtaining and/or transferring information as a result of the state of emergency) decreased from 49.0% for the year 2020 to 39.0% in 2022 at the level of Palestine, and this decrease in the West Bank came from 48.0% for the year 2020 to 40.0% for the year 2022, and the Gaza Strip from 52.0% for the year 2020 to 37.0% for the year 2022.



### **2.3 Operational Independence of the Media:**

The operational independence of the media field was measured based on 7 indicators, with a relative weight of (0.143) for each indicator and a value of 143 points.

The measure of the indicator of legal guarantees for freedom of the press in the West Bank declined during the year 2023 by (62) points to become (348) points compared to (410) points in 2022. This is due to a decline in the percentage of the indicator (lack of clarity in procedures for media ownership and the opportunity to establish media outlets media without political discrimination) from 47.1% in 2022 to 23.8% in 2023, as well as the indicator (the presence of licensing laws that allow the government to control the media) from 44.4% to 31.6%. The indicator (the presence of licensing procedures that hinder the work and establishment of independent media) increased from 40.0% to 30.9%.

At the level of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) for the years 2018 and 2022, there was a decline in the field of operational independence of the media by (133) points in Palestine from (552) points in the year 2020 to (419) points in the year 2022, and a decline of (146) point compared to the year 2018, which reached (565) points.

The largest decline in the index appears in the West Bank with (221) points, where this index reached (348) points in the year 2023 after reaching (569) points in the year 2018, and (410) points in the year 2022 compared to (572) points in 2020 after it was (447) points in 2019. As for the Gaza Strip, it decreased by (66) points, to become (447) after reaching (513) points in 2020, and (502) points in 2019, with a decline in its amount is (111) points after it was (559) points in the year 2018.



This change is explained by the low percentage of achieving indicators at the West Bank level for the year 2023 in all indicators below 50%:

- The indicator (the official media enjoys editorial independence and covers news from all segments of the population) was at 26.6%, and the indicator (licensing procedures hinder the work and establishment of independent media) at 30.9%.
- The indicator (dominance of state-owned media over the country's news and information system) was 38.7%.
- The indicator (clarity of media ownership procedures and the opportunity to establish media outlets without political discrimination) was at 23.8%, with a decline from 53.2% in 2022.
- A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (not considering that the laws related to media licensing are biased towards government control over these media), at the level of the West Bank during the year 2023, to decrease to 30.9% in 2023, while in 2022 it was about 38.3%.
- A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (not considering that licensing laws allow government control over the media), in the West Bank from 62.2% in 2020 to a percentage of achieving 44.4% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 31.6% in 2023, while in the Gaza Strip the percentage of achieving it decreased. The indicator increased from 50.3% in 2020 to 33.3% in 2022.
- A very significant decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator (considering the lack of dominance of state-owned media over the news and information system in the country) in the West Bank from 72.0% in 2018 to a percentage of achieving 40.4% in 2022, to a percentage of achieving 38.7% in 2023, while in the Gaza Strip, the percentage of achieving the indicator decreased from 64.0% in 2018 to 36.4% in 2022.
- A sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator (official media outlets enjoy editorial independence and cover news from all segments of the population) in the West Bank from 70.6% in 2020 to a percentage of achieving 24.3% in 2022, to a percentage of achieving 26.6% in 2023, as is the case in the Gaza Strip. It is noticed that there is a sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator from 66.4% in 2020 to 26.8% in 2022.
- A sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator (clarity of media ownership procedures and providing the opportunity to establish media outlets without political discrimination) in the West Bank from 71.3% in 2020 to a percentage of achieving 47.1% in 2022 to 23.8% in 2023, while it is noticed that there is an increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip increased from 58.7% in 2020 to 70.8% in 2022.



## 2.4 The Media and Diversity of Content:

The media and diversity of content was measured based on 7 indicators, with a relative weight of (0.143) for each indicator, with a value of 143 points.

The indicator of the media and diversity of content for freedom of the press in the West Bank declined in 2023 by (4) points, reaching (420) points in 2023 compared to (424) points in 2022, compared to (436) points in 2020, and (435) points. In the year 2019, with a

decline of (58) points between 2023 and 2018, amounting to (478) points.

At the level of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) for the years 2018 and 2022, there was a decline in the field of media and the diversity of content for freedom of the press in Palestine by (30) points. It reached (417) points in 2022 compared to (447) points in 2020, to (455) points in 2019, and compared to (481) points in 2018. We note that the largest decline was in the Gaza Strip, by (63) points from (406) points in year 2022 compared to (470) points in the year 2020, and also a decline from (479) points in the year 2019, and a decline of (84) points from the year 2018, which amounted to (490) points.



This change is explained by the low percentage of achieving four indicators below 50%, which are:

- A decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the existence of monopoly on obtaining information with a number of media outlets and influential people) in the West Bank from 54.4% in 2018 to a percentage of achieving 34.2% in 2022, to 30.1% in 2023. A decline is also noted in the percentage of achieving the indicator in Gaza Strip from 50.0% in 2018 to 26.6% in 2022.

- The indicator (diversity in sources, information and content related to corruption and or waste of public money) at the level of the West Bank for the year 2023 achieved a rate of 29.6%, while at the level of Palestine in 2022 an achievement rate of 32.5%, and this percentage in the Gaza Strip reached 34.7%, While in the West Bank, it reached 31.4% during the year 2022.
- The indicator (the presence of various media coverage of issues related to corruption and/or waste of public money) at the level of Palestine received an achievement rate of 34.3%, and this percentage in the West Bank reached 34.4% in 2022, and 28.3% in 2023, while in the Gaza Strip Gaza 34.3%, during the year 2022.
- The indicator (availability of Internet use at low cost and appropriate quality) reached 31.2% in the West Bank for the year.

Only two indicators had an achievement rate between 58.7% and 65.7%:


- They are the indicator (the existence of a monopoly in providing internet and/or communication services) and the indicator (the lack of consideration that the available laws allow the concentration of monopolies and joint ownership of the media).


## 2.5 Government and Self-censorship:

The government and self-censorship field was measured based on 8 indicators, with a relative weight of (0.125) for each indicator and a value of 125 points.

An increase of (14) points was recorded in the government and self-censorship field in the West Bank in 2023, where the field in 2023 reached (357) points compared to (343) points in the year 2022, and a decline of (226) points from the highest amount that occurred. The index reached 583 points in 2020.

At the level of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) for the years 2018 and 2022, there was a recorded decline of (207) points in the scale of the government and self-censorship field, as it reached (339) in 2022 compared to (546) points in the year 2020, after reaching (546) points in 2020, (501) points in 2019, and (515) points in 2018.





This is due to the fact that all 8 field indicators achieved an index achievement percentage of less than 50% at the level of the West Bank for the year 2023:

- A decline in 7 indicators in the West Bank for the year 2023 compared to 2022 out of 8 indicators, the most prominent of which is the indicator (imposing editorial control in the media over published issues) from 38.9% in 2022 to 27.9% in 2023, and the indicator (publishing and canceling news on websites) from 47.8% in 2022 to 40.1% in 2023.
- The lowest indicator is (using alternative symbols and words on social media sites in order to avoid banning and/or deletion of the post by these sites), from 17.2% in 2022 to 13.1% in 2023, which indicates that there is a significant use of alternative words and symbols. In each of the West Bank, 13.1% in 2023 and 13.8% in the Gaza Strip in 2022. This is followed by the indicator (governmental censorship measures for publishing and/or publications hinder freedom of the media) at the level of Palestine for the year 2022, with a rate of 18.1%, and also the indicator (media abstention about publishing press materials for fear of being subjected to prosecution by public authorities) with an investigation rate of 30.0%.
- A noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (imposing editorial control in the media on issues published through it) at the level of Palestine, as we notice a noticeable decrease from 58.4% during the year 2020 to 38.6% in 2022, and a noticeable decrease in the West Bank from 57.6% in 2020 to the percentage of achieving the indicator is 38.9% in 2022 and 27.9% in 2023. It is also noted that there is a noticeable decrease in the rate of achieving the index in the Gaza Strip from 60% in 2020 to 37.9% in 2022.
- A noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (media abstention from publishing press materials for fear of being subjected to prosecution by public authorities) at the level of Palestine, as we notice a noticeable decrease from 68.0% during the year 2020 to 30.0% in 2022, and a noticeable decrease in the West Bank from 72.8% in 2020. The achievement rate reached 31.4% in 2022 and 27.2% in 2023, and also in the Gaza Strip from 65.6% in 2020 to 27.0% in 2022.
- A noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (retracting of news and articles after they have been published on websites) at the level of Palestine, as we notice a noticeable decrease from 64.8% during the year 2020 to 48.3% in 2022,

and a decline in the West Bank from 65.6% in 2020 to a percentage of achieving 47.8% in 2022 to 40.1% in 2023, and a noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 64% in 2020 to 49.2% in 2022.

- A noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (journalists exposed to family or social pressure due to published information) in the West Bank from 60.8% in 2020 to a percentage of achieving 40.5% in 2022 to 36.6% in 2023. A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator is also noted in the Gaza Strip from 48.8% in 2020 to 33.1% in 2022. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, as we notice a decrease from 56.8% during the year 2020 to 38.1% in 2022.
- A noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (there are no blacklists of (people and/or institutions) that are prevented from appearing on various media outlets or some of them) at the level of Palestine, as we notice a noticeable decrease from 56.0% during the year 2020 to 39.5% in 2022, a decrease at the level of the West Bank, from 61.6% in 2020 to an achievement rate of 36.3% in 2022 to 32.9% in 2023. A slight decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is also noted, from 46.4% in 2020 to 46.3% in 2022.
- A noticeable decline in the percentage of achieving the index (government regulatory measures for publishing and/or publications hinder freedom of the media) in the West Bank from 60% in 2020 to a percentage of achieving 21.4% in 2022 to 33.3% in 2023. A sharp decline is also noted in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the sector Gaza from 36% in 2020 to 8.3% in 2022. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a noticeable decline from 54.4% during the year 2020 to 18.1% in 2022.


## 2.6 Financing Policies:

The financing policies field was measured based on 9 indicators, with a relative weight of (0.111) for each indicator, with a value of 111 points.

An increase of (25) points was recorded in the scale of funding policies for journalism in the West Bank in 2023, as the field in 2023 reached (321) compared to (296) points in the year 2022, while a decline of (193) points was recorded compared to the highest amount that the field achieved which was (515) points in the year 2020.

At the level of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) for the years 2018 and 2022, there was a recorded decline of (220) points in the scale of financing policies for journalism in Palestine, by (296) in 2022 compared to the highest value of (516) points in the year 2020. While it reached (433) points in 2019, and (457) points in 2018, in addition to an increase that was recorded in the Gaza Strip, reaching (75) points between 2020 and 2019.

## Financing Policies According to Area 2018 -2023



This decrease at the level of the West Bank for the year 2023 is due to 7 out of 9 indicators achieving an achievement rate of less than 50.0% of the index points for this field in 2023, which are:

- A fair decline in (government financial support for the media on the basis of market share or advertising market share), as the percentage reached 9.5% in the West Bank in 2023 compared to 15.7% in 2022, while in Palestine in 2022 the percentage reached 20.2% and 33.4% in the Gaza Strip.
- The indicator (wage levels for journalists and other media professionals) decreased at the level of the West Bank from 16.8% in 2022 to 11.9% in 2023, and it is also low in Palestine in 2022 by 16.2%, including 16.8% in the West Bank and 15.2% in Gaza Strip in 2022.
- A decline in (the budgets allocated for government advertisements in the media in a fair manner) across the West Bank from 12.9% in 2022 to 11.9% in 2023, while the percentage reached 14.9% in Palestine in 2022 and 20.9% in the Gaza Strip.
- A slight increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (imposing high fees in

exchange for obtaining frequencies and/or registering newspapers and/or websites) in the West Bank from 31.5% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 32.5% in 2023. A noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator is also noted in Gaza Strip: 25.0% in 2022. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a noticeable decrease from 29.8% in 2022.

- The indicator (the presence of restrictions on funding and/or foreign support for the media) achieved a percentage of 42.9% in the West Bank in 2023 compared to 24.3% in 2022 and 12.5% in the Gaza Strip in 2022, which led to a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine to 21.3% in 2022.
- The indicator (exerting pressure on journalists by reducing salaries and/or terminating employee contracts) received an achievement percentage of 34.0% at the level of the West Bank in the year 2023, while the indicator obtained an achievement percentage of 36.1% at the level of Palestine, and 37.5. % in the Gaza Strip in 2022.
- A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (imposing an added tax on the purchase of paper and/or newsprint, or broadcasting equipment, and other media equipment) in the West Bank from 29.7% in 2020 to a percentage of achieving 27.2% in 2022, to a percentage of achieving 40.5% in 2023, as well. There is a noticeable decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 50.5% in 2020 to 20.9% in 2022. The same applies to the rate of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a noticeable decline from 35.1% during the year 2020 to 25.6% in 2022.

Two indicators with a percentage of achieving the indicator exceeding 50% in the West Bank for the year 2023 are:

- Indicator (the presence of bribery for journalists from active parties to influence the news content in their media work) with an achievement percentage of 56.0% in the West Bank in 2023 compared to 55.6% in 2022.
- Indicator (the presence of the use of advertisements as a means of pressure to influence editors' decisions) achieved by 50.1% in the West Bank, in 2023.


## **2.7 Transparency and Access to Information:**

The transparency and access to information field was measured based on 8 indicators, with a relative weight of (0.125) for each indicator and a value of 125 points.

The field index in the West Bank declined by (5) points between 2022 and 2023 from (370) points to (365) points, and by (128) points between 2019 and 2023 from (365) points to compared to the highest value reached (493) points in 2019.

There was a significant decline in the field of transparency and access to information in Palestine in 2022, by (89) points. In the year 2022, it reached (365) points compared to the year 2020, which achieved (454) points in 2020, and a further decline of (36) compared to (490) points in 2019, and another decline of (11) compared to (465) points in 2018. In addition, there was a further decline in the Gaza Strip by (112) points, between 2020 and 2022, from (317) points to (429) points.

## Transparency and Access to Information According to Area 2018 -2023



On the other hand, the indicator (the existence of a law guaranteeing the right to obtain information) remained constant at (0) points in the West Bank over the five years 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022, and 2023.

- Also, there was a decrease in the achievement of the indicator (the existence of laws and legislation that allow journalists to access information) in the West Bank from 30.6% in 2022 to an achievement rate of 26.3% in 2023, but we notice an increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine in the percentage of achieving the indicator from 20% during the year 2020 to 26.6% in 2022, while we notice a decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 16.8% in 2020 to 0% in 2022.
- A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (clarity of restrictions imposed on access to information) in the West Bank from 41.5% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 39.7% in 2023. A decline is also noted in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 44.8% in 2020 to 42.9%. In 2022, the same applies

to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, as we notice a significant decline from 50.4% during the year 2020 to 42.0% in 2022.

- A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the contribution of the presence of official media spokesmen to providing information necessary for journalistic work) in the West Bank from 46.6% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 44.0% in 2023. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a decrease from 64.8. % during the year 2020 to 48.8% in 2022, and a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 69.6% in 2020 to 53.1% in 2022.
- A noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (allowing journalists to accompany the security services on field missions) in the West Bank from 29.4% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 23.5% in 2023. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a noticeable decrease from 51.2. % during the year 2020 to 31.1% in 2022, and a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 44% in 2020 to 34.4% in 2022.
- A noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (not being subjected to direct or indirect pressure to reveal sources of information obtained and published) in the West Bank from 47.2% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 44.7% in 2023, and the same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine. We notice a noticeable decrease from 74.4% during the year 2020 to 45.8% in 2022. We also notice a sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 76% in 2020 to 42.9% in 2022.
- As for the indicator (feeling that there is a violation of the privacy of journalists by public authorities) in the West Bank, there was a decrease from 51.2% during the year 2020 to 41.2% during the year 2023, as the indicator decreased at the level of Palestine from 51.2% during the year 2020 to 40.8% during the year 2022, at a varying percentage for each of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, at 42.0% and 38.4%, respectively.


## **2.8 Self-regulation and Protection of Journalists:**

The self-regulation and protection of journalists field was measured based on 11 indicators, with a relative weight of (0.0909) for each indicator and a value of 90 points.

It was noted that there was a significant decline in the field of self-regulation of journalists in the West Bank for the year 2023, with a decrease of (31) points from (401) points in 2022 to (370) points in 2023, and a decrease of (248) points from the highest amount (618) points the field reached in 2018.

It was noted that there was a significant decline in the field of self-regulation for journalists in Palestine, with a decrease of (122) points from (529) points in 2020 to (407) points in 2022, and a decrease of (174) points from 2019, which scored (581) a point, with a greater decline of (218) compared to the year 2019, which amounted to (588) points. While a decline was recorded in the Gaza Strip from (523) points in 2020 to (417) points in 2022, by (106) points, and a decline of (149) points compared to (566) points in 2019.

## Self-regulation and Protection of Journalists According to Area 2018 -2023



The results showed a clear decline in the percentage of achieving all indicators with an achievement percentage less than 50.0% in the West Bank for the year 2023 and 10 indicators at the Palestine level for the year 2022.

- A clear decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the syndicate representing journalists is characterized by professionalism and independence at work) in the West Bank from 33.1% in 2022 to an achievement percentage of 22.2% in 2023.
- A significant decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (independence of representative bodies of media workers from the influence of the government and political parties) in the West Bank from 25.5% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 24.9% in 2023.
- A significant decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (involvement of

the syndicate of media workers in policy-making and public directions) in the West Bank from 31.3% for the year 2022 to 30.9% for the year 2023.

- A clear decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (not dismissing employees from the media due to protests by declared parties against their journalistic work) at the level of Palestine, as we notice a clear decrease from 65.9% during the year 2020 to 42.9% in 2022, as it decreased in the West Bank from 64.8 % in 2020 to an achievement rate of 46.4% in 2023. It is also noted that a clear decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 65.9% in 2020 to 45.5% in 2022.
- A slight increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (implementing regular periodic elections in the representative body of journalists (the syndicate) at the level of the West Bank, as it rose from 36.8% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 39.4% in 2023, also, at the level of Palestine from 37.4% during the year 2020 to 36.0 % in 2022.
- The index (degree of the syndicate representation of workers in the media) in the West Bank in 2022 reached 41.1% in 2023, compared to 42.6% in 2022, compared to 47.8% in the Gaza Strip in 2022.
- The indicator (considering the procedures for affiliation and membership in the syndicate for media workers are acceptable and professional) in the West Bank reached 41.1% in 2023, compared to 51.9% during the year 2022, compared to 46.0% in the Gaza Strip in 2022.
- A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (encouraging the access of women to decision-making positions in media institutions and representative institutions for journalists) in the West Bank from 49.3% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 43.7% in 2023. We note that the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine is a decrease from 53.8% during the year 2020 to 51.4% in 2022, while there is an increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 52.7% in 2020 to 55.5% in 2022.


### » **3. Comparative Findings of Indicators of Fields over the Years 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022:**

#### **3.1 Legal Safeguards for Freedom of the Press:**


3.1.1 There is stability in the indicator (the presence of guarantees by the Basic Law for freedom of the press), during the years 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2022, as this indicator was measured based on the legal aspect form, where the percentage of the indicator's achievement score in Palestine reached 100%, for both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The results of the open answer unanimously agreed on the existence of guarantees by the Basic Law for freedom of the press, which guarantees freedom of opinion and expression, the freedom to establish media stations and not to close them except by a judicial decision, and also guarantees personal freedom and equality before the law.

The Basic Law provides constitutional protection rules; it guaranteed the establishment of newspapers and other media outlets and made them a right for all, as well as the freedom of the visual, audio and written media, the freedom of printing, publishing, distribution and broadcasting, the freedom of those working in them, the prohibition of censorship of the media, and the inadmissibility of warning, stopping, confiscating, canceling or


imposing restrictions on them, except in accordance with the law and pursuant to a judicial ruling. This is in accordance with Article 27 thereof.




3.1.2 The percentage of achieving the indicator in Palestine was 0%, resulting from the presence of a consensus in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip regarding the lack of compatibility of national legislation after the State of Palestine signed the international conventions guaranteeing freedom of the press, as these institutions unanimously agreed that national legislation had not been compatible after the State of Palestine signed the international conventions guaranteeing freedom of the press, this indicator received 0% of the percentage score for achieving the indicator over the four years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022.




3.1.3 The percentage of achieving the indicator (availability of judicial guarantees in the Palestinian courts that protect freedom of the press) in the West Bank during the year 2023 decreased to 48.7%, while in the year 2022 it was about 63.0%. It is noted that this indicator in Palestine for the years 2018 and 2022 has increased from 40.0% in the year 2018. Compared to 52.0% in the year 2022, this increase is due to a significant increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the West Bank from 41.0% in the year 2018 to 63.0% in the year 2022, while this percentage in the Gaza Strip was equal in the years 2018 and 2020, reaching about 38.0%.




3.1.4 The percentage of achieving the indicator (the presence of legal texts criminalizing government officials' incitement against the media) in Palestine was 0.0%, and this is a result of the presence of a consensus in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the absence of legal texts criminalizing government officials' incitement against the media. So, this indicator received 0.0% of the percentage score for achieving the indicator over the four years 2018, 2019, 2020, 2022, and also in the West Bank for the year 2023.




3.1.5 There is stability in the percentage of the indicator's score at 50.0% in Palestine for the indicator (the presence of legal texts that impose restrictions on dealing with ethnic, religious, national security, or sensitive issues such as children and gender), during the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022, and also in the West Bank for the year 2023, as this indicator was measured based on the legal aspect form, where the percentage of achieving the indicator was 50.0% for both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The results of the answer were unanimous in the option: "There are such restrictions, but in a limited manner."



3.1.3 The results showed a decrease in the percentage of (procedures and instructions allowing journalists freedom of movement during the imposition of a state of emergency and closures) in the West Bank from 80.0% in the year 2020 to 30.3% in the year 2023. The indicator also decreased at the level of Palestine in the year 2022 compared to 2020 from 64.8% in 2020 to 50.0% in 2022, while it increased in the Gaza Strip from 37.6% during the year 2020 to 52.0% for the year 2022. This means that the application of the measures in the West Bank for the year 2022 was eased, while in the Gaza Strip these measures were tightened compared to 2020.



3.1.4 The results show that the indicator (considering the presence of the cybercrime law has enhanced freedom of the press) in the West Bank has seen a slight increase in percentage from 20.0% in the year 2020 to 21.4% in the year 2023, and that there has been an increase in the percentage to achieve the indicator to 30.0% at the level of Palestine for the year 2022, while in 2020 it was about 21.6%, and closely between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, where these percentages for the year 2022 reached about 28.0% in the West Bank, and 33.0% in the Gaza Strip. It is considered that the existence of the law has led to somewhat positive results and that it has strengthened the freedom of the press, but to a small extent.




3.1.5 The results indicated an increase in the indicator (behavioral or legal rules that media workers receive bribes to influence their work) in the West Bank in the year 2023 by 78.9%, while in the year 2020 it was about 50.4%, while there was a decrease in this indicator at the level of Palestine during in 2022, it was 38.0%, compared to 50.4% during the year 2020. The percentage also decreased in the Gaza Strip in the year 2022 compared to the year 2020, where it reached about 50.4% in the year 2020 and 33.0% in the year 2022.




### 3.2 Legal and Social Restrictions on the Freedom of the Press:

Below is a presentation of the results for each indicator:

3.2.1 There has been consistency in the percentage of achieving the indicator (not imposing high civil fines on journalists after they were convicted of committing the crime of slander, libel, and defamation), at 100% for both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where the number of cases was found to be (0).



3.2.2 The percentage of achieving the indicator was 0.0% at the level of Palestine during the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022 (due to the presence of cases of arrests of journalists and/or media workers)<sup>6</sup>, despite a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the West Bank from 61.0%, in 2020 and the achievement percentage reached 0.0% in 2022, and it increased to 20% in 2023, as 8 cases were documented. According to the methodology, 10% is subtracted for each person, with a maximum of 10 people. Since the number of cases is 8, 80% is subtracted from the indicator achievement percentage, so the indicator achievement percentage is 20.0. %, while during the years 2018 - 2022 it was found that in the Gaza Strip the percentage of achieving the indicator increased from 0.0% in 2020 to 100.0% during the year 2022, which affected the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, as there are still cases of arrests of journalists and/or media workers in the Gaza Strip. As for the West Bank, no arrests were documented during the year 2022. (the West Bank has 10 cases and there are no cases in the Gaza Strip). Thus, the total is 10 cases and according to the methodology, subtract 10% for each person, up to a maximum of 10 people, so the percentage of achieving the indicator is 0.0%.



3.2.3 Stability in the percentage of achieving an indicator of 0.0% at the level of Palestine (due to the presence of cases of summons and investigation against journalists and/or media workers) due to the fact that there are still procedures for summoning and investigation against journalists and/or media workers, where the number reached 7 cases in the West Bank in 2023 (thus, the percentage of achieving the indicator was 30%), while in 2022 it was found that in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the number of summonses and investigation cases reached (12) cases, distributed into (9) cases in the West Bank, and (3) cases in the Gaza Strip. According to the mechanism for calculating the percentage of the indicator achievement score by subtracting 10% for each summons and investigation

6 The indicator was used based on data monitored by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms - MADA.

case, the indicator at the Palestine level obtained 0% during the four years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2022. (The West Bank has 9 cases and 3 cases in the Gaza Strip, so the total is greater from 10 cases, and according to the methodology, 10% is subtracted for each person, with a maximum of 10 people, so the percentage of achieving the indicator is 0.0%.




3.2.4 We decrease the indicator (there are no cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers). There are still cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers, as the number reached 4 cases in the West Bank in 2023 (thus, the percentage of achieving the indicator is 60%), a decrease from the year 2022, as the number of cases reached 3, with an achievement percentage of 70.0%, while there was one case in 2020, with a percentage of achieving 90.0%. As for the level of Palestine, the percentage of the indicator reached 70% during the years 2020 and 2022, and according to the calculation mechanism the percentage score for achieving the indicator is subtracted by subtracting 10% for each case of torture, with a difference in the percentage between the West Bank of 70%, compared to 100% in the Gaza Strip, where the number of cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers was ( 3) Cases in the West Bank, and no cases in the Gaza Strip.




3.2.5 The indicator (the number of physical attacks against journalists and/or media workers) increased<sup>7</sup>. There are still physical attacks against journalists and/or media workers, as the number reached 9 cases in the West Bank in 2023 (thus, the percentage of achieving the indicator is 10%) with a decline for the year 2022, the number of cases reached 5, with a success rate of 50.0%, while there was one case in 2020, with a success rate of 90.0%. While we find that the indicator reached 30.0% at the level of Palestine in 2022, while in 2018 it was about 78.0%.


<sup>7</sup> The indicator was used based on data monitored by the Palestinian Center for Development and Media Freedoms - MADA.




3.2.6 The results show that the indicator (imposing restrictions or preventing journalists from covering public events and carrying out their journalistic work) decreased at the level of the West Bank in the year 2023, as in 2020 it was about 55.0%, while in the year 2023 it reached 33.0%, and this indicator at the level of Palestine reached 37.0% in the year 2022, while it was 54.0% during the year 2020, with a difference between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as the percentage of achieving the indicator reached 40.0% in the West Bank, while this percentage reached 35.0% in the Gaza Strip.




3.2.7 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (not being subjected to the confiscation and/or destruction of my equipment and/or journalistic materials due to my journalistic work) in the West Bank, as we note that it was 60.0% in the year 2023, while in the year 2018 it was about 78.0%, as well. It also decreased at the level of Palestine, as we notice a decrease from 83% during the year 2020 to 72% in 2022, and a decrease is also observed in the Gaza Strip from 83.0% in 2020 to 66.0% in 2022.




3.2.8 The results indicated a decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the official authorities conduct an investigation into the submitted complaint) in the West Bank from 27.0% in 2020 to a percentage of achieving 21.0% in 2023. As for Palestine, the indicator increased from 23.0% for the year 2020 to 28.0% in the year 2022. There is also a sharp increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 14% in 2020 to 33% in 2022, making a slight increase in the indicator at the Palestine level from 23.0% in 2020 to 28.0% in 2022.




3.2.9 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (compensation by public authorities for the material damage caused due to the attack on my equipment) at the level of the West Bank from 19.0% in 2018 to 0.0% during the year 2023. Also, at the level of Palestine we notice a decrease from 12% during the year 2019 To 3% in 2022, while in the Gaza Strip, the percentage of achieving the indicator decreased from 11% in 2018 to 0% in 2022.




3.2.10 An increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the official authorities conduct an investigation into the submitted complaint) at the level of the West Bank from 10.0% for the year 2018 to 16.0% for the year 2023, while at the level of Palestine we notice a decrease from 13.0% during the year 2018 to 11% in 2022. This is due to the decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the West Bank, as it decreased in the West Bank from 38.0% in 2020 to a percentage of achieving 6.0% in 2022, while in the Gaza Strip, the percentage of achieving the indicator decreased from 25% in 2020 to 22% in 2022.



3.2.11 A slight increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (not systematically prosecuting or imprisoning journalists or media owners as a result of writings and/or broadcasting) in the West Bank from 51.0% in 2020 to 53.0% in 2023, and thus the percentage of the indicator at the level of Palestine increased from 51.0 % for the year 2020 to 55.0% in 2022, as this indicator was measured based on the legal aspect form, where the percentage of the indicator achieving the weighted points reached 59.0% in the West Bank and 34.0% in the Gaza Strip for the year 2022. The results of the answer to the “Yes greatly, and yes limitedly”.




3.2.12 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (there is no widespread and arbitrary distortion, incitement, or defamation against journalists via the Internet due to their publishing sensitive reports) in the West Bank from 39.0% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 38.0% in 2023. The percentage of this indicator also decreased at the level of Palestine as it ranged from 59.0% in 2020 to 39.0% in 2022. A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is also noted from 61% in 2020 to 40% in 2022.



3.2.13 A slight increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (not taking restrictive measures by the official authority, such as closing or blocking media outlets) at the level of the West Bank, from 64.0% in 2022 to 66.0% for the year 2023, and at the level of Palestine, we notice a decrease from 75.0% during the year. 2018 to 60.0% in 2022, and a decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 75.0% in 2018 to 34.0% in 2022.




3.2.14 The indicator percentage (imposing restrictions on obtaining and/or transferring information as a result of the state of emergency) in the West Bank decreased from 48.0% in 2020 to 32.0% in 2023, and at the level of Palestine it decreased from 49% in 2020 to 39.0% in 2022. This decrease in the West Bank from 48.0% for the year 2020 to 40% for the year 2022, and the Gaza Strip from 52.0% for the year 2020 to 37.0% for the year 2022.




### 3.3 Operational Independence of the Media:

Below is a presentation of the results for each indicator:


3.3.1 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (not considering that the laws related to media licensing are biased towards government control over these media), in the West Bank from 58.0% in 2020 to a percentage of achieving 31.6% in 2023, while in the Gaza Strip the percentage of achieving the indicator increased from 48.3% in 2020 to 50.0% in 2022, which affected the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine during the year 2022, dropping to 45.2% in 2022, while in 2020 it was about 53.8%.




3.3.2 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (not considering that licensing laws allow government control over the media) in the West Bank from 62.2% in 2020 to a percentage of achieving 30.9% in 2023, while in the Gaza Strip the percentage of achieving the indicator decreased from 50.3% in 2020 to 33.3% in 2022. We notice a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine during the year 2022 to reach 38.3% compared to what it was in the year 2020, with an achievement rate of 58.0%.




3.3.3 A very slight decline in the rate of achieving the indicator (considering the lack of dominance of state-owned media over the country's news and information system) in the West Bank from 40.6% in 2020 to a rate of achieving 40.4% in 2022, while in the Gaza Strip the rate of achieving the indicator declined from 37.8% in 2020 to 36.4% in 2022. Therefore, we notice a slight decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine during the year 2020 from 39.2% to 39.1% in 2022.




3.3.4 An increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (official media outlets enjoy editorial independence and cover news from all segments of the population) in the West Bank from 24.3% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 26.6% in 2023. However, we notice a sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a sharp decline from 69.2% during the year 2020 to 25.1% in 2022. Also in the Gaza Strip, we notice a sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator from 66.4% in 2020 to 26.8% in 2022.




3.3.5 A sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator (clarity of media ownership procedures and providing the opportunity to establish media outlets without political discrimination) in the West Bank from 47.1% in 2022 to an achievement rate of 23.8% in 2023, and we notice a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine from 68.5% during the year 2020 to 53.2% in 2022. While we notice an increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 58.7% in 2020 to 70.8% in 2022.



3.3.6 A slight increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the presence of diversity in media in terms of ownership) in the West Bank from 43.4% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 45.8% in 2023, and a very slight decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a decline from 48.3% during the year 2020 to 48.2% in 2022. While we notice an increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 51.7% in 2020 to 58.0% in 2022.




3.3.7 A decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator (not concealing the ownership of official positions for the media and intentionally concealing their connection to these media) in the West Bank from 46.8% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 45.8% in 2023. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a decrease from 49 % during the year 2020 to 43.7% in 2022. We also notice a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 44.8% in 2020 to 37.5% in 2022.




### 3.4 The Media and Diversity of Content:

Below is a presentation of the results for each indicator:


3.4.1 A decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator (there is a monopoly on obtaining information with a number of media outlets and influential people) in the West Bank from 34.2% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 30.1% in 2023. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the index at the level of Palestine, where we notice a decline from 33.6% during the year 2020 to 31.7% in 2022. There is also a decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 29.4% in 2020 to 26.6% in 2022.




3.4.2 An increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the state's provision of laws that allow the concentration of monopolies and joint ownership of the media) in the West Bank from 55.5% in 2022 to a rate of achieving 65.7% in 2023. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice an increase from 54.5% during the year 2020 to 57.1% in 2022, an increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is also noted from 53.8% in 2020 to 66.6% in 2022.




3.4.3 An increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the existence of a monopoly in providing internet and/or communication services) in the West Bank from 56.3% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 73% in 2023. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a noticeable increase from 42.7% during the year 2020 to 54.2% in 2022, a slight increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 47.6% in 2020 to 50.0% in 2022.




3.4.4 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (making Internet use accessible to all at a low cost) in the West Bank from 35.0% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 31.2% in 2023. We notice that there is an increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, as we notice a noticeable increase from 29.4% during the year 2020 to 34.4% in 2022, while there is a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 35.7% in 2020 to 34.7% in 2022.




3.4.5 There was no change in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the government uses licensing of media ownership and frequencies as a means of pressure on independent media) in the West Bank for the years 2022 and 2023, as the percentage reached about 50.0% during the two years. However, we notice a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine from 65% during the year 2020 to 46.8% in 2022, and a noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 67.8% in 2020 to 37.5% in 2022.



3.4.6 There was a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (diversity in sources, information, and content related to corruption or waste of public money) in the West Bank from 49.7% during the year 2020 to 29.6% during the year 2023. There was also a decrease at the level of Palestine in the achievement percentage of 32.5%, and this amounted to the percentage in the Gaza Strip is 34.7%.




3.4.7 There was a decrease in the percentage of the indicator (the presence of various media coverage of issues related to corruption and/or waste of public money) in the West Bank from 34.4% during the year 2022 to 28.3% during the year 2023, but at the level of Palestine the percentage of the indicator increased from 33.6% during the year 2020 to 34.3% in 2022, and it increased in the Gaza Strip from 32.2% during 2020 to 34.3% during 2022.




### 3.5 Government and Self-censorship:

This indicator was measured based on the questionnaire's questions related to tools for monitoring journalistic work, which are:

3.5.1 A noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (imposing editorial control in the media on issues published through it) in the West Bank from 38.9% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 27.9% in 2023. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a noticeable decrease from 58.4% during the year 2020 to 38.6% in 2022, and a noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 60% in 2020 to 37.9% in 2022.




3.5.2 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the media abstaining from publishing press materials for fear of being subjected to prosecution by public authorities) in the West Bank from 31.4% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 27.2% in 2023. There was also a sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a noticeable decrease from 68.0% during the year 2020 to 30.0% in 2022, and a noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 65.6% in 2020 to 27.0% in 2022.




3.5.3 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (withdrawal of news and articles after they have been published on websites) in the West Bank from 47.8% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 40.1% in 2023. There was a sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a noticeable decrease from 64.8% during the year 2020 to 48.3% in 2022, a noticeable decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 64% in 2020 to 49.2% in 2022.




3.5.4 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (journalists exposed to family or social pressure due to published information) in the West Bank from 40.5% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 36.6% in 2023. There was a sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a decrease from 56.8% during the year 2020 to 38.1% in 2022, a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is also noted from 48.8% in 2020 to 33.1% in 2022.



3.5.5 A noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (a book was subjected to official or societal threats due to publication) in the West Bank from 40.7% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 38.7% in 2023. As for the level of Palestine, we notice a decrease from 57.6% during the year 2020 to 42.6% in the year 2022. There is also a stability in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 46.8 for both 2020 and 2022.




3.5.6 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the presence of blacklists of (people and/or institutions) that are prevented from appearing on various media outlets or some of them) in the West Bank from 36.3% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 32.9% in 2023, and the same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator. At the level of Palestine, we notice a decrease from 56.0% during the year 2020 to 39.5% in 2022. We also notice a slight decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 46.4% in 2020 to 46.3% in 2022.



3.5.7 An increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (government regulatory measures for publishing and/or publications hinder freedom of the media) in the West Bank from 21.4% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 33.3% in 2023. However, we notice a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a noticeable decrease from 54.4% during the year 2020 to 18.1% in 2022, and a sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 36% in 2020 to 8.3% in 2022.




3.5.8 There was a decrease in the indicator (using alternative symbols and words on social media sites in order to avoid banning and/or deletion of the post by these sites) from an achievement rate of 24.0% during the year 2020 to 13.1% during the year 2023, and the indicator also decreased from 20.8% during the year 2020 to 16.1% during the year 2022 at the level of Palestine, which indicates that there is a significant use of alternative words and symbols on social media sites in order to avoid banning and/or deletion of the post by these sites, and it decreased in the Gaza Strip by achieving an indicator of 13.8% compared to 17.2% in the West Bank.




### 3.6 Financing Policies:


3.6.1 An increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (charging high fees in exchange for obtaining a radio frequency or registering a newspaper) in the West Bank from 31.5% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 32.5% in 2023. There was a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a decrease from 42.3% during the year 2020 to 29.8% in 2022. There is also a sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 40.5% in 2020 to 31.5% in 2022.




3.6.2 An increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (imposing an added tax on the purchase of paper and/or newsprint, broadcasting equipment, and other media equipment) in the West Bank from 27.2% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 40.5% in 2023, and there was a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a noticeable decrease from 35.1% during the year 2020 to 25.6% in 2022. We also notice a noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 50.5% in 2020 to 20.9% in 2022.




3.6.3 A noticeable increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the presence of restrictions on funding and/or foreign support for the media) in the West Bank from 24.3% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 42.9% in 2023, and a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a noticeable decrease from 63.1. % during the year 2020 to 21.3% in 2022, and a noticeable decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 59.5% in 2020 to 12.5% in 2022.




3.6.4 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (government financial support for the media in a fair manner based on market share or of the advertising market) in the West Bank from 15.7% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 9.5% in 2023. We notice a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, as there is a noticeable decrease from 28.8% during the year 2020 to 20.2% in 2022, while an increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 17.1% in 2020 to 33.4% in 2022.




3.6.5 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (allocating budgets for government advertisements in the media in a fair manner) in the West Bank from 12.9% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 11.9% in 2023. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a sharp decline from 27% during the year 2020 to 14.9% in 2022. Also, a slight decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 22.5% in 2020 to 20.9% in 2022.




3.6.6 An increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (using advertisements as a means of pressure to influence editors' decisions) in the West Bank from 47.2% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 50.1% in 2023. The percentage of achieving the indicator decreased at the level of Palestine, as we notice a noticeable decrease from 69.4% during the year 2020 to 46.9% in 2022, and a noticeable decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 77.5% in 2020 to 47.2% in 2022.



3.6.7 A slight increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the presence of bribery for journalists from actors to influence the news content in their media work) in the West Bank from 55.6% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 56.0% in 2023, and a sharp decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine. We notice a decrease from 86.5% during the year 2020 to 56.1% in 2022, and we also notice a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 85.6% in 2020 to 57.2% in 2022.



3.6.8 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (wage sufficiency) in the West Bank from 16.8% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 11.9% in 2023. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a sharp decline from 57.7% during the year 2020 to 16.2% in 2022, and a sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 58.6% in 2020 to 15.2% in 2022.



3.6.9 There was a decrease in the indicator (have you and/or any of your colleagues/colleagues in the institution in which you work been subjected to a salary reduction and/or termination) in the West Bank by 56.8% during the year 2020 to 34.0% during the year 2023, and the indicator obtained an achievement percentage 36.1% at the Palestine level, which indicates the presence of reductions in salaries and/or termination of employment, with a low achievement percentage for the indicator amounting to 37.5% in the Gaza Strip compared to 35.4% in the West Bank.



### 3.7 Transparency and Access to Information:


3.7.1 The indicator (the existence of a law guaranteeing the right to obtain information) still received (0) points in Palestine over the four years 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2022, where the points in the West Bank reached (0) points and in the Gaza Strip (0) points for the same years. The results of the answer were unanimous that there is no law guaranteeing the right to obtain information.




3.7.2 A decrease in the achievement of the indicator (the presence of laws and legislation that allow journalists to access information) in the West Bank from 30.6% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 26.3% in 2023, but we notice an increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice that the percentage went from 20% during the year 2020 to 26.6% in 2022, and we notice a decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 16.8% in 2020 to 0% in 2022.




3.7.3 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (clarity of restrictions imposed on access to information) in the West Bank from 41.5% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 39.7% in 2023. A decline is also noticed in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 44.8% in 2020 to 42.9% in 2022. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, as we notice a significant decline from 50.4% during the year 2020 to 42.0% in 2022.




3.7.4 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the contribution of the presence of official media spokesmen to providing information necessary for journalistic work) in the West Bank from 46.6% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 44.0% in 2023. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, as we notice there is a decrease from 64.8% during the year 2020 to 48.8% in 2022. A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is also noted from 69.6% in 2020 to 53.1% in 2022.




3.7.5 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (allowing journalists to accompany security services on field missions) in the West Bank from 29.4% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 23.5% in 2023. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a noticeable decrease from 51.2% during the year 2020 to 31.1% in 2022, and a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip is noted from 44% in 2020 to 34.4% in 2022.




3.7.6 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (not being subjected to direct or indirect pressure to disclose sources of information obtained and published) in the West Bank from 47.2% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 44.7% in 2023, and the same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a noticeable decrease from 74.4% during the year 2020 to 45.8% in 2022. We also notice a sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 76% in 2020 to 42.9% in 2022.



3.7.7 As for the indicator (feeling that there is a violation of the privacy of journalists by public authorities) in the West Bank, there was a decrease from 51.2% during the year 2020 to 41.2% during the year 2023, as the indicator decreased at the level of Palestine from 51.2% during the year 2020. To 40.8% during the year 2022, with varying percentages for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, at 42.0% and 38.4%, respectively.




3.7.8 As for the indicator (observing the presence of public information sharing on various media outlets by government officials and competent authorities) at the level of the West Bank, there was a slight decrease from 36.2% during the year 2022 to 36.0% during the year 2023. Likewise, at the level of Palestine, it decreased from 52.0% during the year 2020 to 38.2% during the year 2022, with a varying percentage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, at 36.2% and 42.0%, respectively.




### 3.8 Self-regulation and Protection of Journalists:


3.8.1 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the existence of laws that allow journalists to form representative bodies (syndicates)) in the West Bank from 41.1% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 40.8% in 2023. The same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a sharp decline from 60.4% during the year 2020 to 44.6% in 2022. We also notice a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 57.1% in 2020 to 51.8% in 2022.




3.8.2 An increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (dismissal of employees from the media due to protests by declared parties against their journalistic work) in the West Bank from 41.5% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 46.4% in 2023, and a decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, as we note there is a clear decrease from 65.9% during the year 2020 to 42.9% in 2022, and a clear decrease is noticed in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 65.9% in 2020 to 45.5% in 2022.




3.8.3 An increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator (implementing regular periodic elections in the representative body of journalists (the syndicate)) in the West Bank from 36.8% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 39.4% in 2023. As for the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, we note that there is a slight decrease from 37.4% during the year 2020 to 36.0% in 2022. It is also noted that there is an increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 30.8% in 2020 to 34.5% in 2022.




3.8.4 A slight decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (independence of representative bodies of media workers from the influence of the government and political parties) in the West Bank from 25.5% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 24.9% in 2023, and the same applies to the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, where we notice a decrease from 27.5% during the year 2020 to 23.0% in 2022, and a sharp decline in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 29.7% in 2020 to 18.0% in 2022.




3.8.5 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (the syndicate representing journalists is characterized by professionalism and independence at work) in the West Bank from 33.1% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 22.2% in 2023, but there was an increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine, as we note There is an increase from 29.7% during the year 2020 to 33.4% in 2022. It is also noted that there is an increase in the percentage of achieving the index in the Gaza Strip from 28.6% in 2020 to 33.8% in 2022.




3.8.6 A decrease in the percentage of achieving the indicator (encouraging the access of women to decision-making positions in media institutions and representative institutions for journalists) in the West Bank from 49.3% in 2022 to a percentage of achieving 43.7% in 2023. We notice that the percentage of achieving the indicator at the level of Palestine there is a decrease from 53.8% during the year 2020 to 51.4% in 2022, while there is an increase in the percentage of achieving the indicator in the Gaza Strip from 52.7% in 2020 to 55.5% in 2022.




3.8.7 There was a decrease in the percentage of the indicator (the existence of freedom for workers in the official media to join representative bodies of journalists) in the West Bank, as it reached 41.5% during the year 2023 and 47.7% during the year 2022, and the percentage of the indicator also increased at the level of Palestine and ranged from 46.2% during the year 2022 to 48.2% for the year 2022, with a varying percentage of 47.7% in the West Bank compared to 49.2% in the Gaza Strip.




3.8.8 The indicator (the degree of representation of the syndicate of workers in the media) in the West Bank decreased from 42.6% for the year 2022 to 41.1% for the year 2023, and at the Palestine level it reached 44.3% during the year 2022, with a varying percentage of 42.6% in the West Bank compared to 47.8% in the Gaza Strip.




3.8.9 The indicator decreased (considering that the procedures for affiliation and membership in the syndicate for media workers are acceptable and professional) in the West Bank from 51.9% for the year 2022 to 41.1% for the year 2023, and a decrease occurred at the level of Palestine from 56.0% for the year 2020 to 49.9% for the year 2022, with a varying percentage of 51.9% in the West Bank compared to 46.0% in the Gaza Strip.



3.8.10 A slight decrease in the indicator (involvement of the union body of media workers in policy-making and public directions) in the West Bank from 31.3% for the year 2022 to 30.9% for the year 2023, and a decrease in the indicator at the level of Palestine from 69.2% for the year 2020 to 32.9% during the year 2022, at a similar rate of 31.3% in the West Bank compared to 36.1% in the Gaza Strip.



3.8.11 A decrease in the indicator (the extent of the effectiveness of the union body of media workers in intervening and defending the rights of members) in the West Bank from 45.1% for the year 2022 to 39.6% for the year 2023, and a decrease at the level of Palestine from 79.1% for the year 2020 to 45.2% during the year 2022, and a similar percentage of 45.1% in the West Bank compared to 45.5% in the Gaza Strip.



## ANNEXES

### » Annex No. (1): The Percentage of Indicator by the Field and Territory during the Years 2018-2022, and 2023 in the West Bank

Legal Safeguards for Freedom of the Press	West Bank					Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
Guarantees by the Basic Law for freedom of the press.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100.0%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
The compatibility of national legislation with international conventions guaranteeing freedom of the press.	0%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Judicial guarantees in the Palestinian courts that protect freedom of the press.	41%	39%	44%	63%	48.7%	38%	67%	44%	38%	40%	48%	44%	52%
Criminalizing government officials' incitement against the media.	0%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Imposing legal restrictions on addressing ethnic and/or religious issues and/or national security.	50%	50%	50%	50%	50.0%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%
The existence of procedures and instructions that allow journalists freedom of movement during the imposition of a state of emergency and closures.			80%	50%	30.3%			38%	52%			65%	50%

The existence of a cybercrime law that has strengthened freedom of the press.			20%	28%	21.4%			25%	33%			22%	30%
Behavioral or legal rules criminalize access for workers, in the media receiving bribes to influence their work.			50%	39%	78.9%			50%	33%			50%	38%
The degree of achieving weighted points	415	344	430	412	313	438	376	383	384	406	354	413	401

Legal Restrictions on the Freedom of Press	West Bank					Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
Imposing high civil fines on journalists after they were convicted of committing the crime of slander, cuss, and defamation.	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
The number of arrests of journalists and/or media workers.	0%	0%	61%	0%	20%	40%	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%
The number of summonses for investigation against journalists and/or media workers.	0%	0%	0%	10%	30%	0%	0%	0%	70%	0%	0%	0%	0%
The number of cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers.			90%	70%	60%			80%	100%			70%	70%
The number of physical attacks against journalists and/or media workers.	80%	70%	90%	50%	10%	75%	73%	70%	80%	78%	73%	61%	30.0%
Imposing restrictions or preventing journalists from covering public events and carrying out their journalistic work.			55%	35%	33%			52%	40%			54%	37%

Confiscating and/or destroying my equipment and/or journalistic materials on the basis of my journalistic work.	78%	73%	83%	75%	60%	73%	70%	83%	66%	76%	72%	83%	72%
Opening serious investigations by official authorities into complaints submitted by media workers.	58%	61%	27%	26%	21.4%	68%	58%	14%	33%	64%	60%	23%	28%
I have been compensated by public authorities for material damage caused due to the attack on equipment.	13%	7%	39%	4%	0.0%	11%	17%	11%	0%	12%	10%	30%	3%
Punitive measures taken against people who assaulted me or one of my co-workers.	10%	30%	38%	6%	15.9%	17%	33%	25%	22%	13%	31%	34%	11%
Systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists or media owners as a result of writing and/or broadcasting materials.	100%	100%	51%	59%	52.9%	90%	100%	51%	34%	90%	100%	51%	55%
Defamation, incitement or defamation against journalists via the internet on the grounds of publishing sensitive reports.	42%	37%	58%	39%	38.1%	42%	37%	61%	40%	42%	37%	59%	39%
Taking restrictive measures by the official authority such as closing and/or blocking media outlets.	75%	0%	73%	64%	66.2%	75%	0%	69%	34%	75%	0%	72%	60%
Imposing restrictions on obtaining information and/or transferring it as a result of the state of emergency .			48%	40%	31.9%			52%	37%			49%	39%
The degree of achieving weighted points	471	477	577	411	384	446	487	476	537	463	479	485	366

Operational Independence of the Media	West Bank					Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
3.1 Licensing laws that allow the government to control the media.	54%	42%	58%	44%	31.6%	54%	52%	48%	50%	54%	46%	54%	45%
3.2 Licensing procedures that hinder the work and establishment of independent media outlets.	58%	45%	62%	40%	30.9%	56%	53%	50%	33%	57%	49%	58%	38%
3.3 The dominance of state-owned media outlets over the news and information system in the country.	72%	44%	41%	40%	38.7%	64%	50%	38%	36%	69%	46%	39%	39%
3.4 Official media outlets enjoying editorial independence and covering news from all segments of the population.	34%	35%	71%	24%	26.6%	28%	30%	66%	27%	32%	33%	69%	25%
3.5 Clarity of media ownership procedures and the opportunity to establish media outlets without political discrimination.	42%	45%	71%	47%	23.8%	56%	55%	59%	71%	47%	49%	69%	53%
3.6 Diversity of media outlets in terms of ownership and lack of concentration among specific political and/or economic trends.	67%	49%	46%	43%	45.8%	78%	66%	52%	58%	71%	56%	48%	48%
3.7 Concealment of official positions' ownership of media outlets and intentional concealment of their connection to these media outlets.	52%	54%	51%	47%	45.8%	36%	45%	45%	37%	46%	50%	49%	44%
The degree of achieving weighted points	569	447	572	410	348	559	502	513	447	565	470	552	419

The Media and Diversity of Content	West Bank					Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
4.1 The monopoly of access to information by a number of media outlets and influential people.	54%	47%	36%	34%	30.1%	50%	46%	29%	27%	53%	46%	34%	32%
4.2 The state's provision of laws that allow the concentration of monopolies and joint ownership of the media.	25%	29%	55%	56%	65.7%	25%	33%	54%	67%	25%	31%	55%	57%
4.3 The existence of a monopoly in providing Internet and/or communication services.	31%	20%	40%	56%	58.7%	44%	26%	48%	50%	36%	22%	43%	54%
4.4 Making internet use available to everyone at a low cost and good quality.	38%	22%	26%	35%	31.2%	48%	43%	36%	35%	41%	30%	29%	35%
4.5 The government uses licensing of media ownership and frequencies as a means of pressure on independent media.	44%	57%	64%	50%	50.0%	51%	47%	68%	37%	46%	53%	65%	47%
4.6 The diversity of sources, information, and content related to corruption and/or waste of public money.			50%	31%	29.6%			61%	35%			54%	32%
4.7 the degree to which different media outlets cover issues related to corruption and/or waste of public money.			34%	34%	28.3%			32%	34%			34%	34%
The degree of achieving weighted points	478	435	436	424	420	490	479	470	406	481	455	447	417

Government and Self-censorship	West Bank					Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
Imposing editorial control in the media on issues published through them.	44%	36%	58%	39%	27.9%	30%	44%	60%	38%	39%	39%	58%	39%
Refraining from publishing press materials for fear of being subjected to prosecution by public authorities.	51%	52%	73%	31%	27.2%	42%	45%	66%	27%	48%	49%	68%	30%
Publishing news on websites and having it retracted.	53%	58%	66%	48%	40.1%	48%	50%	64%	49%	51%	55%	65%	48%
Exposing journalists to family and/or social pressures on the grounds of publishing information.	51%	50%	61%	41%	36.6%	52%	38%	49%	33%	51%	45%	57%	38%
Writers and/or editors being subjected to official or societal threats on the grounds of publishing.	53%	64%	63%	41%	38.7%	48%	64%	46%	46%	51%	64%	58%	43%
The existence of blacklists of (people and/or institutions) that are prevented from appearing on various media outlets or some of them.	46%	52%	62%	36%	32.9%	40%	51%	46%	46%	44%	51%	56%	40%
Governmental regulatory procedures for publishing and/or publications that hinder freedom media.	74%	47%	60%	21%	33.3%	64%	53%	36%	8%	71%	49%	54%	18%
Using alternative symbols and words on social media sites in order to avoid blocking and/or deletion of the post by these sites.			24%	17%	13.1%			14%	14%			21%	16%
The degree of achieving weighted points	543	520	583	343	357	465	476	476	328	515	501	546	339

Financing Policies	West Bank					Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
6.1 Imposing high fees for obtaining frequencies and/or registering newspapers and/or websites.	38%	47%	43%	31%	32.5%	54%	44%	41%	25%	44%	45%	42%	30%
6.2 Imposing an added tax on the purchase of paper and/or newsprint or broadcasting equipment and other media equipment.	48%	56%	30%	27%	40.5%	42%	37%	50%	21%	46%	48%	35%	26%
6.3 The presence of restrictions on financing and/or foreign support for the media.	56%	34%	64%	24%	42.9%	42%	56%	59%	13%	51%	43%	63%	21%
6.4 Government financial support for the media in a fair manner based on market share or from the advertising market.	16%	20%	30%	16%	9.5%	14%	14%	17%	33%	15%	18%	29%	20%
6.5 Allocating budgets for government advertising in the media in a fair manner.	60%	44%	28%	13%	11.9%	58%	36%	23%	21%	59%	41%	27%	15%
6.6 Using advertisements as a means of pressure to influence editors' decisions.	57%	49%	68%	47%	50.1%	64%	66%	77%	46%	59%	56%	69%	47%
6.7 Bribery of journalists from influential actors on the news content of their media work.	90%	87%	86%	56%	56.0%	89%	86%	86%	57%	89%	86%	86%	56%
6.8 Wage levels for journalists and other media professionals are high enough to avoid bribery	29%	23%	58%	17%	11.9%	36%	28%	59%	15%	32%	25%	58%	16%

6.9 Exerting pressure on journalists by reducing salaries and/or terminating employee contracts.			57%	35%	34.0%			50%	38%			55%	36%
The degree of achieving weighted points	459	432	515	296	321	440	437	512	298	457	433	516	296

Transparency and Access to Information	West Bank					Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
7.1 The existence of a law on the right to access information.	0%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
7.2 The existence of laws and legislation that allow journalists to access information.	0%	21%	22%	31%	26.3%	25%	17%	17%	0%	10%	20%	20%	26%
7.3 The clarity of restrictions imposed on obtaining information.	47%	64%	53%	42%	39.7%	47%	53%	45%	43%	47%	60%	50%	42%
7.4 The presence of official media spokespersons who provide information to journalists smoothly and quickly.	53%	52%	62%	47%	44.0%	64%	61%	70%	53%	58%	55%	65%	49%
7.5 Allowing journalists to accompanying the security services in their field missions.	44%	43%	54%	29%	23.3%	37%	33%	44%	34%	41%	40%	51%	31%
7.6 Pressure on journalists to reveal their sources of information.	85%	71%	74%	47%	44.7%	75%	82%	76%	43%	81%	75%	74%	46%
7.7 Violation of the privacy of journalists by public authorities.			51%	42%	41.2%			50%	38%			51%	41%
7.8 The sharing of public information on various media outlets by government officials and competent authorities.			57%	36%	36.0%			42%	42%			52%	38%
The degree of achieving weighted points	458	493	467	370	365	475	483	429	317	465	490	454	365

Self-regulation and Protection of Journalists	West Bank					Gaza Strip				Palestine			
	2018	2019	2020	2022	2023	2018	2019	2020	2022	2018	2019	2020	2022
8.1 The existence of laws that allow journalists to form representative bodies (syndicates) in the media.	100%	100%	62%	41%	40.8%	100%	100%	57%	52%	100%	100%	60%	45%
8.2 Restrictions and/or dismissal of media employees against the backdrop of advertisers' protest against their journalistic work.	75%	61%	65%	41%	46.4%	75%	71%	66%	46%	75%	65%	66%	43%
8.3 Regular periodic elections in the representative bodies of media workers.	50%	36%	42%	37%	39.4%	0%	17%	31%	34%	30%	30%	37%	36%
8.4 The independence of the representative bodies of media workers from the influence of the government and political parties.	49%	55%	26%	25%	24.9%	48%	46%	30%	18%	49%	52%	27%	23%
8.5 The syndicates representing journalists are characterized by professionalism and independence in work.	43%	38%	30%	33%	22.2%	40%	36%	29%	34%	42%	37%	30%	33%
8.6 Encouraging women's access to decision-making positions in media institutions and representative institutions for journalists.	81%	75%	55%	49%	43.7%	62%	67%	53%	55%	74%	72%	54%	51%
8.7 Freedom for workers in the official media to join "representative bodies" for journalists.			48%	48%	41.5%			42%	49%			46%	48%
8.8 The degree of representation of the union body for workers in the media.			57%	43%	41.1%			60%	48%			58%	44%

8.9 Procedures for affiliation and membership to the syndicates for workers in the media are acceptable and professional.			54%	52%	41.1%			59%	46%			56%	50%
8.10 The degree of involvement of the union body for workers in the media in formulating policies and general trends.			68%	31%	30.9%			69%	36%			69%	33%
8.11 The degree of effectiveness of the syndicates of media workers in intervening and defending the rights of members.			79%	45%	39.6%			78%	45%			79%	45%
The degree of achieving weighted points	618	588	533	401	370	543	566	523	417	588	581	529	407

## » Annex No. (2): Indicators and Method of Calculation

1 Legal safeguards for freedom of the press				
No.	Question	Calculation Marks	Documentation	Sector
1.1	Guarantees by the Basic Law for freedom of the press.	(Yes=1000) (No Guarantees=0)	Review of legal provisions.	Legislations
1.2	The compatibility of national legislation with international conventions guaranteeing freedom of the press.	(Yes, significantly=1000) (Yes, partially=500) (No=0)	Review of legal provisions.	Practices
1.3	Judicial guarantees in the Palestinian courts that protect freedom of the press.	(Yes, definitely=1000) (Yes, on average=750) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=0)	Review of legal provisions.	Legislations
1.4	Criminalizing government officials' incitement against the media.	(Yes=1000) (No=0)	Review of legal provisions.	Practices
1.5	Imposing legal restrictions on addressing ethnic and/or religious issues and/or national security.	(Yes, heavily=0) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=1000)	Review of legal provisions.	Practices
1.6	The existence of procedures and instructions that allow journalists freedom of movement during the imposition of a state of emergency and closures.	(Yes, sufficiently=1000) (Yes, partially=500) (No=0)	Survey of media professionals	Legislations
1.7	The existence of a cybercrime law that has strengthened freedom of the press.	(Yes, significantly= 1000) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=0)	Survey of media professionals	Legislations
1.8	Behavioral or legal rules criminalize access for workers, in the media receiving bribes to influence their work.	(Yes=1000) (No=0)	Review of legal provisions	Legislations

2 Legal Restriction on Freedom of the Press				
No.	Question	Calculation Marks	Documentation	Sector
2.1	Imposing high civil fines on journalists after they were convicted of committing the crime of slander, cuss, and defamation.	Subtraction (10%) for each person, up to a maximum of (10 persons)	MADA report on violations.	Practices
2.2	The number of arrests of journalists and/or media workers.	Number ..... Subtraction (10%) for each person, up to a maximum of (10 people)	MADA report on violations.	Practices
2.3	The number of summonses for investigation against journalists and/or media workers.	Number ..... Subtraction (10%) for each person, up to a maximum of (10 people)	MADA report on violations.	Practices

2.4	The number of cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers.	Number ..... Subtraction (10%) for each person, up to a maximum of (10 people)	MADA report on violations.	Practices
2.5	The number of physical attacks against journalists and/or media workers.	Number ..... Subtract (10%) for each person, up to a maximum of (10 people)	MADA report on violations.	Practices
2.6	Imposing restrictions or preventing journalists from covering public events and carrying out their journalistic work.	(Yes, heavily=0) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=1000)	Survey of media professionals.	Practices
2.7	Confiscating and/or destroying my equipment and/or journalistic materials on the basis of my journalistic work.	(Yes, heavily=0) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=1000)	Survey of media professionals.	Practices
2.8	Opening serious investigations by official authorities into complaints submitted by media workers.	(Yes=1000) (No=0) Not applicable	Survey of media professionals.	Practices
2.9	I have been compensated by public authorities for material damage caused due to the attack on equipment.	(Yes=1000) (No=0) Not applicable	Survey of media professionals.	Practices
2.10	Punitive measures taken against people who assaulted me or one of my co-workers.	(Yes=1000) (No=0) Not applicable	Survey of media professionals.	Practices
2.11	Systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists or media owners as a result of writing and/or broadcasting materials.	(Yes, definitely=0) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=1000)	Review of legal provisions.	Practices
2.12	Defamation, incitement or defamation against journalists via the internet on the grounds of publishing sensitive reports.	(Yes, heavily=0) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=1000)	Survey of media professionals.	Practices
2.13	Taking restrictive measures by the official authority such as closing and/or blocking media outlets.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=1000)	Survey of media professionals.	Practices
2.14	Imposing restrictions on obtaining information and/or transferring it as a result of the state of emergency.	1. Yes, measures are taken broadly = 0 2. Yes, measures are taken narrowly = 500 3. No actions taken = 1000	Review of legal provisions.	Practices

<b>3 Operational Independence of the Media</b>				
<b>No.</b>	<b>Question</b>	<b>Calculation Marks</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Sector</b>
3.1	Licensing laws that allow the government to control the media.	(Yes, clearly=0) (Yes, unclearly=500) (No=1000)	Review of legal provisions.	Legislations

3.2	Licensing procedures that hinder the work and establishment of independent media outlets.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the managers and owners of media agencies	Practices
3.3	The dominance of state-owned media outlets over the news and information system in the country.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals, managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
3.4	Official media outlets enjoying editorial independence and covering news from all segments of the population.	(Yes, clearly=1000) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=0)	Survey for the media professionals	Practices
3.5	Clarity of media ownership procedures and the opportunity to establish media outlets without political discrimination.	(Yes, clearly=1000) (Yes, inappropriately=500) (No=0)	Survey for the managers and owners of media agencies	Legislations
3.6	Diversity of media outlets in terms of ownership and lack of concentration among specific political and/or economic trends.	(Yes, significantly=1000) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=0)	Survey for the media professionals, managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
3.7	Concealment of official positions' ownership of media outlets and intentional concealment of their connection to these media outlets.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals, managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices

4 The Media and Diversity of Content				
No.	Question	Calculation Marks	Documentation	Sector
4.1	The monopoly of access to information by a number of media outlets and influential people.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals, managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
4.2	The state's provision of laws that allow the concentration of monopolies and joint ownership of the media.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=1000)	Review of the legal provisions	Legislations
4.3	The existence of a monopoly in providing Internet and/or communication services.	(Yes, greatly=0) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals, managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
4.4	Making internet use available to everyone at a low cost and good quality.	(Yes, always=1000) (Yes, sometimes=500) (No=0)	Survey for the media professionals, managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
4.5	The government uses licensing of media ownership and frequencies as a means of pressure on independent media.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices

4.6	The diversity of sources, information, and content related to corruption and/or waste of public money.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals, managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
4.7	The degree to which different media outlets cover issues related to corruption and/or waste of public money.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals, managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices

<b>5 Government and Self-regulation</b>				
<b>No.</b>	<b>Question</b>	<b>Calculation Marks</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Sector</b>
5.1	Imposing editorial control in the media on issues published through them.	(Yes, always=0) (Yes, sometimes=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals, managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
5.2	Refraining from publishing press materials for fear of being subjected to prosecution by public authorities.	(Yes, always=0) (Yes, sometimes=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals, managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
5.3	Publishing news on websites and having it retracted.	(Yes, always=0) (Yes, sometimes=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals, managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
5.4	Exposing journalists to family and/or social pressures on the grounds of publishing information.	(Yes, always=0) (Yes, sometimes=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
5.5	Writers and/or editors being subjected to official or societal threats on the grounds of publishing.	(Yes, always=0) (Yes, sometimes=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals, managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
5.6	The existence of blacklists of (people and/or institutions) that are prevented from appearing on various media outlets or some of them.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals, managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
5.7	Governmental regulatory procedures for publishing and/or publications that hinder freedom media.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
5.8	Using alternative symbols and words on social media sites in order to avoid blocking and/or deletion of the post by these sites.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices

6	Financing Policies			
No.	Question	Calculation Marks	Documentation	Sector
6.1	Imposing high fees for obtaining frequencies and/or registering newspapers and/or websites.	(Yes, always=0) (Yes, sometimes=500) (No=1000)	Managers and owners of media agencies.	Legislations
6.2	Imposing an added tax on the purchase of paper and/or newsprint or broadcasting equipment and other media equipment.	(Yes, always=0) (Yes, sometimes=500) (No=1000)	Managers and owners of media agencies.	Legislations
6.3	The presence of restrictions on financing and/or foreign support for the media.	(Yes, always=0) (Yes, sometimes=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the managers and owners of media agencies.	Legislations
6.4	Government financial support for the media in a fair manner based on market share or from the advertising market.	(Yes, always=0) (Yes, sometimes=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
6.5	Allocating budgets for government advertising in the media in a fair manner.	(Yes, always=0) (Yes, sometimes=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
6.6	6.6 Using advertisements as a means of pressure to influence editors' decisions.	(Yes, always=0) (Yes, sometimes=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the managers and owners of media agencies.	Practices
6.7	Bribery of journalists from influential actors on the news content of their media work.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices
6.8	Wage levels for journalists and other media professionals are high enough to avoid bribery	(Yes, appropriately=1000) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=0)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices
6.9	Exerting pressure on journalists by reducing salaries and/or terminating employee contracts.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, limitedly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices

7	Transparency and Access to Information			
No.	Question	Calculation Marks	Documentation	Sector
7.1	The existence of a law on the right to access information.	(Yes=1000) (No=0)	Review of legal provisions.	Legislations
7.2	The existence of laws and legislation that allow journalists to access information.	(Yes, effectively=1000) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=0)	Review of legal provisions.	Practices
7.3	The clarity of restrictions imposed on obtaining information.	(Yes, clearly=1000) (Yes, unclearly=500) (No=0)	Survey for the media professionals.	Legislation

7.4	The presence of official media spokespersons who provide information to journalists smoothly and quickly.	(Yes, significantly=1000) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=0)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices
7.5	Allowing journalists to accompany the security services in their field missions.	(Yes, always=1000) (Yes, sometimes=500) (No=0)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices
7.6	Pressure on journalists to reveal their sources of information.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices
7.7	Violation of the privacy of journalists by public authorities.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices
7.8	The sharing of public information on various media outlets by government officials and competent authorities.	(Yes, significantly=1000) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=0)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices

8 Self-regulation and Protection of Journalists				
No.	Question	Calculation Marks	Documentation	Sector
8.1	The existence of laws that allow journalists to form representative bodies (syndicates) in the media.	(Yes=1000) (No=0)	Review of legal provisions. Survey for the media professionals.	Legislations
8.2	Restrictions and/or dismissal of media employees against the backdrop of advertisers' protest against their journalistic work.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices
8.3	Regular periodic elections in the representative bodies of media workers.	(Takes place regularly as scheduled=1000) (Takes place irregularly with short delay=750) (take place irregularly with considerable delay=500) (Does not take place=0)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices
8.4	The independence of the representative bodies of media workers from the influence of the government and political parties.	(Yes, completely=1000) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=0)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices
8.5	The syndicates representing journalists are characterized by professionalism and independence in work.	(Yes, significantly=1000) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=0)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices

8.6	Encouraging women's access to decision-making positions in media institutions and representative institutions for journalists.	(Yes, significantly=0) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=1000)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices
8.7	Freedom for workers in the official media to join "representative bodies" for journalists.	(Yes, clearly=1000) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=0)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices
8.8	The degree of representation of the union body for workers in the media.	(High=1000) (Low=500) (None=0)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices
8.9	Procedures for affiliation and membership to the syndicates for workers in the media are acceptable and professional.	(Yes, clearly=1000) (Yes, poorly=500) (No=0)	Survey for the media professionals.	Legislations
8.10	The degree of involvement of the union body for workers in the media in formulating policies and general trends.	(High=1000) (Low=500) (None=0)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices
8.11	The degree of effectiveness of the syndicates of media workers in intervening and defending the rights of members.	(High=1000) (Low=500) (None=0)	Survey for the media professionals.	Practices

## » Questionnaire No. (1): Targeting Media Professionals

Dear Respondent:

The Palestinian Center for Media Freedoms & Development (MADA) is working on developing indicators for measuring freedom of the press in Palestine. We would highly appreciate your assistance in producing the findings of this research on “Press Freedom Index in Palestine for 2023”, to be used to measure the level of progress and decline of freedom of the press in Palestine, by answering the questions subjectively. Thank you for your time.

Questionnaire Serial No.:

No.	Question	Options
GOV	Governorate	1. Jenin 2. Tubas and Northern Jordan Valley 3. Nablus 4. Tulkarm 5. Qalqilya 6. Salfit 7. Ramallah and Al-Bireh 8. Jericho and Mid-Jordan Valley 9. Jerusalem 10. Bethlehem 11. Hebron
Q1	Sex	1. Male 2. Female
Q2	Age	
Q3	Place of Residence	1. City 2. Village/Town 3. Camp
Q4	Marital Status	1. Single 2. Married 3. Divorced 4. Widower/widow 5. Separated
Q5	Education Status	1. High School 2. Intermediate Diploma 3. Bachelor 4. Masters 5. PhD
Q6	Place of Work	1. Foreign Institution 2. Official Media 3. Non-Official Media 4. Arabic Institution 5. Freelance Journalist
Q7	The major media outlet you work for	1. Written 2. Audible 3. Visual 4. Electronic
Q8	No. of working years in this field	

1 Legal Safeguards for Freedom of the Press		
No.	Question	Options
1.6	Does the existence of procedures and instructions allow journalists to move freely during the imposition of a state of emergency and closures?	Yes, sufficiently
		Yes, partially
		No
1.7	Does the existence of cybercrime law promote freedom of the press?	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
2 Legal Restrictions on Freedom of the Press		
No.	Question	Options
2.7	Through your follow-up, did you notice that restrictions were imposed or prevented from covering public events for journalists and carrying out their journalistic work?	1. Yes, significantly
		2. Yes, limitedly
		3. No

2.6	I or one of my colleagues was subjected to the confiscation and/or destruction of my press equipment and/or materials as a result of my journalistic work.	1. Yes, significantly
		2. Yes, limitedly
		3. No
2.8	The official authorities have opened serious investigations in the complaints filed by media professionals.	Yes
		No
		Not applicable
2.9	I was compensated by the public authorities for the physical damage caused to my equipment.	Yes
		No
		Not applicable
2.10	I was told by the official authorities that punitive measures have been taken against the persons who attacked me or one of my colleagues.	Yes
		No
		Not applicable
2.13	From my observation, I noticed excessive and arbitrary defamation, incitement, or slander against journalists on the Internet, due to publishing sensitive reports.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
2.15	From my observation to the media outlets and agencies, I noticed that restrictions are imposed on access and/or transfer of information due to the state of emergency.	1. Yes, broadly
		2. Yes, limitedly
		3. No
<b>3</b>	<b>Operational Independence of the Media</b>	
No.	Question	Options
3.2	Through my media work, I find the licensing procedures an impediment to the operation and establishment of independent media outlets and agencies.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
3.3	As I observed the performance of the media, I noticed the domination of the state-owned media over the information and news system in the country.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
3.4	Do the official media outlets enjoy editorial independence and coverage of news for all groups of people.	Yes, clearly
		Yes, poorly
		No
3.6	There is diversity in the ownership of media outlets rather than its concentration with specific politically and/or economically influential figures.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
3.7	There is the intentional concealment of media ownership by official figures as well as of their association with the same.	1. Yes, significantly
		2. Yes, limitedly
		3. No
<b>4</b>	<b>The Media and Diversity of Content</b>	
No.	Question	Options

4.1	Is there a monopoly over access to information by a number of media outlets and people with power?	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
4.3	I believe there is monopoly in providing the services of internet and/or telecommunication	Yes, largely
		Yes, limitedly
		No
4.4	I can use the internet at low cost and adequate quality.	Yes, always
		Yes, sometimes
		No
4.6	Through my media work, there is a diversity of sources, information, and content	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
4.7	By observing the performance of the media, I noticed that the various media outlets cover issues related to corruption and/or squandering of public money.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
<b>5</b>	<b>Government and Self-Censorship</b>	
No.	Question	Options
5.1	In the media agency I work for, the editor imposes internal editorial control on the published issues.	Yes, always
		Yes, sometimes
		No
5.2	The media agency I work for abstained from preparing or publishing press content for fear of being prosecuted.	Yes, always
		Yes, sometimes
		No
5.3	In my work, I noticed that sometimes news is published on websites and then taken down.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
5.4	Through my media work, I have seen journalists under family and/or social pressure to publish specific information.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
5.5	Through my media work, I have seen authors and/or editors being subject to official or social threats on the background of publication.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
5.6	Through my media work, I have seen blacklists of (persons and/or institutions) prohibited from appearing on different media outlets, or some thereof.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
5.8	Using symbols and alternative words throughout social media to avoid being blocked and/or deleting the posts.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No

<b>6</b>	<b>Financing Policies</b>	
No.	Question	Options
6.7	Through my media work, I have seen journalists getting bribes from actors to influence their news content and media work.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
6.8	Are the levels of wages of journalists and other media professionals adequate enough to avoid bribes.	Yes, appropriately
		Yes, limitedly
		No
6.9	Have you, or any of your coworkers at the institution you work for, had your salary reduced and/or suspended	Yes, significantly
		Yes, limitedly
		No
<b>7</b>	<b>Transparency and Access to Information</b>	
No.	Question	Options
7.3	In practice, there are clear restrictions imposed on access to information.	Yes, clearly
		Yes, unclearly
		No
7.4	The existence of official media spokespersons has contributed to providing information to journalists smoothly and rapidly.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
7.5	Through my media work, I noticed that journalists are allowed to accompany the security services in field missions.	Yes, always
		Yes, sometimes
		No
7.6	I was subject to direct or indirect pressure to disclose information resources I obtained or published.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
7.7	I believe the private life of journalists is invaded by the public authorities.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
7.8	There is public information sharing on various media outlets by government officials and competent authorities.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
<b>8</b>	<b>Union Bodies Representing Journalists</b>	
No.	Question	Options
8.1	There are laws that allow journalists to form representative bodies (syndicates) for the media outlet.	Yes
		No
8.2	Through my media work, I have noticed that media personnel are dismissed on the background of protesting against their press work by advertisers.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No

8.3	The frequency of elections within the representative bodies of media outlets.	Regularly, on schedule
		Irregularly, with short delay
		Irregularly, with considerable delay
		Not at all
8.4	The representative bodies of the media professionals are autonomous from the influence of the government and political parties.	Yes, completely
		Yes, poorly
		No
8.5	I think the union body representing journalists is professional and independent.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
8.6	Women are encouraged to access decision-making positions in media organizations and representative institutions of journalists.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
8.7	Official media professionals are free to join "representative bodies" for journalists.	Yes, clearly
		Yes, poorly
		No
8.8	The degree of representation of the trade union body of media professionals.	High
		Low
		None
8.9	The procedures for affiliation and membership in the union body for media professionals are acceptable and professional.	Yes, significantly
		Yes, poorly
		No
8.10	The degree of involvement of the trade union body for media professionals in developing public policies and orientations.	High
		Low
		None
8.11	The degree of effectiveness of the trade union body for media professionals in intervention and defending the rights of its affiliates.	High
		Poor
		None

## » Questionnaire No. (2): Targeting Managers and Owners of Media Agencies

Dear Respondent:

The Palestinian Center for Media Freedoms & Development (MADA) is working on developing indicators for measuring freedom of the press in Palestine. We would highly appreciate your assistance so we can produce the findings of this research on “Press Freedom Index in Palestine for 2023”, to be used to measure the progress and regression that is taking place at the level of press freedom in the country, by answering the questions with complete objectivity. Thank you for your time.

Questionnaire Serial No.:

No.	Question	Options
GOV	Governorate	1. Jenin 2. Tubas and Northern Jordan Valley 3. Nablus 4. Tulkarm 5. Qalqilya 6. Salfit 7. Ramallah and Al-Bireh 8. Jericho and Mid-Jordan Valley 9. Jerusalem 10. Bethlehem 11. Hebron
Q1	Sex	1. Male 2. Female
Q2	Age	
Q3	Place of Residence	1. City 2. Village/Town 3. Camp
Q4	Marital Status	1. Single 2. Married 3. Divorced 4. Widower/widow 5. Separated
Q5	Education Status	1. High School 2. Intermediate Diploma 3. Bachelor 4. Masters 5. PhD
Q6	Place of Work	1. Foreign Institution 2. Official Media 3. Non-Official Media 4. Arabic Institution 5. Freelance Journalist
Q7	The major media outlet you work for	1. Written 2. Audible 3. Visual 4. Electronic
Q8	No. of working years in this field	

3 Operational Independence of the Media		
No.	Question	Options
3.2	Through my media work, I find the licensing procedures an impediment to the operation and establishment of independent media.	Yes, significantly Yes, limitedly No I do not know
3.3	From my observation of the performance of media outlets, I noticed the domination of state-owned media on the news and information system in the country.	Yes, significantly Yes, limitedly No
3.5	The procedures of media ownership are clear and there is a chance to establish media agencies without political discrimination.	1. Yes, clearly 2. Yes, inappropriately 3. No clarity
3.6	The media is diverse in terms of ownership and non-concentration on specific political and/or economic orientations.	Yes, significantly Yes, limitedly No

3.7	There is intentional the intentional concealment of media ownership by official figures as well as of their association with the same	Yes, significantly Yes, limitedly No
<b>4</b>	<b>The Media and Diversity of Content</b>	
No.	Question	Options
4.1	Is there a monopoly over access to information by a number of media outlets and people with power?	Yes, significantly Yes, poorly No
4.3	I believe there is a monopoly in providing the services of internet and/or telecommunication.	Yes, significantly Yes, limitedly No
4.4	I can use the internet at low cost and adequate quality.	Yes, always Yes, sometimes No
4.5	The government uses the licensing of ownership of media and frequencies as leverage against the independent media outlets.	Yes, significantly Yes, poorly No
4.6	Through my media work, I noticed the diversity in resources, information and content.	Yes, significantly Yes, poorly No
4.7	By observing the performance of the media, I noticed that the various media outlets cover issues related to corruption and/or squandering of public money.	Yes, significantly Yes, limitedly No
<b>5</b>	<b>Government and Self- Censorship</b>	
No.	Question	Options
5.1	In the media agency I work for, the editor imposes internal editorial censorship on the published issues.	Yes, always Yes, sometimes No
5.2	The media agency I work for abstained from preparing or publishing press content for fear of being prosecuted.	Yes, always Yes, sometimes No
5.3	Through my media work, I noticed that sometimes news is published on websites and then taken down.	Yes, significantly Yes, limitedly No
5.4	Through my media work, I have seen journalists under family and/or social pressure for publishing specific information.	Yes, significantly Yes, limitedly No
5.5	Through my media work, I have seen authors and/or editors being subject to official or social threat on the background of publication.	Yes, significantly Yes, limitedly No
5.z	Through my media work, I have seen blacklists of (persons and/or institutions) prohibited to appear on different media outlets, or some thereof.	Yes, significantly Yes, poorly No
5.7	The government censorship procedures for publication and/or print constitute an impediment to freedom of the media.	Yes, significantly Yes, poorly No

<b>6 Financing Policies</b>		
No.	Question	Options
6.1	Imposing high fees to receive frequencies and/or register newspapers and/or websites.	Yes, always Yes, sometimes No
6.2	Imposing an added value tax on the purchase of paper and/or newsprint or broadcast equipment and other media equipment.	Yes, always Yes, sometimes No
6.3	Imposing restrictions on the foreign funding and/or the support provided to the media.	Yes, always Yes, sometimes No
6.4	Equitable government financial support for the media outlets based on the market share or advertising market.	Yes, always Yes, sometimes No
6.5	Allocating budgets for government advertisements in the media in a fair manner.	Yes, always Yes, sometimes No
6.6	Using advertisements as leverage to influence the decisions of editors.	Yes, always Yes, sometimes No
6.9	Have you or any of your coworkers in the institution you work for had your salary reduced and/or suspended.	Yes, significantly Yes, limitedly No
<b>7 Transparency and Access to Information</b>		
No.	Question	Options
7.3	In practice, there are clear restrictions imposed on the access to information.	Yes, clearly Yes, unclearly No

## » Questionnaire No. (3): Targeting Institutions Concerned with Freedom of the Press

Dear Respondent:

The Palestinian Center for Media Freedoms & Development (MADA) is working on developing indicators for measuring freedom of the press in Palestine.

We would highly appreciate your assistance so we can produce the findings of this research on “Press Freedom Index in Palestine 2023”, to be used to measure the progress and regression taking place at the level of freedom of the press in the country, by answering the questions with complete objectivity. Thank you for your time.

Name of the Institution/Person Investigated:

Name of the Subject

Researcher’s Job Title:

phone number:

Email:

Researcher’s Name:

No.	Question	Options/Answers
1.1	Guarantees by the Basic Law for freedom of the press.	1. .... 2. .... 3. ....
1.2	The compatibility of national legislation with international conventions guaranteeing freedom of the press.	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, partially 3. Not applicable
1.3	Judicial guarantees in the Palestinian courts that protect freedom of the press.	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, poorly 3. Not available
1.4	Criminalizing government officials’ incitement against the media.	1. .... 2. .... 3. ....
1.5	Imposing legal restrictions on addressing ethnic and/or religious issues and/or national security.	1. .... 2. .... 3. ....
1.8	Guarantees by the Basic Law for freedom of the press.	1. Yes 2. No
2.1	Imposing high civil fines on journalists after they were convicted of committing the crime of slander, cuss, and defamation.	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, poorly 3. Not applicable
2.2	The number of arrests of journalists and/or media workers.	No. – MADA: .....
2.3	The number of summonses for investigation against journalists and/or media workers.	No. – MADA: .....

2.4	The number of cases of torture against journalists and/or media workers.	No. – MADA: .....
2.5	The number of physical attacks against journalists and/or media workers.	No. – MADA: .....
2.11	Systematic prosecution or imprisonment of journalists or media owners as a result of writing and/or broadcasting materials.	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, limitedly 3. None
2.13	From my observation, I noticed excessive and arbitrary defamation, incitement, or slander against journalists on the Internet, due to publishing sensitive reports.	Yes, take measures on a large scale Yes, take action narrowly No actions were taken
3.1	Licensing laws that allow the government to control the media.	1. .... 2. .... 3. ....
4.2	The state's provision of laws that allow the concentration of monopolies and joint ownership of the media.	1. Yes, significantly 2. Yes, poorly 3. Not applicable
7.1	The existence of a law on the right to access information.	1. Yes 2. Not applicable 3. I Do not know
7.2	The existence of laws and legislation that allow journalists to access information.	1. Yes, effectively 2. Yes, poorly 3. Not applicable
8.1	There are laws that allow journalists to form representative bodies (syndicates) for the media outlet.	1. Yes 2. No 3. I do not know